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5Abstract
This thesis investigates self-face recognition and the plasticity of
self-representations through several different behavioural and brain
stimulation manipulations. The experiments in Chapters 3 and 4 explore the
involvement of the temporoparietal area in self-other discrimination processes.
Using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to modulate neural
excitability in this region, the experiments in these chapters explore self-other
face discrimination and mental body rotation. Enhancing neural excitability
in this area appears to enhance familiar other-recognition and the ability to
take another’s spatial perspective. Chapters 5 and 6 target brain areas
associated with multisensory bodily illusions with tDCS, and investigate their
involvement in self-updating. Chapter 5 explores the contribution of the
intraparietal sulcus to multisensory integration during the Enfacement
illusion. Chapter 6 investigates the effect of tDCS on somatosensory cortex
during a modified enfacement illusion paradigm to investigate self-updating.
Chapters 7 and 8 explore the novel use of a self-association paradigm to
update bodily and conceptual aspects of self. The experiments in these
chapters demonstrate that a previously unfamiliar face can be incorporated
into the conceptual self-representation. Chapter 7 investigates the existence of
a bidirectional modulatory link between conceptual and bodily aspects of self,
and found that changes to the conceptual self did not have an effect on the
bodily self-representation. The experiment in Chapter 8 investigates the
nature of the association created between the self-representation and the novel
face in Chapter 7 by testing whether the newly associated face affects
recognition of well-established perceptual and conceptual aspects of self.
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1 Introduction
This thesis will investigate the cognitive and neural mechanisms supporting
self-face recognition. The current chapter will start with a review of face percep-
tion literature, followed by a review of the literature on self-face processing in
an attempt to answer the question of whether the self-face is special. The next
sections will outline the key processes involved in self-face recognition, and re-
view developmental, behavioural, neurostimulation and neuroimaging research
to give an overview of the cognitive and neural mechanisms underpinning the
ability to acquire, maintain and update a mental representation of one’s own
face.
1.1 The Self in Psychology
The self has often been regarded as ‘special’, with processing of self-relevant
information being thought of as distinct from the processing of non-self-related
information (Kircher et al., 2000). With the use of modern research techniques
such as neuroimaging and brain stimulation, the study of the self has now
started to be grounded in the brain, and research can investigate whether the
self is distinct at a neural level. The study of the self is often divided into two
complementary streams of research. These are the study of the conceptual-self,
reflecting memory-based knowledge constituting varied semantic and episodic
information about the self, and the bodily-, or physical-self, reflecting the study
of visual, sensory, and proprioceptive representations of one’s face and body.
Body-ownership: the sense of one’s body as belonging to the self and existing
as an entity distinct from the bodies of others, and the sense of agency: as
being the agent of one’s actions, combine to form a minimal, bodily, sense of
self (Tsakiris, 2010). This bodily sense of the self, along with the ability for
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kinaesthetic-visual matching, has been argued to form the basis for explicit
mirror self-face recognition (Mitchell, 1997). Self-face recognition is the ability
to represent the visual properties of one’s own face as distinct from the faces
of others, and consequently to recognise that the face you see in the mirror
belongs to you. Self-face recognition, and the awareness of the physical self
as distinct from others around us, appears to be critically important for the
development of self-awareness and an abstract, conceptual sense of self (Rochat,
1995), preceding an awareness of the self as a social being among others, and the
identification with one’s public appearance (Zahavi & Roepstorff, 2011). In this
light, self-face recognition can be seen as critical for the development of social
cognitive abilities, providing the basis for social interaction. This thesis will
investigate the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underpin some of the key
processes involved in self-face recognition, and by extension, the representation
of the physical self.
1.2 Face Perception in General: How are faces unique?
The human face-recognition system represents one of the most highly ad-
vanced skill sets in human perception. Faces are the most unique aspect of an
individual, facilitating recognition above and beyond other distinctive features
such as voice, hair style, and body shape. Prosopagnosia, the loss of the ability
to recognise individuals from their faces, has a severe impact on the lives of
those living with the disorder, demonstrating how vital this skill is (Yardley,
McDermott, Pisarski, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008). Faces also provide im-
portant cues for the recognition of other types of social information, such as
emotion and speech comprehension. Not only can the human face-recognition
system draw on invariant information in order to identify individuals from their
facial features alone, changeable aspects of faces such as expression and gaze
direction also provide vital information for social communication between indi-
viduals (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). It is unsurprising, therefore, that
from a very early age infants show a preference for faces over any other object
(Farroni et al., 2005; Morton & Johnson, 1991; Sanefuji et al., 2011), and that
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this preference remains present throughout the lifespan (Haxby et al., 2000).
Arguably no other visually perceived aspect of a person provides such a rich
and varied source of information.
Because of the social importance of faces, it has been suggested that faces
may be ‘special’ stimuli, and that areas of the brain may have become spe-
cialised for the function of facial recognition. In favour of the domain-specificity
hypothesis, several researchers have argued that what sets face perception apart
from object recognition is the importance of configural information in the vi-
sual representation of faces (Carey & Diamond, 1977; Diamond & Carey, 1986;
Rhodes, 2013). These authors argue that second-order features - the spatial
relationships between the individual, first-order, features of the face (e.g. nose,
eyes, mouth) - are especially important in face recognition, and that this re-
liance on configural processing is unique to faces, making them special relative
to non-face objects.
If this is the case, then the recognition of faces should be particularly dis-
rupted by manipulations that change the configuration of features, or affect
configural processing. One such manipulation tested participants’ recognition
of individual facial features (e.g. nose, eyes) when they were presented in novel
configurations (Tanaka & Sengco, 1997). At the beginning of the experiment
participants were presented with novel faces to learn. Following the learning
phase, participants were shown individual facial features of the learned faces
in one of three different configurations: 1) in isolation, 2) in a new face con-
figuration, 3) in the original face configuration. Recognition of features was
best in the original configuration, followed by the new configuration, and was
poorest in isolation. The findings suggested that participants were not repre-
senting the first-order features of each face in isolation, but rather holistically:
relative to other features within the face. Critically, recognition of the features
of non-face stimuli such as houses was not affected by configuration alterations,
suggesting that participants represented the first-order features of these stimuli
in isolation.
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The stimuli inversion paradigm has also been used to highlight the im-
portance of configural processing for face-recognition. Inversion of a stimulus
impairs configural processing, and so recognition of faces should be dispro-
portionally affected by inversion relative to other classes of visual stimuli. In
(1969), Yin showed that identity-recognition of faces is heavily impaired when
faces are inverted, as opposed to presented upright. Critically, no effect of the
manipulation was found for non-face objects, in which recognition performance
was comparable regardless of orientation (Yin, 1969). The finding that faces
are disproportionally affected by rotation has been replicated by a number of
studies (Scapinello & Yarmey, 1970; Yarmey, 1971).
The findings that face-recognition is disproportionally affected by manip-
ulations of configuration and configural processing have been used to support
the idea that face-processing is qualitatively different to the processing of other
classes of visual stimuli. As well as qualitative differences, face-processing can
also be thought of as special in terms of having specialised networks within the
brain developed specifically to process human faces. The most compelling evi-
dence for a dissociation between face and object processing in the brain comes
from research into prosopagnosia.
Prosopagnosics suffer from an selective inability to recognise faces, while
showing no impairment in object-recognition (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2005;
Riddoch, Johnston, Bracewell, Boutsen, & Humphreys, 2008). The opposite
deficit has also been researched: following traumatic brain injury patient CK
presented with a specific deficit in object-recognition, but his ability to recognise
faces remained intact (Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997). This double
dissociation suggests that different neural mechanisms underlie the recogni-
tion of faces and non-face objects. In line with this, neuroimaging research
has identified face-selective regions in the human brain. Separate areas within
the ventral visual cortex, right extrastriate cortex and fusiform gyrus appear
to be involved in the process of face versus object recognition (Gauthier et
al., 2000; Gauthier, Anderson, Tarr, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1997; Grill-Spector,
Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004; Haxby et al., 1991, 1994; Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin,
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Schouten, & Haxby, 1999; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; McCarthy,
Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997; Puce, Allison, Asgari, Gore, & McCarthy, 1996;
Sergent, Ohta, & Macdonald, 1992). Put together, these findings suggest that
different cognitive processes, supported by distinct neural regions, underpin the
recognition of faces and non-face objects.
On the other hand, it has also been speculated that what may seem to make
faces special is not something unique about faces, but rather reflects expertise
and familiarity with human faces – the expertise hypothesis. In support of this,
Diamond and Carey (1986) showed that, for participants with expertise in a
particular dog breed, recognition of individual dogs of that breed was just as
sensitive to inversion as was recognition of human faces. Diamond and Carey
(1986) suggest that faces are not special in terms of their reliance on configural
processing. They argue that, for other classes of object that: 1) share the same
basic configuration, and 2) individuals of that class can be recognised on the
basis of their second order relational features, one can become an expert and
exploit those features to distinguish between individuals of that class in the
same way as one distinguishes between faces. In support of this, Gauthier and
Tarr (1997) trained participants to become experts in a novel class of objects
(‘greebles’), and showed that recognition of individual ‘greeble’ features was
sensitive to configural manipulations, just as the recognition of human faces
is. This suggests that faces are not special in terms of having distinguishing
features that are particularly sensitive to inversion, and a review of research on
the face-inversion effect concluded that the effect of inversion on face-recognition
does not provide evidence for the existence of a specialised process for face-
recognition (Valentine, 1988). Rather, this evidence would suggest that what
may make faces ‘special’ is the fact that they represent a class of visual stimuli
in which the majority of humans are experts (above and beyond any other class
of objects).
In support of this, Bornstein, Sroka, and Munitz (1969) showed that prosopag-
nosics who formally had expertise with particular animals lost the ability to
distinguish between individuals of that species at the same time that they lost
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the ability to recognise faces. Prosopagnosics have also been shown to have
difficulty recognising unique members of a class of visual stimuli that share
similarity in shape and configuration (e.g. cars, certain animals) (Damasio,
Damasio, & Van Hoesen, 1982). Furthermore, expertise with a particular class
of visual object is associated with recruitment of brain areas involved in face
recognition, specifically the fusiform face area (FFA) and right occipital face
area (Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000; Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson,
Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999), suggesting that it is the level of expertise with an ob-
ject class that determines the recruitment of FFA, rather than a specialisation
of the FFA for faces.
However, evidence in favour of the expertise hypothesis remains inconclu-
sive. Three neuroimaging studies of expertise in the recruitment of FFA for
non-face objects reported no effects for objects of expertise (Grill-Spector et
al., 2004; Op de Beeck, Baker, DiCarlo, & Kanwisher, 2006; Yue, Tjan, &
Biederman, 2006), and an attempt to replicate previous behavioural findings
supporting the expertise hypothesis in dog experts failed to show configural
‘face-like’ processing for the dog stimuli (Robbins & McKone, 2007). Further-
more, a review of the face-processing literature covering behavioural and neuro-
logical research concluded that evidence strongly supported the domain speci-
ficity hypothesis of face- and object-recognition, rather than expertise (McKone,
Kanwisher, & Duchaine, 2007).
1.3 Is the Self-Face Special?
Beyond the question of whether faces represent special stimuli in the visual
processing system, is the idea that recognition of the self-face may be a unique
process distinct from the recognition of other faces. Certainly the experiential
nature of looking at one’s own face is intuitively different than that of recog-
nising the face of any other person, but does this reflect distinct cognitive and
neural mechanisms involved in processing of the self-face relative to other faces?
Behavioural research suggests that this may be the case.
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There is a large body of research indicating that the self-face is processed
differently to other faces. Firstly, there appears to be a distinct behavioural
advantage for the processing of the self-face over the faces of others. Tong and
Nakayama (1999) found that the self-face was identified faster among an array
of distractor faces than a stranger’s face, and this temporal advantage for the
self-face persisted even when the faces were presented at different viewing an-
gles (front, three-quarters and profile views), or inverted. However, Tong and
Nakayama (1999) did not think that this pointed to the self-face as ‘special’,
but rather that the self-bias in face processing reflected the robust representa-
tion of the self-face as an overlearned stimulus, and that a similar processing
advantage would be evident for other highly familiar faces due to extensive
visual exposure leading to more efficient processing. However, evidence from
Keenan et al. (1999) disputes this viewpoint. Keenan et al. (1999) compared
explicit identity discrimination responses to the self, highly familiar (friend or
co-worker), and unfamiliar (stranger) faces. Faces were presented in both up-
right and inverted orientations, and across both orientations, responses to the
self-face were significantly faster relative to all non-self faces. Despite the friend
or co-worker faces being highly familiar to the participant, a self-face advan-
tage was still observed, suggesting that the advantage for self-faces cannot be
explained purely by familiarity.
The self-face advantage is not only evident in explicit tests of identity dis-
crimination, but also in implicit face-recognition tasks where participants make
judgements about the orientation of a face. Sui and Han (2007) found that
participants responded faster when judging the orientation of their own face,
relative to a familiar other’s face. This highlights a self-face bias in not only
identity discrimination, but also perceptual processing of facial features. These
findings suggest that there is something special about the way the self-face is
processed compared to other faces - both highly familiar and unfamiliar - that
leads to behavioural advantages in the identification and recognition process.
There is evidence to suggest that individuals rely on different types of in-
formation when processing their own face relative to familiar others. Bre´dart
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(2003) showed participants pairs of images of their own face, or a colleague’s.
One photo in each pair was mirror reversed, while the other was an original.
For the self-face, participants indicated which image showed their face as they
see it in the mirror, and, for their colleague’s, which one was a better likeness.
The majority of participants were able to correctly identify both the true im-
ages, but their decision making process was different depending on the identity
of the face. Participants reported relying more on asymmetric facial features
to identify their own mirror image than their colleague’s face, and the use of
this strategy also predicted higher accuracy during self-recognition. The results
suggest that individuals do not rely on the same type of information when iden-
tifying images of the self and images of familiar faces, suggesting that different
cognitive processes may be engaged in both types of face-recognition.
Research into categorical perception effects can shed light on the potential
processing differences between the self-face and other faces. Categorical per-
ception refers to the way in which particular stimuli are discriminated by the
brain, simplifying what would be a large number of stimuli into fewer, distinct
categories. Categorical perception in faces can be observed by the abrupt tran-
sition in face identity that is perceived along a morphing continuum between a
pair of familiar faces. Photos along the continuum will be clearly perceived as
either one of the known identities. What makes the self-face special, however,
is that categorical perception of the self-face is possible under conditions in
which categorical perception of other familiar-faces is eliminated. Keyes (2012)
showed that categorical perception of highly familiar face morphs was impaired
when the faces were presented upside-down. For the self-face, however, cater-
gorical perception effects persisted even when the stimuli were inverted. This
suggests that categorical perception of familiar faces is linked with configural
processing, which was impaired when the faces were inverted. The lack of an
impairment for the inverted self-face suggests that categorical perception of the
self-face is supported by both configural and featural processing. This suggests
that self-face representations contain strong configural and featural elements.
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In summary, converging evidence suggests that self-face recognition is un-
derpinned by distinct cognitive processes, setting it apart from the recognition
of other faces. The next sections of this Chapter will focus on understanding
the cognitive and neural mechanisms that support self-face recognition.
1.4 Understanding the Mechanisms of Self-Face Recog-
nition
Understanding self-face recognition is not as simple as understanding the
differences in perceptual processing between the self-face and other faces. In the
investigation of self-face recognition, it is critical to address the question of the
mechanisms involved in the initial acquisition of a mental representation of the
self-face, assuming that infants are not born with an innate knowledge of their
physical appearance. Along similar lines, it is also important to understand
the mechanism involved in updating the mental self-face representation as an
individual’s physical appearance changes over time. Accordingly, Tajadura-
Jime´nez, Longo, Coleman, and Tsakiris (2012) suggested that the study of
self-recognition should distinguish between three key processes:
1. Self-identification: The process by which an infant comes to acquire a
representation of their own face through matching their own sensorimotor
signals with those they observe in the mirror and identifying with their
reflection.
2. Self-recognition: The process by which a stored mental representation of
the self-face is maintained, allowing for diachronic recognition of one’s
own face.
3. Self-updating: The process by which the stored mental representation
of the self-face is updated to reflect changes in an individual’s physical
appearance.
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The following three sections of this Chapter will explore the three pro-
cesses of self-face recognition (i.e. self-identification, self-recognition and self-
updating). Starting with the question of self-identification, the next section
will review the developmental trajectory of self-face recognition. Following
this, the use of multisensory body illusions for studying self-identification and
self-updating will be discussed. Finally, the process of self-recognition will be
explored in a review of the neural correlates of self-face recognition.
1.5 The Development of a Self-Face Representation:
An Implicit Self-Other Distinction from Birth?
Recognising an image of one’s face requires a comparison between an ex-
ternal stimulus and an internal, mental representation of the self-face, but how
is this mental representation initially acquired? Converging evidence suggests
that the process of self-identification may rely on an innate sensitivity to mul-
tisensory contingency. From a very young age, infants show a sensitivity to the
contingency between their own actions and the sensory outcomes of those ac-
tions. From 24 hours of age, infants more often turn towards touch received on
their cheek when the touch is administered by an experimenter, compared with
self-stimulation (spontaneously touching their own cheek) (Rochat & Hespos,
1997), suggesting that from birth infants are able to distinguish between self-
produced and external tactile stimulation. Ten-week-old infants also display a
sensitivity to contingency between their leg movements and the movements of
a mobile hanging above them, showing significantly more leg kicking when the
mobile moves as a result of their leg movements than when the mobile is ma-
nipulated by an experimenter (Rovee & Rovee, 1969). By five-months, infants
are able to discriminate between a live-feed of their own legs and pre-recorded
video of their own (or another infant’s) legs (Bahrick et al., 1985), while infants
of nine-months are able to discriminate between a live-feed and a delayed video
of their own face (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979), showing a sensitivity to con-
tingency between their own proprioceptive signals and visual feedback. This
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research shows that very young infants are sensitive to the contingency between
their own actions and the sensory consequences of those actions across multiple
modalities (i.e. visual and tactile).
Even in the absence of self-generated movement, two studies suggest that
infants can still discriminate between self and other through the perception of
visuo-tactile contingency. Filippetti, Johnson, and Lloyd-Fox (2013) showed
that, from 12 hours after birth, newborns will preferentially look at a video
showing an infant’s face being stroked in synchrony with touch that they are
receiving to their own face, rather than a face stroked in asynchrony. Impor-
tantly, the newborns had no preference for contingency when the videos showed
an inverted infant’s face being touched, suggesting that their sensitivity for
multisensory synchrony is specifically related to bodily stimuli. Furthermore,
Zmyj, Jank, Schu¨tz-Bosbach, and Daum (2011) showed that 7 and 10 month
old infants were able to discriminate between two videos of life-like doll baby
legs being stroked in synchrony or asynchrony with touch on their own legs.
Again, the sensitivity to the visuo-tactile contingency was only apparent when
the stimuli was body related; infants displayed no preference when the videos
showed wooden blocks being stroked. Bahrick et al. (1985) suggested that an
infant’s ability to detect multisensory contingency between proprioceptive and
visual information underlies the development of visual self-recognition. The
ability to detect synchrony across sensory modalities may provide vital infor-
mation allowing newborns to distinguish the self from others, and subsequently
to develop a coherent mental representation of their physical body.
It is not until five months that infants start to display some discrimination
between self and other on the basis of featural elements rather than sensorimotor
contingency. Bahrick and Moss (1996) presented two, three, five and eight
month old infants with pre-recorded videos and still images of themselves and a
peer. By five months, infants were able to discriminate between themselves and
another infant in a video, and by eight months, infants could also discriminate
between themselves and the peer in still images. This ability to discriminate
was reflected by a preference to look at the peer rather than the self across
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both ages and mediums, a finding that has been replicated by other groups
(Legerstee, Anderson, & Schaffer, 1998; Rochat & Striano, 2002). Bahrick and
Moss (1996) suggested that this ability to discriminate showed that infants
were familiar with their physical appearance by five months of age, however, it
is important to note that this familiarity does not provide evidence that infants
of five or eight months possess an abstract concept of themselves, or recognise
that the image represents them. It is likely that the infants’ preference for
looking at the image of the peer over themselves is based upon a preference for
novelty; as the majority of infants were exposed to mirrors during their daily
life, their visual appearance would have been highly familiar to them. It is not
until later, around 18 months, that infants start to explicitly recognise their
own reflection.
By around 18 to 24 months of age, human infants start to recognise them-
selves in a mirror (Amsterdam, 1972; Brooks-Gunn & Lewis, 1984). The classic
‘rogue mark test’, first developed by Gallup (1970) for use in primates, and later
by Amsterdam (1972) for use in human infants, tests whether an organism is
able to recognise its own face in a mirror. Passing the mark test is widely con-
sidered to reflect the developmental milestone of explicit mirror self-recognition
(MSR). Since Amsterdam (1972) first developed the original mark test for use
in human infants, the basic paradigm has changed very little. For the test, chil-
dren are covertly marked typically on or around the nose, usually by the mother
pretending to wipe the infant’s face. The covert application ensures that the
mark can only be discovered by noticing its presence on the mirror image of the
self. The infants are then placed in front of a mirror and observed for signs of
mirror-guided mark-directed behaviours. Within the literature, the use of the
term ‘mark-directed behaviour’ has varied widely. For example, the term has
been used to refer to mark touching, nose touching and looking at the mark in
the mirror (Amsterdam, 1972); touching in the region of the mark, verbalisa-
tions about the mark or of a referential and self-labelling nature (i.e. speaking
about the nose, or the infant’s name) (Asendorpf & Baudonnie`re, 1993; Lewis
& Brooks-Gunn, 1979); and looking at the mark or the nose (Bertenthal &
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Fischer, 1978; Schulman & Kaplowitz, 1977). Despite these differences in the
definition of mark-directed behaviour, most research converges on the idea that
MSR starts to emerge around 18 and 24 months of age (Bard, Todd, Bernier,
Love, & Leavens, 2006).
Researchers also disagree on what passing the mark test means. While
there is a general consensus that success at the mark test reflects ‘mirror-self
recognition’, there are arguments as to what self-recognition means in terms
of self-awareness. Gallup, for instance, argued that the ability to recognise
one’s own face in the mirror represents a marker for self-awareness (Gallup,
1979, 1998). Gallup’s classic cognitivist interpretation of success at the mirror
mark test states that any animal capable of passing the test must be in pos-
session of a conceptual self-awareness (Gallup, 1977). It should be emphasised
that in Gallup’s opinion, mirror self-recognition does not lead to a self-concept,
but rather is a way of testing whether an animal already possesses a sense of
self-identity (Gallup, 1977). However, others disagree that passing the mark
test reflects self-awareness in the infant. Reports of children who previously
passed the mirror mark test that, when seeing a red mark on their mother’s
nose, touched their own nose, suggest that passing the test does not necessarily
infer that an infant understands that the person they see in the mirror is ‘me’
(Mitchell, 1993).
The ability for MSR could reflect a more basic process of mapping the body
onto the mirror surface, allowing an infant to look at parts of their body that
they are not normally able to see (Rochat & Zahavi, 2011), and compare this
image with a mental representation of the self-face (Asendorpf, 2002). This
explanation implies that an infant passing the mark test does possess a stored
representation of their own body (one in which the red mark does not exist), but
also that they require the contingency between their own movements and the
movements they observe in the mirror to recognise that the reflection represents
themselves. This is supported by research showing that three year old infants
will remove a covertly applied sticker when looking at their face in a mirror (or
live video), but are unable to use the same information provided in a photograph
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(or delayed video) of themselves to complete the same task (Povinelli, Landau,
& Perilloux, 1996; Povinelli & Simon, 1998). By four to five years of age the
majority of children are able to use information about themselves in a delayed
video to remove a covertly applied sticker, suggesting that it is not until later in
development that children have an abstract sense of the self as existing through
time. For younger children, the contingency between visual and proprioceptive
cues, afforded by the mirror surface, seem to be critical to allow themselves to
recognise their reflection.
In summary, prior to the existence of a stored mental representation of their
physical appearance, infants are able to discriminate between self and other on
the basis of contingency between multisensory signals. It has been suggested
that this form of intermodal matching underlies the development of explicit self-
recognition, allowing for the formation of a visual representation of one’s face
through the matching of proprioceptive, sensorimotor and visual information
during mirror exposure (Bahrick et al., 1985). The formation of a visual rep-
resentation of self subsequently paves the way for explicit self-recognition and
conceptual self-awareness in later development (Rochat, 1995). In this sense,
multisensory integration can be seen as vital for the development of self-face
recognition.
1.6 Self-Identification and Self-Updating
1.6.1 Multisensory Theories of Body-Representation
The evidence reviewed in the previous section converges on the idea that
multisensory matching plays an important role in the formation of a representa-
tion of the self-face. Multisensory models of body-ownership form a useful basis
for understanding and investigating the specific processes of self-identification
and self-updating. Body-ownership refers to the feeling that sensations relat-
ing to the body are experienced uniquely by the individual, and that the body
belongs to the self (Gallagher, 2000). The current section outlines multisensory
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theories of body ownership and multisensory integration paradigms used to ex-
perimentally investigate the conditions required for multisensory matching to
lead to a sense of body-ownership.
Botvinick and Cohen (1998) proposed that the only requirement for the
attribution of a body part to the self was intermodal matching. The rubber
hand illusion (RHI) provides evidence that a sense of ownership can be induced
over a fake rubber hand through the use of a simply multisensory integration
paradigm (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004;
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). During the illusion, participants observe touch to
a fake rubber hand, while feeling synchronous touch on their own hidden hand.
This induces the feeling that the observed touch is in fact the touch that is
felt, and can lead to an illusory sense of ownership over the fake hand. The
RHI paradigm provides a way in which body-ownership can be manipulated in
a controlled, experimental setting. When the observed and felt touch are out of
synchrony, the illusion is abolished. Interestingly, physical similarity to the rub-
ber hand does not influence body-ownership, but the experience of ownership
over the rubber hand influences the perceived similarity between the rubber
hand and the real hand, suggesting that multisensory integration may play a
part in updating mental representations of the physical body (Longo, Schu¨u¨r,
Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2009). In line with this, experience of owner-
ship appears to affect the way that one’s own body is experienced, such that
the rubber hand, rather than being represented as an additional limb, replaces
the existing, real hand. Reports of subjective experiences of ownership (Longo,
Schu¨u¨r, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008), and physiological changes ex-
perienced during RHI (Moseley et al., 2008) suggest that the rubber hand is
incorporated into the existing body schema and replaces the real hand.
Armel and Ramachandran (2003) went one step further by suggesting that
any object could be incorporated into one’s body representation so long as
synchronous intermodal matching was present. To investigate this, Armel and
Ramachandran (2003) performed the RHI with participants, before ‘injuring’
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the rubber hand. Skin Conductance Responses (SCR) measured from the par-
ticipant’s real hand at the point the rubber had was injured were significantly
higher in the synchronous condition than the asynchronous condition, reflecting
a sense of induced bodily ownership over the rubber hand in the synchronous
condition. Critically, the same pattern of SCRs was also identified when a table
was stroked in synchrony with the participant’s hidden hand, and then injured.
Armel and Ramachandran (2003) argued that this showed that any object,
provided the appropriate intermodal matching is present, can be incorporated
into the body-representation. However, other research disputes this, suggesting
that intermodal matching between one’s occluded hand and an external object,
while necessary, is not sufficient for the object to be experienced as part of one’s
body.
A number of studies have provided evidence to suggest that induction of
body-ownership is not successful when the object attempting to be incorporated
does not resemble a hand (Graziano, Cooke, & Taylor, 2000; Haans, Ijsselsteijn,
& de Kort, 2008; Holmes, Snijders, & Spence, 2006; Tsakiris, Costantini, &
Haggard, 2008; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). The RHI is also abolished when
the rubber hand is placed in an implausible location anatomically or posturally
(Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Graziano et al., 2000; Lloyd, 2007; Tsakiris &
Haggard, 2005). These findings suggest that synchronous multisensory stimu-
lation, while necessary, is not sufficient for induction of body-ownership over
a fake limb, as suggested by Botvinick and Cohen (1998) and Armel and Ra-
machandran (2003). The object to be incorporated needs to resemble the limb
it is replacing, as well as be in an anatomically and posturally congruent loca-
tion with regards to the individual. In line with this, Tsakiris (2010) proposed
a top-down account of body-ownership, in which multisensory stimulation is
integrated alongside a reference model that codes for anatomical and structural
information about the body (e.g. Graziano & Botvinick, 2002). The integra-
tion of multisensory signals such as those presented in the RHI creates a conflict
between the current online representation of the body (proprioceptive signals),
and the felt and observed touch. In order for a resolution of this conflict, the
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current body-representation must be updated to reflect a coherent representa-
tion of the body within the environment, such that the observed touch to the
rubber hand, integrated with the felt touch on the real hand, result in a change
in perceived location of the hand towards the rubber hand. Interestingly, the
findings of Filippetti et al. (2013) and Zmyj et al. (2011), showing that infants
were sensitive to contingency only when the stimuli were body related, is in line
with this model of body ownership.
1.6.2 From Body-Ownership to Self-Identification
While the RHI can inform researchers about the processes of body-ownership,
the experiential nature of identifying with a face is somewhat different. A
facial-analogue of the RHI, the Enfacement Illusion, can be used to explore the
processes underpinning self-face recognition (Tsakiris, 2008). The Enfacement
paradigm has been considered as a model of self-identification, reflecting the
same processes by which initial representations of the self-face are acquired and
subsequently updated (Tajadura-Jime´nez, Longo, et al., 2012). Therefore, its
use in studying the plasticity of self-face representations is invaluable.
In the Enfacement Illusion, synchronous tactile stimulation applied to the
participant’s cheek and an observed other’s cheek causes a blurring between
the self and the other, namely, that the participant incorporates a part of the
other’s face into their own self-face representation. This incorporation of the
other causes a change in self-identification, and critically, only occurs following
synchronous interpersonal multisensory stimulation (IMS). Tajadura-Jime´nez,
Longo, et al. (2012) identified three factors contributing to the experience of
Enfacement. Firstly: self-identification, which refers to feelings of causal rela-
tionship between felt and observed touch, resemblance between the other’s face
and the self, a sense that the other’s face was indeed the self-face or belonged
to the self, that one was being imitated by or imitating the Enfacement face,
and that one was looking into a mirror. Secondly: self-similarity, which re-
lates to the feeling that the other’s face and the self-face resembled each other,
and that the experience of the self-face became less vivid during the illusion.
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And lastly, ‘affect’, which refers to feelings about the other person, such that
they seem attractive or trustworthy. The authors argue that the first two fac-
tors match two key processes in self-face recognition: self-identification and
self-recognition. The authors identify that the biggest differences in experience
between synchronous and asynchronous stimulation lie in the first two factors
of self-identification and similarity. Although there is a difference in affect be-
tween the two conditions, it is smaller than the change in the other two factors
across conditions.
Tajadura-Jime´nez, Longo, et al. (2012) investigated the qualitative expe-
rience of both synchronous and asynchronous IMS. While illusions inducing
changes in self-identification and body-ownership may rely on similar mecha-
nisms of multisensory integration, the qualitative experience of the two differs
dramatically. Firstly, the conscious experience during RHI, in either synchronic-
ity condition, remains very qualitatively similar, differing mainly quantitatively,
with higher ratings given in the synchronous condition. However, the con-
scious experience of Enfacement differs qualitatively depending on whether the
stroking is synchronous or asynchronous. When stroking is synchronous, par-
ticipants generally focus on physical similarity between the two faces, whereas
during asynchronous stimulation, the focus is mainly on the multisensory stim-
ulation, feelings of control and imitation of the other’s face, and a ‘mirror-like’
experience, rather than any physical similarities. The effect of Enfacement ap-
pears then to be the creation of resemblance and similarity between the self and
the other, with multisensory integration being the cause. Asynchrony disrupts
this process of increasing similarity, and the focus is put on the felt touch rather
than any similarity between the self and other.
This revealed that there are two separate components to the illusion. The
sense of similarity, and the sensorimotor experience during the IMS. Multisen-
sory stimulation appears to be the cause of self-identification with the other
person’s face, but is not regarded by an individual as part of the experience
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of identification. Sensorimotor experience only becomes relevant during asyn-
chronous stimulation when the focus is drawn to that and no feelings of similar-
ity are induced. This highlights important differences between self-identification
and body-ownership. While the mechanisms behind both processes may be sim-
ilar - both rely on the integration of multisensory signals – the dimensionality
of the two experiences differs. The experience during RHI is centred largely on
a shift in body representation from an embodied first-person perspective. Self-
identification is driven by not only integration of information from a first-person
perspective, but also a third person perspective, as an individual identifies with
the face in front of them. The findings from research with the Enfacement
Illusion provide evidence in an experimental setting that the integration of
synchronous multisensory signals can lead to a change in the self-face represen-
tation. The Enfacement Illusion therefore provides a useful tool for studying
the neural underpinnings of self-identification and self-updating.
1.6.3 Neural Correlates of Self-Identification and Self-Updating
Apps, Tajadura-Jime´nez, Sereno, Blanke, and Tsakiris (2013) investigated
the neural correlates of the Enfacement Illusion, highlighting neural regions
which may be involved in the processes of self-identification and self-updating.
They found activity in the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ), intraparietal
sulcus (IPS) and inferior occipital gyrus (IOG) that was modulated by the
interaction of congruency and synchronicity during the Enfacement Illusion,
and varied parametrically with the subjectively reported strength of the illusory
experience. This suggests that the experience of identification with a face relies
on the involvement of multisensory (rTPJ, IPS) and unimodal (IOG) brain
areas.
Activity in the IOG was thought to reflect the plasticity of this area, allow-
ing for representations of low-level facial features to be updated. Activity in the
OFA (part of IOG) reflects processing of individual facial features rather than
configural processing of facial identity (Barton, 2008; Kanwisher & Barton,
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2011), suggesting that intermodal matching may cause updating of the self-
face features in this area to resemble more closely the features of the face seen
during the Enfacement Illusion, reflecting the assimilation of the other’s fea-
tures into the self-face representation that has been documented behaviourally
(Tajadura-Jime´nez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012; Tajadura-Jime´nez, Longo, et al.,
2012; Tsakiris, 2008). Activity in IPS was speculated to reflect the integration
of multisensory signals. IPS receives input from superior temporal sulci and the
IOG – both implicated in face processing (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000;
Haxby et al., 2000; Barraclough & Perrett, 2011; Kanwisher & Barton, 2011),
as well as vestibular and somatosensory input (Seltzer & Pandya, 1980, 1986;
Lopez & Blanke, 2011), suggesting that it is involved in integrating multisensory
information during the Enfacement Illusion, playing a critical role in producing
the experience of identifying with the observed face. Interestingly, there was
a reduction in activity in TPJ during sycnrhonous stimulation. The TPJ is
suggested to be involved in representing the self as distinct from others, leading
to the suggestion that the reduction in activity observed during sycnrhonous
IMS reflects that the other’s face started to be represented as the self-face.
In summary, the Enfacement Illusion provides a useful tool for investigating
the cognitive and neural mechanisms underpinning self-identification and self-
updating. To date, however, there is little research utilising the Enfacement
Illusion paradigm to directly investigate the roles of specific brain areas in these
processes. Initially, fMRI research suggests that self-identification and self-
updating rely on an interplay between multimodal and unimodal areas of the
brain, but further investigation is required to elucidate the roles of individual
areas to the experience of Enfacement.
1.7 Self-Recognition
1.7.1 The Neural Correlates of Self-Recognition
This section will explore the neural correlates of self-face recognition in an
attempt to understand the specific brain areas underpinning the process of
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self-recognition. This section is split into four areas of research:
1. Hemispheric dominance in self-face recognition
2. Functional neuroimaging research
3. Electroencephalogram research
4. Non-invasive brain stimulation research
1.7.2 Hemispheric Specialisation in Self-Face Recognition
Evidence for hemispheric specialisation in self-face processing is often drawn
from research comparing RTs in left and right hands as a measure of hemispheric
dominance. Evidence suggests that if task processing is strongly lateralised to
a particular hemisphere, responses made by the contralateral hand will show a
temporal advantage (Hodges, Lyons, Cockell, Reed, & Elliott, 1997). A number
of studies have shown a left hand advantage for recognising the self-face, sug-
gesting a right hemisphere specialisation (Keenan et al., 1999; Ma & Han, 2010;
Keenan, Freund, & Hamilton, 2000; Keenan, Ganis, Freund, & Pascual-Leone,
2000; Platek, Keenan, Gallup, & Mohamed, 2004). Keenan, Nelson, O’Connor,
and Pascual-Leone (2001) have also investigated self-recognition in patients un-
dergoing hemispheric anaesthesia in preparation for epilepsy surgery. During
anaesthesia of each hemisphere, Keenan et al. (2001) presented patients with
a morphed photo of theirs and a famous person’s face. Following anaesthe-
sia, patients were given a forced choice task in which they chose which of two
photographs (100% self or 100% other) was shown to them previously. Fol-
lowing right hemisphere anaesthesia, four of the five patients chose the famous
face, while following left hemisphere anaesthesia, all five patients selected the
‘self’ face, further supporting a right hemisphere dominance in self-recognition.
Keenan et al. (2001) elicited motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) using transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation as a proxy measure of hemisphere activation while
healthy participants viewed images containing the self-face or a familiar face.
MEPs elicited from stimulation to the right hemisphere were significantly larger
when viewing an image containing the self-face than any other face/hemisphere
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combination. Larger MEPs while viewing the self-face suggest higher levels of
activation, again supporting a right hemisphere dominance in self-face process-
ing.
Despite this evidence for right hemisphere dominance in self-face recog-
nition, research also exists to support a left-hemisphere bias in this process.
Brady, Campbell, and Flaherty (2004) created mirror-symmetric chimeric faces
(composed of the left or right side of a photograph of a face) of the partic-
ipant’s own face and a friend’s face, and asked participants to choose which
of two composite faces best resembled the original. When participants chose
which of two chimeric faces best resembled themselves, they chose the face
made up of the mirror-right side of their face, corresponding to the side of their
face that lies in their right visual field (and left hemisphere) when they look
at themselves in the mirror. When asked to choose which chimeric face best
resembled their friend, they chose the composite made from the right side of
the friend’s face, representing the side that would fall within their left visual
field. This provides evidence to suggest a bias in left hemisphere processing for
self-recognition. Furthermore, hemisphere bias in self-recognition has also been
investigated in split-brain patient JW. Turk et al. (2002) highlights that JW
was capable of self-recognition when images of the self-face were presented to
either visual field, suggesting that both hemispheres are independently capable
of self-face recognition. However, it was evident that JW’s right hemisphere
showed an advantage for recognition of familiar faces, while the left hemisphere
was biased towards self-recognition. This double dissociation suggests that the
processes of self- and other-face recognition rely on distinct mechanisms in the
brain.
The evidence presented above demonstrates that hemisphere dominance in
self-recognition is a controversial issue. Across the literature there is no con-
sensus as to whether either hemisphere plays a dominant role in identification
of the self-face, however, critically, the study of a split-brain patient indicates
that both hemispheres are independently capable of self-recognition. The next
section of this review will focus on neuroimaging research to highlight which
Chapter 1. Introduction 39
brain regions are preferentially involved in self-face recognition relative to the
processing of familiar-faces.
1.7.3 Neuroimaging Research
Behavioural data suggests that processing of the self-face is special, above
and beyond familiarity and experience. Explicit identity discrimination and
perceptual processing tasks demonstrate a temporal advantage for self-face pro-
cessing over other highly familiar faces. Self-face processing also appears to rely
on different types of information, with evidence from categorical perception
paradigms suggesting that featural processing is more heavily involved in the
perception of the self-face than other familiar faces. The combined evidence
suggests that distinct neural mechanisms may underlie the perception of the
self-face and other familiar faces.
Research into the neural correlates of self-face recognition has expanded
rapidly over the past 10 years. One main assumption in the neuroimaging lit-
erature is that presenting participants with images of their own face while in
an MRI scanner is an easy way of investigating the neural correlates of self-
recognition (Devue & Bre´dart, 2011), however, beyond this common assump-
tion, the paradigms employed within the literature vary extensively. There are
differences in the tasks used, the control stimuli chosen, and the aims of the
studies themselves. Therefore, Table 1.1 summarises the tasks, stimuli, aims
and contrasts used by the studies in this review. Following this is a summary
of the areas most commonly implicated in the process of self-recognition.
1.7.4 Brain Areas Involved in Self-Recognition
Evidence from neuroimaging studies suggests a wide neural network under-
lying visual self-recognition, spanning across both hemispheres and encompass-
ing multiple cortices. This section will cover the most consistently activated
brain areas in the study of self-recognition. Table 1.2 provides a comprehensive
list of brain areas implicated in self-face processing.
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Figure 1.1: A visual representation of the brain areas identified in self-face
recognition in the studies included in this review. Triangles represent studies that
used a self > unfamiliar contrast, and squares represent studies that used a self >
familiar contrast.
1.7.4.1 Superior Frontal Gyrus
Three studies contrasting the self-face with a familiar face found selective
activation in the right superior frontal gyrus (Platek et al., 2006, 2004; Platek
& Kemp, 2009). Platek et al. (2006) specifically found activation in this area
in the self versus familiar contrast, and not in a self versus unfamiliar contrast,
suggesting the activation reflects the self-specificity aspect of the self-face and
not familiarity. Platek et al. (2004) found that both images of the self-face
and performance of a mental state attribution task elicited activation in this
area. These patterns of activation are consistent with a model of self-awareness,
that involves the modelling of both the self and others, in the right hemisphere
spanning frontal and parietal regions (Decety & Chaminade, 2003).
1.7.4.2 Inferior Frontal Gyrus
Activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus has been reported in six studies
comparing self-face activation with activation to a familiar face (Devue et al.,
2007; Kaplan et al., 2008; Platek et al., 2004; Sugiura et al., 2008; Uddin et
al., 2005), and in one comparing self-face to an unknown face (Sugiura et al.,
2000). Activation in the left IFG has been reported in two studies contrasting
the self-face with an unknown face (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001). This area has
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been hypothesised to underlie the process of discrimination between the self and
another individual (Devue et al., 2007; Uddin et al., 2005). This is supported
by evidence from research using tasks that require participants to discriminate
between the self and another face (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001; Devue et al., 2007;
Uddin et al., 2005). Uddin et al. (2005) specifically found that as the amount
of self in an image increased, so did activation in this area.
Evidence also suggests that this area is involved in processing self-relevant
information, and is not specific to self-face recognition. Kircher et al. (2000)
found the left IFG was selectively activated during the processing of self-relevant
words compared to words that were not related to the self, and activation in this
area has also been reported in response to listening to the self-voice (Kaplan
et al., 2008). Sugiura et al. (2000) also suggests that activity in the right IFG
may reflect sustained attention to the stored representation of the self-face.
1.7.4.3 Insular Cortex
A number of studies have found selective activation in the insula cortex
elicited by the self-face. In the left hemisphere: once during comparison with
a familiar face (Platek et al., 2006), and twice with unknown faces (Morita et
al., 2008; Sugiura et al., 2000). And twice in the right insula when contrasting
the self-face with an unfamiliar face (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001). Devue et al.
(2007) also identified right anterior insula activation during the processing of
the self-face as well as self-body, suggesting that this area is implied in the
integration of different aspects of the physical self into one self-concept. Fur-
ther evidence suggests that this area is involved in not only physical aspects of
the self, but also abstract self-processing. Kircher et al. (2000) demonstrated
that activation in this area was shared by both the self-face as well self-relevant
adjectives, suggesting that this area integrates self-relevant information regard-
less of modality. It has also been suggested that this area processes self-relevant
information for evaluation, supported by Morita et al. (2008), who found that
activation in the right insular cortex was positively correlated with scores on a
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public self-consciousness scale, and bilateral insular cortex activation was ob-
served during attractiveness ratings of the self-face versus that of unfamiliar
others.
1.7.4.4 Cingulate Cortex
The cingulate cortex has been implicated in the self-recognition process
in two studies comparing self-face activation to familiar faces (Devue et al.,
2007; Platek & Kemp, 2009), and four studies using unknown faces as con-
trols (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001; Morita et al., 2008; Sugiura et al., 2000).
In a similar fashion to the insula, the cingulate cortex has been implicated in
abstract self-relevant processing. It is involved when individuals attend to self-
relevant information (over non-self-relevant information) regardless of modality
(Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004). Devue et al. (2007) also found this area to be
activated to not only the self-face but also photographs of the self-body.
1.7.4.5 Occipital Lobes
Activation in the occipital lobes, extending to both the fusiform and inferior
temporal gyri (Morita et al., 2008), may reflect the early stages of face process-
ing before identification, on the basis of familiarity (Devue et al., 2007). Devue
et al. (2007) found specific activation for faces contrasted with bodies bilaterally
in the middle occipital gyrus, which also extended to the right fusiform gyrus,
suggesting this area plays a specific role in face processing.
1.7.4.6 Fusiform Gyrus and Inferior Temporal Gyrus
Evidence suggests that the fusiform gyrus and inferior temporal gyrus are
involved in familiarity judgements, rather than differentiation processes between
the self and others. Sugiura et al. (2006) found familiarity dependent activation
in these areas when participants performed a familiarity judgement task while
viewing images of their own body. They also found that these areas were not
activated for the self-name, suggesting this region is specialised for self-body
and face processing in contrast with more general self-processing areas. If these
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areas are not involved in identification, then the difference in activation to faces
of different types may reflect a difference in processing style for own face versus
other faces, rather than purely familiarity.
1.7.4.7 Inferior Parietal Lobule
Three studies have found self-specific activation in the inferior parietal lob-
ule when comparing the self-face to familiar faces (Kaplan et al., 2008; Platek
et al., 2006; Uddin et al., 2005), and two during comparison with an unfamiliar
face (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001). This region has been suggested to be involved
in self-other differentiation, but at a general level and across sensorial modali-
ties, rather than the specific differentiation of faces (Platek et al., 2006; Uddin
et al., 2005).
1.7.4.8 Supramarginal Gyrus
This region is implicated bilaterally in self-recognition (Sugiura et al., 2006,
2008; Platek & Kemp, 2009). When the supramarginal gyrus is damaged it can
lead to asomatognosia, which has lead to the suggestion that this region may
play a role in representing the self-face as part of one’s body (Sugiura et al.,
2000). This area may also form, together with the occipito-parital junction,
part of a neural network involved in the representation of the self in physical
space (Platek et al., 2006; Sugiura et al., 2000; Uddin et al., 2005).
1.7.4.9 Precuneus
Activity in this area is suggested to reflect integrative processes involved
in the integration of self-referential stimuli of different modalities into the self-
concept (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004).
Chapter 1. Introduction 45
Table 1.2: Brain areas implicated in self-recognition
Area References
Fusiform gyrus (L) (Sugiura et al., 2000, 2005, 2006; Kircher et
al., 2001)
Fusiform gyrus (R) (Sugiura et al., 2006)
Supramarginal Gyrus (R) /
inferior parietal lobe
(Sugiura et al., 2000, 2006, 2008, 2012; Uddin
et al., 2005)
Supramarginal Gyrus (L) /
inferior parietal lobe
(Kircher et al., 2001; Platek & Kemp, 2009)
Putamen (L) (Sugiura et al., 2000)
Midbrain (R) (Sugiura et al., 2005; Morita et al., 2014)
Hypothalamus (R) (Sugiura et al., 2000)
Thalamus (R) (Morita et al., 2014)
Lenticular/subthalamic nu-
cleus (R)
(Kircher et al., 2001)
Precentral sulcus (R) (Sugiura et al., 2008, 2006)
Precentral gyrus (R) (Morita et al., 2008)
Precentral (L) (Ramasubbu et al., 2011)
Anterior cingulate (L) (Platek & Kemp, 2009; Taylor et al., 2009)
Anterior cingulate (R) (Sugiura et al., 2000; Kircher et al., 2000,
2001; Morita et al., 2008; Platek & Kemp,
2009; Taylor et al., 2009)
Cingulate gyrus (L) (Taylor et al., 2009)
Cingulate gyrus (R) (Taylor et al., 2009)
Middle cingulate cortex (Morita et al., 2014)
Presupplementary motor
area (R)
(Sugiura et al., 2000)
Supplementary motor area (Morita et al., 2014)
Continued on next page
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Table 1.2 – Continued from previous page
Area References
insular (L) (Sugiura et al., 2000; Morita et al., 2008,
2014)
Insular (R) (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001; Devue et al., 2007;
Morita et al., 2008; Ramasubbu et al., 2011;
Morita et al., 2014)
Pulvinar (R) (Sugiura et al., 2000)
Anterior insula (L) (Sugiura et al., 2000)
Hippocampal formation (R) (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001)
Precruneus (R) (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001; Scheepers et al.,
2013)
Precuneus (L) (Platek & Kemp, 2009; Scheepers et al., 2013)
Subthalamic nucleus (R) (Kircher et al., 2000)
Cerebellum (L) (Kircher et al., 2000)
Cerebellum (R) (Kircher et al., 2001)
Parahippocampal gyrus (R) (Platek & Kemp, 2009; Sugiura et al., 2005)
Parahippocampal gyrus (L) (Sugiura et al., 2005)
Middle temporal lobe (R) (Kircher et al., 2000)
Middle temporal gyrus (L) (Platek et al., 2006; Sugiura et al., 2006)
Inferior temporal gyrus (R) (Sugiura et al., 2008, 2006; Morita et al., 2014;
Sugiura et al., 2012; Oikawa et al., 2012; Apps
et al., 2012)
Inferior temporal gyrus (L) (Morita et al., 2014)
Superior temporal (L) (Kircher et al., 2001)
Superior temporal gyrus (R) (Platek & Kemp, 2009)
Temporal cortex (R) (Scheepers et al., 2013)
Temporal cortex (L) (Scheepers et al., 2013)
Inferior parietal lobule (L) (Kircher et al., 2000; Ramasubbu et al., 2011;
Scheepers et al., 2013)
Continued on next page
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Area References
Inferior parietal lobule (R) (Platek et al., 2006; Kaplan et al., 2008;
Scheepers et al., 2013)
Superior parietal lobule (R) (Uddin et al., 2005; Scheepers et al., 2013;
Oikawa et al., 2012; Apps et al., 2012)
Superior parietal lobule (L) (Ramasubbu et al., 2011)
Posterior superior parietal
lobule (R)
(Sugiura et al., 2006)
Intraparietal sulcus (R) (Sugiura et al., 2012)
Postcentral sulcus (R) (Sugiura et al., 2012)
Postcentral gyrus (R) (Scheepers et al., 2013)
Ventral premotor cortex (R) (Morita et al., 2014)
Frontal operculum (R) (Sugiura et al., 2005)
Prefrontal Regions (L) (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001; Sugiura et al.,
2000)
Inferior frontal gyrus (L) (Kircher et al., 2001; Scheepers et al., 2013)
Inferior frontal gyrus (R) (Uddin et al., 2005; Sugiura et al., 2008,
2000; Morita et al., 2014; Sugiura et al., 2012;
Oikawa et al., 2012; Platek et al., 2004; Devue
et al., 2007; Kaplan et al., 2008; Ramasubbu
et al., 2011; Scheepers et al., 2013)
Mid-inferior frontal gyrus
(R)
(Morita et al., 2014; Sugiura et al., 2006;
Scheepers et al., 2013; Oikawa et al., 2012)
Mid-inferior frontal gyrus
(L)
(Morita et al., 2014; Scheepers et al., 2013)
Middle frontal gyrus (L) (Kircher et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2009)
Middle frontal gyrus (R) (Platek et al., 2004, 2006)
Medial frontal gyrus (R) (Platek et al., 2006; Sugiura et al., 2000; Tay-
lor et al., 2009)
Continued on next page
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Medial frontal gyrus (L) (Platek & Kemp, 2009; Taylor et al., 2009)
Superior frontal gyrus (R) (Platek et al., 2004, 2006; Platek & Kemp,
2009; Ramasubbu et al., 2011)
Inferior occipital gyrus (R) (Uddin et al., 2005; Kaplan et al., 2008; Apps
et al., 2012)
Inferior occipital gyrus (L) (Morita et al., 2014)
Anterior occipital cortex (R) (Morita et al., 2008)
Posterior occipital cortex (R) (Morita et al., 2008)
Occipital cortex (R) (Scheepers et al., 2013)
Occipital cortex (L) (Scheepers et al., 2013)
Occipito-temporo-parietal
junction (R)
(Morita et al., 2014, 2008; Sugiura et al.,
2005)
Occipito-temporo-parietal
junction (L)
(Morita et al., 2014)
Occipito-parietal junction
(R)
(Sugiura et al., 2006)
Occipital cortex (L) (Morita et al., 2008)
Inferior occipital cortex (R) (Morita et al., 2014)
Superior occipital (L) (Ramasubbu et al., 2011)
Occipital face area (Apps et al., 2012)
1.7.4.10 Summary
Results from neuroimaging studies suggest a wide and bilateral neural net-
work involved in the processing of the self-face, spanning frontal, occipital,
parietal and temporal brain regions. It is currently difficult using current pop-
ular paradigms to separate activation purely driven by the recognition of the
self-face from automatic evaluative and emotional processes elicited by the per-
ception of one’s own face. Identification of the self may lead to evaluative
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processes, as well as eliciting emotional responses, which may be reflected in
the activations identified. Brain activation driven purely by recognition of the
self-face, un-confounded by these types of processes which are often driven by
perception of the self-face, needs further investigation.
1.7.5 Electroencephalogram Research
Evidence from EEG studies can also highlight self-specific processing in the
human brain. Ninomiya, Onitsuka, Chen, Sato, and Tashiro (1998) demon-
strated that the P300, a component reflecting the evaluation of stimulus sig-
nificance, was enhanced in response to the self-face relative to unfamiliar-faces,
suggesting a heightened relevance of the self-face. Keyes, Brady, Reilly, and
Foxe (2010) identified an increased vertex positive ERP at frontocentral sites
and enhanced N170 over occipito-temporal recording sites for self-faces relative
to both familiar (friend) and unfamiliar faces, as well as reduced P2 and N2
components over posterior and frontocentral sites respectively. A distinction
between personally familiar and unfamiliar faces was not identified until 250ms
after stimulus onset, suggesting that the self-face elicits special processes of
recognition. The early discrimination of the self-face from both familiar and
unfamiliar faces is thought to reflect early categorisation processes based on
the identity of the face (Jacques & Rossion, 2006). Sui, Zhu, and Han (2006)
demonstrated that, following encoding of facial structure, an automatic process
of self-face recognition occurs. During 500-700ms after stimulus onset, an in-
creased positivity for self-face stimuli relative to familiar-faces can be observed
in a passive observation task. This difference between self-face and familiar-face
processing is reduced under an attended condition. While the ERP to self-faces
was unaffected by level of attention, the neural response to familiar faces be-
came more similar to that of the self-face when the familiar face stimuli was
attended to. This demonstrates that the self-face elicits an automatic process
of recognition regardless of the level of attention provided to it.
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1.7.6 Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Research
Research using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is able to pro-
vide evidence for the causal role of particular brain areas in self-face recogni-
tion. Uddin, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, and Iacoboni (2006) applied 20 minutes of
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to the right inferior pari-
etal lobule (IPL) to create a virtual lesion. Participants performed a self-face
recognition task before and after receiving stimulation, in which they had to in-
dicate the identity of a series of morphed faces, created by morphing a photo of
the participant’s face with a personally familiar face. Following stimulation, the
amount of faces identified as ‘self’ by participants, while actually containing over
50% of the other’s face, increased relative to before stimulation. This indicates
that impaired functioning within the IPL resulted in a disruption of the ability
to correctly identify images of the self, leading to more liberal self-recognition
behaviour in which participants accepted faces containing a minority of their
own face as resembling themselves. Heinisch, Dinse, Tegenthoff, Juckel, and
Bru¨ne (2011) expanded upon this finding to investigate whether the effect was
specific to self-face recognition, or affected the recognition of faces in general.
Using a morphing videos paradigm, participants viewed videos that morphed
either from a familiar face into their own, or their own to the other face. Par-
ticipants indicated the point in the videos at which the face started to resemble
more themselves, or the other person, depending on the direction of morphing.
In line with the findings of Uddin et al. (2006), Heinisch et al. (2011) found that
rTMS disrupted self-face recognition in the direction of the other face. Partici-
pants responded to videos morphing from a familiar face into their own earlier
following stimulation, accepting as their own a face that contained more of the
other’s face than before stimulation. The authors found no effect of stimulation
on videos in the other direction, suggesting that the effect is specific to self-face
recognition, and not the recognition of faces in general.
Chapter 1. Introduction 51
1.8 Bodily Representations of Self Beyond the Body
Embodied accounts of social cognition propose that body representations
play an important role in social cognitive processes (Gallese, Keysers, & Riz-
zolatti, 2004). Research has shown that the observation of others’ bodies can
elicit corresponding patterns of activation in parts of our own brains, thought
to be part of the human mirror neuron system (Iacoboni et al., 1999), sug-
gesting that representations of our own and others’ bodies can overlap. Such
accounts suggest that the perception of others’ bodies in relation to our own
plays an important role in social cognitive processes such as empathy and ac-
tion understanding. Recently, research using paradigms of body illusions has
demonstrated how changes in the perception of similarity between one’s own
and the bodies of an outgroup can affect perception and behaviour towards that
group. Farmer, Maister, and Tsakiris (2014) recruited white participants and
created the illusion of ownership over a dark-skinned rubber hand using the
RHI. Following embodiment with the dark-skinned hand, Farmer et al. (2014)
found a reduction in implicit racial bias. Peck, Seinfeld, Aglioti, and Slater
(2013) found the same result when virtual reality was used to create the illu-
sion of ownership over an entire dark-skinned body in white participants. Along
similar lines, Banakou, Groten, and Slater (2013) used virtual reality to create
a sense of ownership over a child-like body in adult participants. Ownership
over the body caused participants to overestimate the size of objects (compared
to a baseline condition in which embodiment did not occur), as well as cause
participants to classify child-like attributes with themselves faster than adult-
like attributes. These studies provide evidence that changes in the way the
bodily self is perceived in relation to other groups can change perception and
behaviour towards those groups.
Maister, Slater, Sanchez-Vives, and Tsakiris (2014) suggest that changes
in the self-body representation are able to lead to changes in perception and
behaviour of other groups through processes of self-association. Firstly, the il-
lusory sense of ownership over the body part belonging to the out-group mem-
ber creates an increase in perceived perceptual similarity between the self and
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the out-group. Secondly, the new perceived similarity between the self and the
out-group leads to the conceptual representation of the self becoming associated
with the conceptual representations of the out-group. Through this association,
positive attitudes relating to the self are extended to members of the out-group,
leading to a positive change in perception and behaviour towards members of
that outgroup. This suggests that changes in the physical representation can
have a modulatory effect on other aspects of self – i.e. changes to the bodily
self-representation can change the conceptual representation of the self. The
idea that changes to one aspect of the self can lead to corresponding changes
in another aspect of self raises the question of whether the representation of
the physical self can be altered in ways other than multisensory integration, for
example, through changes to the way the self is conceptualised.
One study suggests that the physical representation of the self can be al-
tered through means other than the integration of multisensory signals. Farmer,
McKay, and Tsakiris (2013) ran an experiment in which participants played a
trust-game with another individual, whose behaviour was either trustworthy
or untrustworthy towards the participant. Before and after the trust game,
participants completed a self-face recognition task in which they rated images
created by morphing the other’s face with their own face. Following trust-
worthy behaviour by the other, participants judged images containing a higher
percentage of the other’s face as looking more similar to themselves. This study
highlights that it is possible to change the perception of one’s physical features,
and the degree of perceived physical similarity between the self and another
person, without multisensory driven updating. However, the mechanisms by
which this type of updating can occur are unclear.
1.9 Gaps in Research of Self-Face Recognition
Because of the critical importance of self-face recognition in self-awareness
and social cognition, the neural correlates and cognitive mechanisms of self-
identification, self-recognition and self-updating constitute an important topic
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requiring further empirical investigation. The wealth of neuroimaging litera-
ture has highlighted a large number of areas within the brain that show ac-
tivation associated with self-recognition (e.g. Devue et al., 2007), and to a
lesser extent, self-updating and self-identification (Apps et al., 2013; Bufalari,
Porciello, Sperduti, & Minio-Paluello, 2014). While these neuroimaging studies
are able to highlight correlations between self-face recognition processes and
indirect measures of brain activity, providing insight into which areas of the
brain are involved in self-face recognition, they cannot provide causal evidence
for the role of these brain areas in self-face recognition. Presently, three studies
have used TMS to investigate the causal role of the rTPJ in self-recognition
(Heinisch et al., 2011; Heinisch, Kru¨ger, & Bru¨ne, 2012; Uddin et al., 2006).
These studies found that the application of low-frequency TMS to this area
altered discrimination of the self-face from a familiar other’s face, suggesting
that rTPJ is causally involved in maintaining a representation of the self-face
(i.e. the process of self-recognition). To date, however, no studies have used
non-invasive brain stimulation to investigate the role of any area of the brain
in the processes of self-identification and self-updating. There is, therefore, a
lack of causal evidence to implicate specific areas of the brain in the processes
that underpin self-face recognition.
Apps et al.’s (2013) fMRI study of the Enfacement Illusion shed some
light on which areas of the brain may be involved in the processing of self-
identification and self-updating during multisensory integration. The authors
found activity that varied parametrically with the reported strength of the
Enfacement Illusion in IPS, as well as rTPJ and IOG. As IPS receives input
from superior temporal sulci and the IOG – both implicated in face processing
(Allison et al., 2000; Haxby et al., 2000; Barraclough & Perrett, 2011; Kan-
wisher & Barton, 2011), as well as vestibular and somatosensory input (Seltzer
& Pandya, 1980, 1986; Lopez & Blanke, 2011), it may be involved in integrat-
ing multisensory information during the Enfacement Illusion, playing a critical
role in producing the experience of identifying with the observed face. As such,
IPS is a candidate for study with brain stimulation, as this could elucidate its
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involvement in self-identification and self-updating during multisensory integra-
tion.
Furthermore, before tactile stimulation can be integrated with visual in-
formation, touch on the skin is first mapped onto the body in the primary
somatosensory area (S1). Activation of the body map in this area is critical for
the accurate perception of touch on the body, and therefore plays an impor-
tant role in the experience of multisensory stimulation during the Enfacement
Illusion, in which tactile stimulation is experienced in synchrony with observed
touch on another’s face. Accurate mapping of touch on the body in S1 is there-
fore critically important in the processes of self-identification and self-updating,
and the causal contribution of this area to these processes during the Enface-
ment Illusion warrants investigation.
Lastly, there is little research investigating whether the self-face representa-
tion can be updated by means other than multisensory integration. The specific
mechanisms will be elucidated in later Chapters, but in summary, as discussed
in the above section of this review, there is evidence to suggest that changes
to the mental representation of one’s body are able to modulate aspects of the
conceptual self-representation (Maister et al., 2014). It is unclear, however,
whether bidirectional modulatory links exist between conceptual and percep-
tual representations of self. In other words, can the mental representation of
one’s body be affected by changes to the conceptual self-representation?
1.10 Present Thesis
The present thesis aims to investigate the cognitive and neural mechanisms
involved in the processes of self-face recognition. The way in which we perceive
our own face and body is highly important for social-cognition, influencing the
way in which we perceive and behave towards others (Maister et al., 2014). With
this in mind, understanding the mechanisms that support the maintenance
and updating of our mental self-face representation could provide important
insight not only within the domain of self-recognition, but also for wider social-
cognition. Considering this aim, the experiments in the following chapters can
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be split in to two sections:
Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 employ transcranial direct current stimulation
(tDCS) to directly investigate the causal role of neural regions in the processes
of self-recognition, self-identification and self-updating. A comprehensive dis-
cussion of the methodology of tDCS will follow in the next Chapter, but, in
summary, tDCS is a form of non-invasive brain stimulation which can be used
to modulate the excitability of neuronal populations, and is therefore a useful
tool to investigate the involvement of specific areas of the brain in cognitive
processes. While there is a vast amount of neuroimaging research providing in-
sight into the neural correlates of these processes, there is little causal evidence
to implicate specific brain areas in the individual processes of self-face recogni-
tion (i.e., self-identification, self-recognition and self-updating). In light of this,
chapters 3 and 4 target the right temporoparietal area to further investigate
its role in self-other discrimination and self-recognition. Specifically, Chapter
3 aims to follow closely the work of Heinisch et al. (2011, 2012) and Uddin et
al. (2006), further expanding upon the understanding of the right temporopari-
etal area in self-recognition by investigating the effect of tDCS on this process.
Chapter 4 investigates the hypothesis that the right temporoparietal area is
important for the discrimination of self and other not only at the low-level of
physical appearance (in self-recognition), but also for higher-level social cogni-
tion processes such as mental perspective taking. Chapters 5 and 6 use tDCS
to explore the processes of self-identification and self-updating. Specifically,
Chapter 5 explores the involvement of IPS in integrating multisensory signals
during Enfacement, while Chapter 6 investigates the role of S1 in processing
somatosensory input during the Enfacement Illusion.
The next section, comprising Chapters 7 and 8, explores the novel use of
a self-association paradigm to update bodily and conceptual aspects of self,
to investigate whether the self-face representation can be updated by means
other than multisensory integration. Chapter 7 investigates whether associating
a novel face with the self can update the self-face representation. Chapter 8
investigates the nature of the association created between the self-representation
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and the novel face in the self-association paradigm, by testing whether the newly
associated face affects recognition of well-established perceptual and conceptual
aspects of self.
57
2 Transcranial Direct Current
Stimulation: Methodological
Considerations
This Chapter will discuss the methodological considerations of using tran-
scranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to investigate human cognitive func-
tions. TDCS is a noninvasive form of brain stimulation that delivers a low-
intensity direct current to cortical areas of the brain between two electrodes
placed on the scalp (in some cases, the second, ‘reference’ electrode is placed
elsewhere, such as the neck or arm) (Paulus, 2003). Depending on the place-
ment of the electrodes, the stimulation is considered to be ‘anodal’ or ‘cathodal’.
This simply refers to which electrode (i.e. the anode or the cathode) has been
placed over the brain region of interest. TDCS has the potential to positively, or
negatively modulate cortical excitability depending on the polarity of the stim-
ulation delivered (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000a). Anodal tDCS generally increases
excitability, while cathodal tDCS typically decreases excitability (Iyer et al.,
2005; Nitsche & Paulus, 2000a). This type of stimulation can lead to sustained
modulations in cortical excitability, with the duration of the after-effect being
dependent on the intensity and duration of the stimulation period (Nitsche &
Paulus, 2001). TDCS is considered to be a relatively safe method of modulating
neuronal excitability of the cortex, and is associated with infrequently reported
minor adverse effects such as a mild itching sensation, headache, and nausea
(Poreisz, Boros, Antal, & Paulus, 2007).
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2.1 Temporal Effects of tDCS
The duration of the modulation in cortical excitability induced by tDCS
appears to be dependent upon the intensity and duration of the stimulation
period (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000a; Shekhawat, Stinear, & Searchfield, 2013).
Studies of the effect of tDCS over the primary motor cortex can elucidate the
duration of the effect the stimulation has. Paradigms typically use TMS to elicit
motor evoked potentials (MEPs) and record these from peripheral muscles as
an indirect measure of motor cortex excitability. The MEPs elicited during (or
following) tDCS can be compared with MEPs elicited before stimulation to ex-
plore the duration of the change in excitability due to tDCS. Very short periods
of stimulation elicit changes in cortical excitability that are short-lived: ‘intra-
tDCS’ effects that do not extend beyond the end of the stimulation (Nitsche
& Paulus, 2000a). Four seconds of tDCS has been shown to elicit intra-tDCS
changes in excitability of up to 30% relative to non-tDCS levels, a change that
is generally smaller compared with the longer-lasting effects.
In animals, direct current applied directly to the cortex for as little as 5
minutes has been shown to modulate cortical excitability for hours following
the end of the stimulation period (Bindman, Lippold, & Redfearn, 1964). In
humans, changes in cortical excitability elicited by tDCS can also persist beyond
the end of the stimulation period, with the duration of the after-effect being
dependent on the intensity and duration of the stimulation period. TDCS of at
least 0.3mA lasting at least three minutes appears to be necessary for changes
in cortical excitability to persist beyond the end of the stimulation (Nitsche &
Paulus, 2000a). Nitsche and Paulus (2000a) applied stimulation over the motor
cortex for 5 minutes with either anodal or cathodal tDCS, and observed changes
in excitability lasting up to 5 minutes following the end of the stimulation.
Longer lasting effects have also been shown: nine minutes of cathodal tDCS at
1mA reduced MEPs for up to 60 minutes (Nitsche et al., 2003), and changes
in cortical excitability following 13 minutes of tDCS at 1mA lasted up to 90
minutes following the end of the stimulation (Nitsche & Paulus, 2001).
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2.2 Mechanisms of Action
In contrast with TMS, which induces action potentials during stimulation
(Bolognini & Ro, 2010), the effects of tDCS are thought to be in part due to a
modulation in the rate of spontaneous neuronal firing (Priori, Hallett, & Roth-
well, 2009). The current densities produced by tDCS in the brain fall below the
required amount for producing action potentials in cortical neurons (Wagner
et al., 2007; Tehovnik, 1996), however, studies in animals show that even small
changes in polarization (of the magnitude of those induced by tDCS) are able
to change the rate of neuronal discharge (Bindman et al., 1964; Purpura & Mc-
Murtry, 1965). Anodal stimulation is thought to lead to a depolarization of the
resting membrane potential, while cathodal stimulation causes hyperpolariza-
tion, supported by intracellular recordings in animals (Purpura & McMurtry,
1965). Studies on the effect of tDCS on the human motor system provide further
evidence that tDCS affects resting membrane potentials. (Nitsche & Paulus,
2000a) targeted the human motor cortex with anodal and cathodal tDCS. They
used TMS to elicit motor evoked potentials (MEPs), recording these from pe-
ripheral muscles as an indirect measure of motor cortex excitability. Nitsche
and Paulus (2000a) found that anodal tDCS increased MEP size, while cathodal
tDCS led to a decrease in the size of MEPs.
There is also evidence that the effects of tDCS act at a synaptic level. For
example, research in rats which interrupted electrical activity by inducing hy-
pothermia (stopping spontaneous neuronal firing), found that the after-effects
of polarization were not eradicated (Gartside, 1968). This finding suggests that
tDCS does not only affect spontaneous firing rates of neurons, but also has a
lasting effect on synaptic strength. Nitsche et al. (2003) suggest that tDCS may
affect synaptic strength through long-term potentiation (LTP) and long-term
depression (LTD). LTP is a long term facilitation of neuronal excitability (Cooke
& Bliss, 2006), which anodal tDCS may induce through increased pre-synaptic
activity coupled with postsynaptic depolarization. LTD is a long lasting reduc-
tion in neuronal activity (Malenka & Bear, 2004), which cathodal tDCS may
induce through a reduction in presynaptic discharge, and a hyperpolarization
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of the postsynaptic neuron (Nitsche et al., 2003).
In summary, the mechanisms of action of tDCS on cortical excitability
changes are not completely clear, however, it appears to involve a combina-
tion of both modulations at the synaptic level, as well as hyperpolarization
and depolarization of the resting membrane potential. It has been suggested
that intra-tDCS effects reflect changes in the polarization of the resting mem-
brane potential, which changes in excitability that persist beyond the end of
the stimulation period rely on changes at the synaptic level (Arul-Anandam &
Loo, 2009).
2.3 Safety Considerations
tDCS is considered to be a relatively safe method of modulating cortical ex-
citability in humans when the safety guidelines are followed concerning current
intensity, electrode size and duration of stimulation (Iyer et al., 2005; Nitsche
& Paulus, 2000a, 2001; Nitsche et al., 2003). Nitsche et al. (2004) conducted an
MRI study in which they scanned participants immediately, 30, and 60 minutes
after they received 13 minutes of anodal or 7 minutes of cathodal (known to
induce long lasting changes in cortical excitability) tDCS. The authors reported
that the tDCS did not induce brain edema, structural alternations of brain tis-
sue, or alterations of the blood brain barrier. Iyer et al. (2005) conducted a
Phase 1 study investigating the safety of frontal tDCS. 103 participants received
stimulation between 1 and 2 mA, and the study found no adverse effects of the
stimulation on cognitive or psychomotor measures. A further study reviewing
567 cases of tDCS in healthy participants and patients. TDCS was associated
with a number of different mild adverse effects including: a tingling sensation
during stimulation (70.6%), feelings of fatigue (35.3%) and itching sensations
underneath the electrode (30.4%), but no significant adverse effects of the stim-
ulation were observed (Poreisz et al., 2007). Overall, tDCS appears to present
a relative safe method of manipulating cortical excitability in humans when
applied according to current tDCS safety guidelines.
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2.4 Directionality of the Effects in the Motor and
Cognitive Domains
As mentioned previously, the effects of tDCS on motor cortex excitability
show a dichotomy between anodal and cathodal stimulation. Anodal tDCS
causes an increase in excitability as measured by increased MEP size (thought
to reflect neuronal depolarization), which cathodal tDCS results in a decrease
in excitability and MEP size (thought to reflect hyperpolarization). This di-
rectional effect in the motor domain has been robustly reported, with a meta-
analysis of human tDCS studies reporting that the majority of those investigat-
ing the effects of tDCS on MEPs reported the same anodal cathodal dichotomy
(Jacobson, Koslowsky, & Lavidor, 2012). On the other hand, studies investigat-
ing the effect of tDCS on cognitive processes paint a different picture. While
some studies in the cognitive domain have found clear effects of anodal and
cathodal tDCS reflecting that of the motor domain (Fecteau et al. 2007; Spar-
ing et al. 2009; Stone and Tesche 2009), more often than not, a significant
effect of anodal tDCS is reported, without a significant effect of cathodal tDCS
(Jacobson et al., 2012).
There are a number of interpretations of the lack of a clear anodal-facilitation
/ cathodal-inhibition effect in the cognitive domain. One explanation considers
the noise that the measures generally used to assess cognitive processes intro-
duce. Whereas measuring MEPs (as is typically done in studies of tDCS in
the motor domain) involves the stimulated area only, cognitive processes are
measured in a large range of ways. For example, one cognitive process may
be measured with a variety of behavioral tasks including measures of RTs and
accuracy. These different measures introduce noise into testing process. An-
other explanation for the lack of a clear cathodal effect on cognitive processes
focuses on the fact that cognitive processes are more likely to be underpinned
by a large network of brain areas. While increasing excitability in one of the
regions involved in a cognitive process with anodal tDCS may facilitate pro-
cessing throughout the whole network, cathodal stimulation over only one area
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may not have an inhibitory effect as other parts of the network are able to com-
pensate for the decreased excitability in one area. The issues of directionality
of the tDCS effect in the cognitive domain will be revisited in the following
chapters when discussing the results of the experiments.
Despite the lack of a clear cathodal tDCS effect in the cognitive domain,
evidence does suggest that targeting the regions that are thought to underpin
cognitive processes can result in changes in performance, demonstrating that
tDCS can be used as an effective tool for studying the neural basis of cogni-
tive processing. In the next 4 Chapters of this thesis, tDCS will be used to
investigate the neural mechanisms thought to support the processes of self-face
recognition.
2.5 tDCS in Social Cognition
tDCS is becoming an ever more popular methodological tool to study social
cognition, and can be used to highlight the causal involvement of cortical re-
gions in specific cognitive functions. This section will provide a short discussion
on how tDCS has been used previously to investigate social cognitive processes.
Relevant to this thesis are studies on self-other processing and body represen-
tation. See Table 2.1 for a list of the most relevant tDCS studies. One area
of particular interest both in the literature and this thesis is the temporopari-
etal area. A number of studies have used tDCS to investigate the role of the
temporoparietal region in self-other processing. For example, Santiesteban,
Banissy, Catmur, and Bird (2012) compared the effects of Anodal and Catho-
dal tDCS (relative to sham stimulation) over the rTPJ on two tasks requiring
discrimination between self and other representations. Anodal tDCS over rTPJ
enhanced performance on an imitation inhibition task – requiring the represen-
tation of the other to be inhibited, and a perspective taking task – requiring the
representation of the other to be enhanced, relative to cathodal tDCS and sham
stimulation. Conversely, there was no effect of tDCS on a control self-other
attribution task that did not involve discrimination between the self and an-
other. The results suggest that the rTPJ is involved in controlling co-activated
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representations of self and other. This finding is especially interesting when
considering Apps et al.’s (2013) finding that the magnitude of TPJ activation
during the Enfacement Illusion was negatively correlated with the subjective
strength of the illusion, suggesting that as participants identify with the IMS
face they begin to represent it as their own.
While Santiesteban et al. (2012) found a selective effect of anodal tDCS over
rTPJ on imitation inhibition and perspective taking, others have also found an
effect of cathodal tDCS on similar tasks. Mai et al. (2016) applied anodal,
cathodal or sham stimulation over rTPJ, and investigated the effect on theory
of mind (TOM) and cognitive empathy. Cathodal tDCS decreased the accuracy
of TOM judgements about another’s intention, and judgements about another’s
emotion (cognitive empathy). The authors found no effect of anodal stimula-
tion on either task, which they suggest may be due to ceiling effects on the
tasks limiting room for improvement following anodal tDCS. The findings sug-
gest that inhibiting cortical excitability in may impair the ability to accurately
represent another’s mental state – in line with the suggestion that this area
is involved in representing and self and others, and highlights that cathodal
stimulation can also provide insight into cognitive functioning.
tDCS is also a valuable tool for investigating the lateralization of func-
tion. Santiesteban et al. (2015) again investigated the role of TPJ in visual
perspective taking and imitation inhibition, with the addition of a theory of
mind task. This time, the authors compared anodal tDCS of the right and left
TPJ, as well as using an active control site (occipital cortex) not previously
implicated in social cognitive processing. The addition of an active control site
in which stimulation is applied to a region not thought to be involved in the
tested process allows for stronger conclusions to be drawn about the localiza-
tion of function, as it can be used to rule out a general effect of stimulation
on the brain. Previously, neuroimaging research had provided inconsistent sup-
port for the lateralization the TPJ in these processes, showing activation of the
rTPJ in imitation inhibition (Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2009) and lTPJ
in perspective taking (Schurz, Aichhorn, Martin, & Perner, 2013) exclusively,
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and bilateral activation of TPJ in theory of mind (e.g. Jenkins & Mitchell,
2010). The results showed that anodal stimulation of both the left and right
TPJ enhanced performance on the imitation inhibition and perspective taking
tasks, suggesting bilateral involvement of the TPJ in these processes. Neither
left or right tDCS affected performance on the theory of mind task. These
findings highlight the use of tDCS not only in investigating lateralization of
function, but also as a complimentary tool for expanding upon the findings of
neuroimaging research. As discussed in Chapter 1, this thesis aims to expand
upon neuroimaging research by Apps et al. (2013) to investigate the neural un-
derpinnings of self-face recognition, which highlighted the involvement of not
only TPJ but also IPS in the processes of self-identification and self-updating.
Much of the tDCS research that is most relevant to the current thesis has
focused on self-other discrimination processes and the TPJ. This thesis aims to
expand upon this with a focus on the bodily self and recognition of the self-face.
The following two experimental chapters use tDCS to explore the role of TPJ
in self-other face discrimination and mental body representation. Furthermore,
this thesis will use tDCS to investigate the processes of self-identification and
self-updating, which have not yet benefitted from tDCS research. Neuroimag-
ing research as highlighted the involvement of IPS in multisensory integration
during the Enfacement Illusion, and the somatosensory cortex (S1) during the
perception of touch to the self and others. Chapters 5 and 6 will use tDCS to ex-
plore the involvement of these two areas in self-identification and self-updating.
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3 The role of the right
temporoparietal area in
self-recognition
3.1 Introduction
1The ability to discriminate self from others is crucial for both self-awareness
and social cognition. The process of self-recognition, as described in Chapter
1 as the ability to maintain an updated mental representation of the self-face,
relies on the ability to distinguish between what is self, and what is not self.
Chapter 1 of this thesis reviewed the literature on the neural underpinnings
of self-other discrimination and described a widely distributed set of neural
regions able to discriminate between images of the self-face and other faces
(e.g. Devue et al., 2007). Despite the wealth of neuroimaging studies exploring
the correlates of self-recognition, there has been little research providing causal
evidence for the involvement of specific brain areas in self-recognition.
Three studies to date have investigated self-recognition with noninvasive
brain stimulation. One study investigated the role of the inferior parietal lob-
ule (IPL; Uddin et al., 2006), while the other two specifically targeted the tem-
poroparietal junction (encompassed in the IPL) (Heinisch et al., 2011, 2012).
Uddin et al. (2006) used low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation (rTMS) to investigate the involvement of right and left IPL in self-other
face discrimination. rTMS is often used to impair typical functioning in a corti-
cal area to provide causal evidence of its involvement in a cognitive function. If
1This experiment has been published as Payne, S., & Tsakiris, M. (2016). Anodal tran-
scranial direct current stimulation of right temporoparietal area inhibits self-recognition. Cog-
nitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 1-8.
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performance in a task is disrupted following stimulation, it supports an active
role of the targeted area in the tested process. Uddin et al. (2006) presented
participants with a face-recognition task before and after 20 minutes of rTMS.
During the task, participants were presented with static images of faces (cre-
ated by morphing the participant’s own face with that of a highly familiar
individual – resulting in six images along the morphing spectrum, with varying
degrees of self-face visible: 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%) and were required to
indicate whether the face looked more like their own face, or the familiar per-
son’s face. Following the application of rTMS to rIPL (but not lIPL), Uddin
et al. (2006) reported a disruption in the participants’ ability to discriminate
their own and the other’s face. Following stimulation, participants were more
likely to identify morphed face images containing 60% of the other’s face, and
only 40% of their own face, as their own face, than preceding stimulation. In
other words, more of the self-other morphed images were recognised as ‘self’
following stimulation. In line with this, Heinisch et al. (2011, 2012) found
concurrent results after applying low-frequency rTMS over rTPJ between two
morphing-video self-recognition tasks. Participants watched videos that mor-
phed from their own face to a familiar face (self-to-other), or a familiar face
into their own face (other-to-self), and pressed a button to indicate when they
noticed a change in identity of the face. Over two experiments, Heinisch et
al. (2011, 2012) showed that following stimulation of rTPJ participants again
identified more of the self-other morph as resembling themselves than before
stimulation. This was apparent in both self-to-other and other-to-self directions
of morphing video. In other words, when the video morphed from self to other,
participants indicated that the face started to look more like the other at a later
point, when more of the other’s features had become visible. In the other-to-self
direction, participants indicated that the face started to look more like them-
selves at an earlier point, when more of the other’s features were still visible.
Taken together, these findings indicate that disruption of normal brain activity
in the right temporoparietal area alters self-other discrimination by facilitating
self-face recognition, as participants recognise more of a self-other morphing
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spectrum (be it static morphed images, or morphing videos) as representing
their own face (See Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: The point of discrimination on the self-other morphing spectrum before
and after TMS to the right TPJ. Following TMS, participants discriminated between
self and other at a point where less of the self-face was actually visible, resulting in
more of the spectrum being recognized at ‘self’.
The temporoparietal area has also been extensively implicated in wider self-
body processing (Blanke, 2012). Lesions to the temporoparietal areas are often
reported in patients suffering from body identification disorders such as aso-
matognosia and somatoparaphrenia, in which patients lose awareness of a body-
part, or attribute ownership of their body-part to another person (Feinberg,
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Venneri, Simone, Fan, & Northoff, 2010). Furthermore, out-of-body experi-
ences, in which patients experience their body as being located away from
its true location, have been associated with processing in temporoparietal ar-
eas (Blanke & Arzy, 2005). Accordingly, direct cortical stimulation over the
right angular gyrus has been shown to disrupt accurate processing of one’s
body by inducing out-of-body illusory experiences (Blanke, Ortigue, Landis,
& Seeck, 2002). The temporoparietal area has also been implicated in higher-
level social cognitive processes such theory of mind, engaged during the classic
Sally-Anne theory of mind task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), explicit
and implicit mentalizing (Frith & Frith, 2003), and visual perspective taking
(Aichhorn, Perner, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 2006; Keysar, Barr, Balin,
& Brauner, 2000; Ramsey, Hansen, Apperly, & Samson, 2013; Shibata & Inui,
2011). Because of the wide-ranging involvement of TPJ in body-related pro-
cessing as well as social-cognition, there is growing support for the idea that
self-other discrimination is not only a prerequisite for complex social cognitive
processes to develop, but that the low-level computational mechanisms that
discriminate signals arising from the self from signals arising from the environ-
ment may be crucial to higher-level social cognitive processes (Decety & Lamm,
2007).
Decety and Lamm (2007) have proposed that higher-level forms of social
cognition such as theory of mind, in which one must simultaneously represent
and discriminate between one’s own perspective and someone else’s perspective,
may rely on the same mechanisms that allow for the discrimination of self and
other at a lower-level in social cognitive processing, such as the discrimination
of the self-face from the faces of others. .They also speculate that the rTPJ may
underpin this mechanism. In support of this, Santiesteban et al. (2012) found
that increasing neuronal excitability in rTPJ led to enhanced performance on
two social cognitive perspective taking tasks. However, to date there is no re-
search that has investigated how lower-level forms of self-other discrimination
are affected when cortical excitability is increased in the right temporoparietal
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area. Research addressing this question will not only contribute to our under-
standing of this area’s involvement in low-level self-other discrimination, but
also has the potential to provide insight into how low-level mechanisms may
contribute to meta-cognition.
Experiment 1 aimed to investigate the role of the right temporoparietal
area in lower-level self-other discrimination by targeting this region with anodal
tDCS. An established face morphing task (Heinisch et al., 2011, 2012; Tajadura-
Jime´nez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012; Keenan, Freund, Hamilton, Ganis, & Pascual-
Leone, 2000) was adapted to investigate the extent to which anodal stimulation
over the right temporoparietal area would affect the ability to discriminate self
from other. Participants watched videos of their face morphing into the face
of a familiar other, and a familiar face morphing into their own face (before
and after 20 minutes of tDCS) and responded when they detected a change
in identity of the face in the video. The pre-tDCS block of videos acted as a
baseline measure of self-other discrimination, and changes in performance from
pre-tDCS to post-tDCS were compared. Based on the results of Uddin et al.
(2006) and Heinisch et al. (2011, 2012), which showed that impaired functioning
of rTPJ facilitated self-recognition by reducing the amount of self-face required
to discriminate between self and other, it was hypothesised that an increase in
cortical excitability in this area would have the opposite effect: anodal tDCS
over the right temporoparietal area would cause an inhibition of self-recognition,
by requiring more of the self-face to be visible to discriminate between self and
other.
3.2 Materials and Methods
3.2.1 Participants
Sixty (44 female, mean age 21.54 years) participants volunteered to take
part in the study and were reimbursed for their time. All participants were
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screened for possible contraindications to tDCS, and provided signed and in-
formed consent for their participation. Once recruited, participants were ran-
domly assigned to the anodal (n = 20, 15 female), cathodal (n = 20, 15 female),
or sham (n = 20, 14 female) stimulation group. We chose this number of par-
ticipants per condition based on the reported N size in recent, similar tDCS
studies (see Enticott et al., 2012; Santiesteban et al., 2012). All participants
were na¨ıve to the purpose of the study and were unaware of the type of stim-
ulation they received until after the experiment. The study was approved by
the Royal Holloway, University of London Ethics Committee.
3.2.2 Design
The study was a double-blind, sham-controlled, mixed design, with a within
subjects factors of Timing of the Video Morphing Task (Pre vs. Post-stimulation),
and a between groups factor of tDCS Group (anodal vs. cathodal vs. sham).
We chose a between-groups design to avoid learning effects on the Video Mor-
phing Task across several sessions of stimulation. Participants took part in one
experimental session in which they completed two blocks of the Video Morphing
Task, separated by 20 minutes of tDCS.
3.2.3 Stimuli and Tasks
3.2.3.1 Self-Recognition Video Morphing Task
The study used a modified version of Keenan, Freund, et al.’s (2000) video
morphing task (see also Heinisch et al., 2011, 2012; Tajadura-Jime´nez, Grehl,
& Tsakiris, 2012). First, a photograph was taken of each participant’s face
with a neutral expression. Participants with glasses or facial hair did not take
part in order to control variation in the morphing videos. All photographs were
converted to greyscale, flipped horizontally so as to reflect the orientation of
the self-face that participants would be most accustomed with (from mirror
exposure), and a template was applied around the face to remove hair and non-
facial features. All photo manipulation was completed using Adobe Photoshop
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CS6. Every participant was then paired with a familiar, gender- and skin-tone-
matched, famous individual (following the procedure of Heinisch et al., 2011,
2012, participants indicated the name of a famous individual with whom they
were highly familiar), and the same procedure was applied to a photograph of
the famous face. Famous faces were used following the finding that rTMS over
rTPJ only affects discrimination of the self from familiar, but not unfamiliar
faces (Heinisch et al., 2012). The face morphing software Abrasoft Fantamorph
(www.fantamorph.com) was used to create a morphing continuum between the
two faces, and 100 images representing 1% steps of morphing between the two
faces were exported. Adobe Premier Pro was used to convert the image series
into two directions of video (self-to-other and other-to-self), with three dura-
tions (10, 15 and 20 seconds), resulting in six videos for each participant. The
three durations, and two directions of video were created in order to make the
videos less predictable, and required participants to make a conscious choice
regarding when the face in the video started to look more like the individual it
was morphing into, rather than responding at the same temporal point in each
video.
During the Experiment, each of the six videos was presented five times
per block in a randomised order, resulting in 30 trials per block. Before each
video a fixation cross was presented on screen for 1-2.5sec. The video was
then presented, and participants watched the video and made their response.
Participants were told to respond with a button press as soon as they detected
a change in the identity of the face in the video, such that, when the video
morphed from self to other, participants responded when the face started to
look more like the familiar other, and when the video morphed from other to
self, participants responded when the face started to look more like their own
(see Figure 3.2). All participants responded with their right index finger. The
pre-stimulation video morphing trials provided a baseline measure of the ‘point
of discrimination’ between self and other, and we compared performance in the
post-tDCS block with baseline performance to investigate the effect of tDCS
on self-other discrimination.
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Figure 3.2: An example of the two directions of morphing video used in the
experiment. Videos were 10, 15 or 20 seconds in length, and morphed either from a
familiar face into the participant’s own face, or from the participant’s face to a
familiar face.
3.2.4 tDCS Parameters
Participants were stimulated with either the anode or cathode electrode
placed over the right temporoparietal area (electrode position CP6: electroen-
cephalography (EEG) 10/20 system; Herwig, Satrapi, & Scho¨nfeldt-Lecuona,
2003) and the reference electrode over the Vertex (measured individually for
each participant). Stimulation was delivered via two 3.5 electrodes, placed
within saline-soaked sponges, for 20 minutes at the intensity of 1mA (30 sec-
onds ramp up, 20 seconds ramp down). The set-up for the sham stimulation
was identical, with the anode electrode position counterbalanced across partic-
ipants, except that the stimulator was only switched on for the first 15 seconds
of stimulation. Participants were asked following the experiment if they were
aware of the type of stimulation they received, with the majority being unaware.
The electrode montage and tDCS parameters were identical to those used pre-
viously to successfully modulate cortical excitability of rTPJ (Santiesteban et
al., 2012).
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Table 3.1: Experiment 1 Demographic Data by tDCS Group
Demographic Data
Age Gender Handedness
M (SD) Female Male Right Left Ambidextrous
Anodal 19.6 (1.23) 15 5 18 2 -
Cathodal 22.25 (5.97) 14 6 20 - -
Sham 22.45 (4.41) 12 5 14 2 1
3.2.5 Data Analysis
Preceding analysis, the raw RT data were converted into % of self-face
present in the morphing video at the point at which participants judged a
change in identity. As past research has shown that brain stimulation (i.e.
TMS) affected self-other discrimination ability independently of the direction
of morphing video (self-to-other vs. other-to-self; Heinisch et al., 2011, 2012),
and because the experiment was not interested in the directions themselves
but rather in the amount of the self-face required to discriminate between the
two faces, the data were averaged across direction of video to create a point of
discrimination before and after tDCS, reflecting the amount of self-face needed
to discriminate between the self and another’s face 2. Following this, data
were cleaned by identifying participants with responses outside 2 SD +/- M
response. Three participants were excluded from analysis, leaving a total of 57
data points for analysis. See Table 3.1 for demographic data.
2Analysis including the factor of Direction of Morphing was conducted, to ensure that
tDCS Group did not interact with self-other discrimination depending on the direction of the
video. While there was a main effect of Direction of Morphing: F (1, 54) = 309.49, p < .001,
η2 = .851, this was expected based upon the amount of each face required to recognise each
identity. Direction of Morphing did not interact with tDCS Group: Direction of Morphing
* tDCS Group: F (2, 54) = 2.07, p = .14, η2 = .071, Direction of Morphing * tDCS Group
* Timing: F (2, 54) = .58, p = .57, η2 = .021. There was a significant interaction between
Timing and tDCS Group: F (2, 54) = 5.18, p = .009, η2 = .161, for which further analysis
would collapse across Direction of Morphing. Therefore, the main analysis presented in this
Chapter collapses across Direction of Morphing.
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3.3 Results
Before conducting analysis on the experimental tasks, independent t-tests
were used to check whether the tDCS groups differed significantly on age. The
t-tests revealed no significant differences between any of the groups: anodal and
cathodal, t(38) = 1.943, p = .059; anodal and sham, t(35) = 1.989, p = .056;
cathodal and sham, t(35) = .418, p = .69.
Pre-tDCS and post-tDCS self-other discrimination performance was entered
into a repeated measures ANOVA with tDCS group as a between subjects factor
and Timing of Task (Pre- vs. Post-tDCS) as a within subjects factor. There was
no significant effect of Timing of Task, F (1, 54) = 2.337, p = .132, η2 = .041,
or tDCS Group, F (2, 54) = .692, p = .505, η2 = .025. However, the interaction
between Timing of Task and tDCS group was significant, F (2, 54) = 5.178, p =
.009, η2 = .161. Paired-samples t-tests split by tDCS Group, with Bonferroni
correction applied for multiple comparisons, highlighted a significant increase in
the percent of self-face present at the point of discrimination following anodal
tDCS: t(19) = -3.896, p = .001 (Pre-tDCS M = 50.46, Post-tDCS M = 52.88).
There was a slight increase following cathodal stimulation, and a slight decrease
following sham stimulation, however, neither or these differences approached
significance. Cathodal: t(19) = -.414, p = .683 (Pre-tDCS M = 50.11, Post-
tDCS M = 50.42); sham: t(16) = 1.064, p = .303 (Pre-tDCS M = 50.36,
Post-tDCS M = 49.54). See Figure 3.3.
3.4 Discussion
Previous research has investigated the effect of low-frequency rTMS over
rTPJ on self-other discrimination. Experiment 1 sought to expand the un-
derstanding of the role of the right temporoparietal area in this process by
observing the effects of excitatory anodal tDCS over this region on a self-other
face discrimination task. Participants watched videos that morphed between
their own and a familiar other’s face, and responded when they judged a change
in identity of the face. The amount of the participant’s own face in the video at
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Figure 3.3: Mean % of self-face visible at the point of discrimination before and
after tDCS. Error bars represent SE.
the point of response was used to reflect the ‘point of discrimination’ between
the participant and the familiar other. Participants performed this task before
(baseline) and after a 20 minute session of tDCS in which they received anodal,
cathodal, or sham stimulation targeted over the right temporoparietal area.
Following anodal stimulation, but not cathodal or sham, there was a change
in the participants’ ability to discriminate between self and other. Specifically,
following stimulation participants required more of their own face to be visi-
ble in order to discriminate between self and other. In effect, self-recognition
was inhibited as participants recognised fewer frames of the morphing video as
resembling themselves.
Three previous studies have applied repetitive TMS over rTPJ to investi-
gate this area’s functional role in self-other discrimination. Following rTMS,
participants were more likely to judge images containing 60% of the other and
only 40% of the self as ‘self’ (Uddin et al., 2006), and judged a change in iden-
tity in videos morphing between the self and the other at a point that contained
more of the other’s face than before stimulation (Heinisch et al., 2011, 2012).
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In essence, there was a facilitation of self-recognition, as more frames of the
morphing video were recognised as self (rather than other) following rTMS to
rTPJ (Uddin et al., 2006; Heinisch et al., 2011, 2012). The finding that self-
recognition is facilitated when activity in rTPJ is disrupted with rTMS, and
inhibited when neural excitability in the right temporoparietal area is enhanced
with tDCS as the results of Experiment 1 suggest, may seem surprising when
considering the right hemisphere’s involvement in self-recognition. However,
these results are in line with the idea that the right temporoparietal area is in-
volved in a mechanism which distinguishes between representations of self and
other, underpinning higher-level social cognition (Bird & Viding, 2014; Decety
& Lamm, 2007), as explained below.
In recent years, the neural underpinnings of self-other discrimination have
been extensively investigated as part of the larger social neuroscience pro-
gramme. In particular, the study of self-other distinction was extended from
the field of self-awareness to that of social cognition as it became clear that the
process whereby the self is represented as distinct from others is a prerequisite
for fundamental social cognitive processes, such as empathy (Bird & Viding,
2014; Decety & Lamm, 2007). Neuroimaging evidence highlights an overlap
between regions within the right temporoparietal area involved in performing
high-level social cognitive tasks, including theory of mind (Frith & Frith, 2006),
empathy (Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006) and perspective taking
(Aichhorn et al., 2006), with those involved in lower-level self-other process-
ing (Decety & Lamm, 2007). This has led to the suggestion that a domain
general computational mechanism associated with low-level agency processing
(comparing signals arising from the self with externally produced signals) may
support higher-level social cognitive processes (Decety & Lamm, 2007). Such
a mechanism would allow an individual to distinguish between their own and
another’s perspective, thus supporting processes such as empathy and theory of
mind. For example, the outcome of a low-level agency judgement, i.e. whether
or not an observed action is attributed to the self or another, could be applied
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in a more abstract sense to attribute a mental state to either the self or an-
other (see Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009). In a similar vein, this mechanism
could also extend to the sharing and understanding of other’s emotional states.
In Bird and Viding’s (2014) Self to Other model of empathy, a crucial step
in empathizing is the ‘Self-Other Switch’: an active process in which the em-
pathizer switches from focusing on the signals arising from the self, to focusing
on the state of the target individual. This idea is consistent with evolutionary
views that higher-order processes operate on the framework of preceding levels
of processing (see also Decety & Lamm, 2007). Bird and Viding speculate that
the location of such a mechanism may be TPJ, due to its involvement in the
control of self and other representations. If higher order social cognition relies,
at least in part, on the same basic computational mechanisms as low-level dis-
criminatory processes, the active role of rTPJ in this process may be to inhibit
representation of the self, in order to enhance representation and recognition of
another.
This is in line with the idea that the default state of the cognitive representa-
tional system appears to be ‘self’, while switching to a state in which representa-
tion of another is enhanced is an active process (Bird & Viding, 2014; Gusnard,
Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001). Research suggests that the state of the
self often influences judgements about others – an ‘egocentricity bias’ - whether
these be judgements about another’s beliefs (Nickerson, 1999), affective state
(Silani, Lamm, Ruff, & Singer, 2013), or visual perspective (Surtees & Apperly,
2012). In order to accurately represent the state of another, online represen-
tations of the self must be inhibited. Santiesteban et al. (2012) demonstrated
that anodal tDCS over rTPJ reduced the extent to which the participant’s own
perspective interfered with taking the incongruent visual perspective of another
person. In essence, the participant’s own perspective was inhibited, while the
perspective of the other was enhanced. This finding may reflect the facilitation
of such a representational switching mechanism. The results of Experiment 1
may reflect the operation of this same mechanism at a lower-level, resulting in
enhanced recognition of a familiar other’s face, while inhibiting recognition of
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the self, lending weight to the idea that low-level computational mechanisms
may support higher-level meta-cognition.
While it may have been expected to observe in the cathodal group the oppo-
site effect to the anodal group, the lack of an effect from cathodal stimulation is
not entirely surprising. In a recent meta-analysis of tDCS studies, Jacobson et
al. (2012) report that, while in the motor-domain the majority of anodal stim-
ulation leads to a facilitation, and cathodal stimulation leads to an inhibition,
cathodal stimulation in the cognitive domain is unlikely to result in a decrease
of function in cognitive processing. This has been attributed to compensatory
processes in the complex neuro-networks involved in cognitive processes. In line
with this, we did not find any differences in self-other discrimination following
cathodal stimulation of the temporoparietal area, but observed a selective effect
of anodal stimulation.
The stimulation site in Experiment 1 was localised using the EEG 10/20
system. While the preferable approach would be to use fMRI-guided neuron-
avigation to individually target the right temporoparietal area for each partici-
pant, localisation with the EEG 10/20 system is considered acceptable with this
type of stimulation (Herwig et al., 2003). Future studies should also consider
including an active control stimulation site, such as the left temporoparietal
area, to ensure that any effect of stimulation is site specific. However, while
this approach is considered acceptable to localise the stimulation site, it is im-
portant to note that it is unlikely that modulation of only neural activity in
the right temporoparietal area was affected by the tDCS in the current ex-
periment. Datta et al. (2009) has shown that tDCS delivered by rectangular
sponge electrodes (such as those used in the current experiment) result in diffuse
modulation of neural activity that is not specific to the site targeted. Future
research employing a ring electrode configuration, shown to provide superior
spatial focality, would provide valuable insight into the specificity of the effect
observed in the current experiment to the modulation of neural activity in right
temporoparietal junction.
There is also a possibility that the effect observed in the current experiment
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was influenced by uncontrolled variables such as baseline neural excitability. A
between-groups design was chosen to avoid practice effects on the video mor-
phing task across several sessions, however, this introduces the possibility the
effect that is observed post-stimulation could be due to differences in baseline
neurological features between the three stimulation groups. While the current
experiment attempted to control for differences between the groups on baseline
self-other discrimination ability with the pre-tDCS video morphing task, the ef-
fect of tDCS on modulating neuronal excitability may have varied between the
groups, despite the random allocation of participants to tDCS groups. How-
ever, it is unlikely that the baseline neural excitability of the individuals in the
anodal group was consistently different from those in the other two group.
To conclude, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that anodal tDCS over the
right temporoparietal region affects self-other face discrimination by inhibiting
recognition of the self while facilitating recognition of a familiar other. The
results of Experiment 1 supports previous research indicating a functional in-
volvement of the right temporoparietal area in self-other discrimination, and
provides insights into the active role of this region in this process. It is specu-
lated that the right temporoparietal area may support higher-order social cog-
nitive processes including mentalising and empathy, and Experiment 1 suggests
that this region may support these processes by enhancing the representation
of others, and inhibiting the representation of the self.
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4 The right temporoparietal
area: beyond self-face
recognition
4.1 Introduction
Experiment 1 found that anodal tDCS over the right temporoparietal area
facilitated recognition of a familiar face, over recognition of one’s own face.
Participants recognised more frames of a video morphing between their own
face and a familiar other’s face as representing the other person’s face follow-
ing anodal stimulation of right temporoparietal area. This was suggested to
reflect interference with a mechanism that distinguishes between representa-
tions of the self-face and the faces of others, biasing perception of self-other
morphed face stimuli towards recognition of the other. Chapter 4 describes an
initial exploratory experiment investigating whether tDCS over the right tem-
poroparietal area affects discrimination between one’s own bodily perspective
and the perspective of another person.
The ability to imagine ourselves in another person’s spatial location with a
corresponding altered perspective is one that we use often in everyday life. For
example, when giving directions you may imagine yourself in the other person’s
location and describe the necessary steps to take from their point of view. This
process requires an imagined transformation of one’s egocentric perspective,
and an adoption of a disembodied self-location. This ability to take another’s
spatial perspective, while simultaneously distinguishing it from our own, may
contribute to conceptually similar, higher level social cognitive processes such
as theory of mind and empathy (Decety & Lamm, 2007), and so understanding
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the neural structures that support this process could have wider implications
for our understanding of social cognition processes.
Research into mental body transformations (MBT) typically presents par-
ticipants with line drawings of human bodies, of which they are required to
make left-right judgements about a particular body part (Parsons, 1987). Re-
action times are generally longer for figures presented facing the participant (or
inverted), than figures facing away from the participant (or upright), reflecting
the longer time required to imagine oneself in a position which is far removed
from one’s actual position in space (Blanke et al., 2005; Parsons, 1987; Zacks,
Rypma, Gabrieli, Tversky, & Glover, 1999). Neuropsychological evidence sug-
gests that the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) supports imagined changes in
egocentric perspective and position. Functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI: Zacks, Ollinger, Sheridan, & Tversky, 2002; Zacks et al., 1999) mag-
netoencephalography (MEG: Wang, Callaghan, Gooding-Williams, McAllister,
& Kessler, 2016), and electroencephalogram (EEG: Arzy, Thut, Mohr, Michel,
& Blanke, 2006; Blanke & Arzy, 2005) studies all highlight the involvement of
TPJ during the performance of MBTs. While there is no clear lateralisation of
this task-related activity, with reports of both left and right temporoparietal
activation in response to egocentric perspective transformations, two studies
have provided causal evidence for the involvement of rTPJ by showing that the
application of single- and double-pulse TMS over rTPJ impairs MBTs (Wang et
al., 2016; Blanke & Arzy, 2005). However, no study to date has directly com-
pared, using brain stimulation methods, the specific involvement of left and
right TPJ in egocentric perspective transformations.
As well as a lack of clear lateralisation of TPJ in MBT, there is little re-
search investigating whether the identity of the figure which the transforma-
tion is aimed towards affects MBTs. The stimuli used in earlier MBT studies
were typically not photographs of real individuals, and were cartoonish in na-
ture, often presented in unrealistic positions such as upside down. Given the
well reported involvement of rTPJ in self-other discrimination as well as MBT
(Heinisch et al., 2011, 2012; Uddin et al., 2006), it seems prudent to investigate
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whether egocentric transformations of one’s body differ depending on whether
the target of those transformations is the self, or another individual. One study
that the author knows of has investigated MBT towards images of one’s own
body in contrast to images of another’s body. Ganesh, van Schie, Cross, de
Lange, and Wigboldus (2015) found that egocentric MBTs towards the self
recruited higher activation of bilateral TPJ compared with egocentric MBTs
towards a stranger (when self-related awkwardness was taken into account),
suggesting that the TPJ may discriminate between self and other during the
performance of MBTs. However, no reaction time data was collected for body
transformations towards either identity, so it is unclear whether MBTs towards
the self and others differ behaviourally.
Experiment 2 investigates the causal involvement of right and left tem-
poroparietal area in MBT performance using tDCS. Previously, stimulation of
rTPJ with anodal tDCS has led to enhanced performance on two social cogni-
tive tasks involving the control of imitation and perspective taking (Hogeveen
et al., 2014; Santiesteban et al., 2012), leading to the suggestion that this re-
gion is involved in the control of self and other representations. Subsequently,
Santiesteban et al. (2015) used tDCS to investigate the lateralisation of self-
other control and found that anodal tDCS over both the left and right TPJ
improved performance on the same imitation inhibition and perspective taking
tasks, suggesting bilateral involvement of TPJ in these social cognitive abilities.
Anodal tDCS over rTPJ has also led to improved performance on a lie-detection
task (Sowden et al., 2015), and increased the use of belief information in moral
judgements of others’ actions (Sellaro et al., 2015), suggesting that rTPJ is also
involved in processing others’ beliefs and intentions. These studies highlight the
potential of tDCS as a methodological tool for investigating social functioning.
To date, no study has applied tDCS to investigate egocentric perspective trans-
formations in a mental body transformation task.
The aims of the current experiment are threefold: firstly, Experiment 2
will investigate whether MBTs performed towards one’s own body differ from
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transformations towards the body of a gender-matched other. Secondly, Ex-
periment 2 aims to disambiguate the involvement of the left temporoparietal
area and the right temporoparietal area in MBT. To the author’s knowledge,
no study has yet compared directly the effect of excitatory stimulation of right
and left temporoparietal areas on MBT. Finally, Experiment 2 will investigate
the potential interaction between tDCS and identity of the transformed per-
spective. Previously reported stimulation of rTPJ with TMS has impaired not
only MBT (Wang et al., 2016; Blanke & Arzy, 2005), but has also affected self-
other discrimination processes (Heinisch et al., 2011, 2012; Uddin et al., 2006).
Therefore, the modulation of right temporoparietal area cortical excitability
may have an important interaction effect on MBT, affecting transformations to-
wards one’s own body differently than transformations towards another’s body.
To answer these questions, Experiment 2 will measure the effect of tDCS across
two tasks (MBT task and a control ‘Lateralisation’ task). In both tasks partic-
ipants will be presented with photos of their own body, and a friend’s body (to
control for familiarity), facing towards or away from the camera. Participants
will judge the lateralisation of a gloved hand, either from the perspective of the
person on the screen: by transforming their body position to match that of the
photo (MBT task); or in relation to a fixation cross, requiring no transformation
(Lateralisation task). It is hypothesised, based on the effect of TMS over rTPJ
on MBT (Blanke & Arzy, 2005), and the excitatory effect of anodal tDCS over
cortical brain areas (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000b; Santiesteban et al., 2012), that
anodal tDCS over an area involved in MBT should result in shorter RTs when
performing the MBT task (as opposed to the control Lateralisation task). The
effects of anodal tDCS over the right temporoparietal area will be contrasted
with anodal tDCS over the left temporoparietal area, and sham stimulation.
Chapter 4. The right temporoparietal area: beyond self-face recognition 85
4.2 Materials and Methods
4.2.1 Participants
Due to the exploratory nature of the exeriment, 30 (26 female, mean age
21.71 years, SD = 3.56) participants volunteered to take part in the study
and were reimbursed for their time. All participants were screened for possible
contraindications to tDCS, and provided signed and informed consent for their
participation. Participants were assigned randomly to one of three stimulation
groups: Anodal-right temporoparietal area (n = 10, 9 female), Anodal-left
temporoparietal area (n = 10, 8 female), or sham (n = 10, 9 female). All
participants were unaware of the aims of the study. The study was approved
by the Departmental Ethics Committees, Department of Psychology, Royal
Holloway, University of London.
4.2.2 Design
The study was a single-blind, sham-controlled, mixed design, with a within
subjects factors of Identity (self vs. friend), Orientation (front-facing vs. back-
facing) and Task (MBT vs. Lateralisation), and a between groups factor of
tDCS Group (right temporoparietal area-anodal vs. left temporoparietal area-
anodal vs. sham). Participants took part in one experimental session in which
they experienced 20 minutes of tDCS, followed by performing the Mental Body
Transformation task and Lateralisation task (the order of which was counterbal-
anced across participants). The Lateralisation task was introduced to control
for any general effects of tDCS on RTs, as the task was similar in nature to the
MBT task but required no transformation of egocentric perspective. Partici-
pants were blind to the type of stimulation that they received until after the
end of the experiment.
4.2.3 Stimuli
Before the experimental session, all participants attended a photo session
along with a close, same-gender friend. A friend was chosen rather than an
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unfamiliar person to control for the effects of familiarity. Two full body pho-
tographs of each participant (and their friend) were taken to use in the MBT
and Lateralisation tasks. The participants were asked to wear a pair of black
shorts and a white sleeveless top to create uniformity, and avoid any effect of
distinctive clothing. The participants held their arms out to the side, and two
photographs were taken, facing towards (front-facing) and away from (back-
facing) the camera. The photographs were all converted to greyscale, and a
grey background was applied. For the photographs of the participant, each
picture was also mirror reversed to reflect how participants are used to seeing
themselves in the mirror. The images were then edited to create a set of stimuli
showing each individual wearing a glove on one of their hands. During the tasks,
participants judged which hand the glove was on, either from the perspective
of the person on the screen (MBT task), or in relation to a central fixation
cross (Lateralisation task). In total, four images were created of both the par-
ticipant and their friend (eight in total): front-facing left hand, front-facing
right hand, back-facing left hand, back-facing right hand (see Figure 4.1A for
example stimuli).
4.2.4 Procedure
At the beginning of the session participants received 20 minutes of tDCS,
which was either left temporoparietal area-anodal stimulation, right temporopari-
etal area-anodal stimulation, or sham stimulation. Following the tDCS partici-
pants performed the MBT task and the Lateralisation task. The order of these
tasks was counterbalanced across participants.
4.2.4.1 tDCS Parameters
The stimulation parameters used in this experiment follow those of previous
research which has successfully used tDCS to investigate the role of TPJ in so-
cial cognition (see Santiesteban et al., 2012; Payne & Tsakiris, 2016). Stimula-
tion was applied through two square 3.5cm2 electrodes, inserted in saline-soaked
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sponge sleeves. Participants in the right temporoparietal area-anodal stimula-
tion group had the anodal electrode placed over CP6 (electroencephalography
10/20 system) and the cathodal electrode placed over the Vertex (measured in-
dividually for each participant). Participants in the left temporoparietal area-
anodal stimulation group had the anodal electrode placed over CP5, and the
cathodal over the Vertex. For participants in the sham group, the site of the
anodal electrode was counterbalanced between CP6 and CP5, with the location
of the cathodal electrode held constant over the Vertex. Stimulation was de-
livered for 20 minutes at an intensity of 1mA (30 seconds ramp up, 20 seconds
ramp down). For the sham stimulation, the stimulator was only switched on for
the first 15 seconds of stimulation in order to mimic the initial itching sensation
felt by participants in the active stimulation groups. During the stimulation
period, participants in all three groups were told to sit quietly and relax.
4.2.4.2 Mental Body Transformation Task
Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross for 1000ms, fol-
lowed by one of the eight body stimuli for 400ms, which was followed by a
blank screen until participants made their response (see Figure 4.1B). Partic-
ipants were instructed to imagine themselves in the position of the person on
the screen, and respond with a button press to indicate whether the glove in
the photo was on the person’s left or right hand. Participants were instructed
to respond as quickly and accurately as they could, but to ensure that they per-
formed an egocentric perspective transformation before giving their response.
Once participants had made their response, the next trial began. Participants
performed half of the task with their right hand, and half with their left, the
starting hand was counterbalanced across participants. The task was divided
into four blocks of 64 trials, with each image repeated eight times. Participants
performed a short block of eight practice trials at the beginning to familiarise
themselves with the task.
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4.2.4.3 Lateralisation Task
The Lateralisation task was exactly the same at the MBT task, except
that participants were not required to imagine themselves in the position of
the person on screen, and merely indicated which side of the fixation cross the
glove appeared on.
Figure 4.1: Stimuli and trial procedure. (A) An example of the type of stimuli seen
by participants in the MBT task and the Lateralisation task. The captions
underneath the full body photos show the correct response to the stimuli for the
MBT and Lateralisation tasks. (B) Each trial begins with a fixation cross, followed
by presentation of the body stimuli, followed by a blank screen until the participant’s
response is recorded.
4.2.5 Data Analysis
The average RTs from correct trials were used as the dependent variable in
our statistical analysis. Two participants were excluded for making incorrect
responses on over 25% of trials. Of the remaining 28 participants, the average
error rate was 7.76%.
4.3 Results
A 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA was conducted on the RT data, with within-
subjects factors of Task (MBT vs. Lateralisation), ID (Self vs. Friend) and
Orientation (Front-facing vs. Back-facing), and a between subjects factor of
tDCS (right temporoparietal area-anodal vs. left temporoparietal area-anodal
vs. sham). There was no main effect of ID on RTs: F (1, 25) = 2.626, p =
.118, η2 = .095, nor any significant interactions involving ID. However, the
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analysis revealed main effects of Task, F (1, 25) = 132.731, p < .001, η2 = .842,
Orientation: F (1, 25) = 40.385, p < .001, η2 = .618, and tDCS: F (2, 25) =
5.01, p = .015, η2 = .286, which were superseded by significant interactions
between Task and tDCS: F (2, 25) = 8.263, p = .002, η2 = .398, and Task and
Orientation: F (1, 25) = 40.817, p < .001, η2 = .62. No other interaction effects
reached significance.
To investigate these interactions, further analysis was split by task and
collapsed across ID. Firstly, performance on the control Lateralisation task was
analysed. As expected, the ANOVA indicated that tDCS had no effect on the
performance of simple lateralisation judgements: F (2, 25) = 2.456, p = .106, η2
= .164, with no difference between performance of the three tDCS groups (right
temporoparietal area M = 360.89, left temporoparietal area M = 380.89, sham
= 437.44). Again, as expected there was no effect of Orientation on RTs in the
Lateralisation task: F (1, 25) = 2.022, p = .167, η2 = .075. The interaction
between tDCS and Orientation was not significant: F (2, 25) = .319, p = .730,
η2 = .025.
Next, RT data from the MBT task was analysed to explore the effect of tDCS
on mental body rotation. There was a main effect of Orientation on RTs in the
MBT task: F (1, 25) = 40.74, p < .001, η2 = .62, reflecting longer RTs when par-
ticipants made judgements about front-facing figures (M = 987.68), compared
to back-facing figures (M = 767.26). Importantly, the effect of Orientation was
specific to the MBT task, indicating that participants were performing the ego-
centric perspective transformations in this task, and not in the Lateralisation
task. There was also a main effect of tDCS: F (2, 25) = 6.255, p = .006, η2 =
.334. Bonferroni corrected t-tests (with a corrected alpha level of .016) revealed
that stimulation of right temporoparietal area resulted in significantly shorter
RTs (M = 628.09) than left temporoparietal area (M = 1060.05, p = .002),
while the difference between right temporoparietal area and sham stimulation
approached significance (M = 944.27, p = .02). Performance between the left
temporoparietal area and sham groups did not differ (p = .38). The interaction
between tDCS and Orientation in the MBT task was not significant: F (2, 25)
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Figure 4.2: Mean RTs by tDCS group in the MBT and Lateralisation tasks,
averaged across Identity and Orientation. Error bars represent standard error. TPA
= temporoparietal area.
= 2.953, p = .071, η2 = .191. See Figure 4.2. See Table 4.1 for means, SDs and
95% confidence intervals for all trial types by tDCS condition.
Error rates were analysed to check that tDCS over right temporoparietal
area did not increase RT at the cost of accuracy. The % of errors made on each
task was entered into a 2 x 2 ANOVA with factors of Task (MBT vs. Lateral-
isation) and tDCS (right temporoparietal area-anodal vs. left temporoparietal
area-anodal vs. sham). There was a main effect of Task: F(1, 25) = 46.63, p <
.001, = .65, reflecting more errors in the MBT relative to the Lateralisation task
(MBT M = .08, Lateralisation M = .03). There was no main effect of tDCS:
F(2, 25) = .17, p = .84, = .01, nor an interaction between tDCS and Task: F(2,
25) = 1,11, p = .34, = .08, suggesting that tDCS over right temporoparietal
area improved speed of response on the MBT task without sacrificing accuracy.
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4.4 Discussion
The current study aimed to investigate the involvement of the left and right
TPJ in egocentric perspective transformations using the modulatory effect of
tDCS. Anodal tDCS over right temporoparietal area, but not left temporopari-
etal area, led to an enhanced ability to perform MBTs. Participants who re-
ceived tDCS over right temporoparietal area were faster to make egocentric
perspective transformations than those who received anodal tDCS over left
temporoparietal area. tDCS over right temporoparietal area did not appear to
significantly affect performance on a similar control task in which participants
were not required to perform egocentric perspective transformations, suggesting
that the effect of the stimulation was specific to MBTs, rather than a general
improvement in speed of response. Although there did seem to be a slight
improvement in RT on the Lateralisation task in the right temporoparietal
area group compared with left temporoparietal area and sham, this difference
was far greater in the MBT task, suggesting that even if anodal tDCS over
right temporoparietal area were having a general effect on RTs, it was having
a greater impact on MBT above general speed of response. This finding is
supported by previous research demonstrating causal involvement of rTPJ in
egocentric perspective transformations (Blanke & Arzy, 2005), and indicates
that the involvement of the temporoparietal area in egocentric MBTs may be
heavily lateralised to the right hemisphere.
The results of Experiment 2 corroborate previous reports of TPJ activity
during egocentric perspective transformations, and add to the understanding
of the causal involvement of the right temporoparietal area in this process.
Previously, Blanke and Arzy (2005) demonstrated that disrupting activity in
rTPJ impaired mental body transformations. The results of Experiment 2
have expanded upon this by highlighting the excitatory effect of anodal tDCS
over right temporoparietal area, which led to an enhanced ability to mentally
rotate one’s body. Taken together, these findings highlight the causal role of
the right temporoparietal area in performing egocentric body transformations,
and suggest that processes of self location, agency and egocentric perspective,
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vital for a sense of belonging in one’s body, may be enhanced by tDCS of right
temporoparietal area, but not of left temporoparietal area.
One of the aims of Experiment 2 was to provide evidence to directly com-
pare the effects of anodal stimulation of the right and left temporoparietal areas
on MBTs. Interestingly, there was no effect of anodal stimulation over the left
temporoparietal area on MBTs. This is surprising when considering that ac-
tivity in this area has been previously reported in response to imagined shifts
in egocentric perspective and position (Arzy et al., 2006; Zacks et al., 2002,
1999). However, while neuroimaging studies have highlighted lTPJ activity
associated with the performance of MBT, no study has provided causal evi-
dence for this region’s involvement. Increased BOLD activity in both left and
right temporoparietal areas correlated with MBT may reflect distinct cognitive
processes engaged when performing MBT tasks, of which left temporoparietal
area activity contributes to, but is not necessary for, egocentric perspective
transformations. The results of Experiment 2 support a reliance on the right
hemisphere for MBT, rather than the left.
Experiment 2 also investigated whether MBTs are affected by whether they
are directed towards an image of one’s own body, or an image of another individ-
ual’s body. The results showed no difference between MBTs directed towards
an image of the self and an image of a friend. Nor did the results indicate that
identity interacted with the effect of the tDCS at either site. This is interesting
when considering the literature on self biases in perception (Keenan et al., 1999;
Ma & Han, 2010; Tong & Nakayama, 1999), which indicates that the self elicits
prioritised processing. However, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that the
right temporoparietal area does not distinguish between taking the spatial per-
spective of one’s own body over that of another person’s, suggesting that at least
in the case of spatial body transformations, the functional involvement of the
right temporoparietal area goes beyond body- or person-identity. Furthermore,
the lack of a main effect of identity, independently of the tDCS stimulation,
corroborates the hypothesis that egocentric perspective transformations do not
depend on identity.
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It is important to note that Experiment 2 had a number of limitations.
Firstly, the sample size, while similar to previous brain stimulation research
investigating MBT (Blanke et al., 2005) is small, meaning that the results may
be statistically underpowered and should be interpreted with caution. As the
current experiment was an exploratory experiment to investigate the further
involvement of the temporoparietal junction in social cognition, future research
is needed to replicate the current results. Furthermore, owing to the between
subjects design of the experiment, it cannot be ruled out that the three groups
were affected differently by the tDCS based on individual features, such as
differences in anatomy impacting upon current flow, and baseline differences
in neural excitability (Benwell, Learmonth, Miniussi, Harvey, & Thut, 2015;
Sellaro, Nitsche, & Colzato, 2016; Truong, Magerowski, Blackburn, Bikson, &
Alonso-Alonso, 2013). It is also important to consider that the location of the
control electrode in the current experiment (over Cz) may have introduced a
potential confound, when considering the proximity of Cz to the primary motor
cortex (M1), and thus its proximity to areas of the human mirror neuron system.
The human MNS is heavily implicated in the observation of other’s bodies and
actions, and so may be involved in a task in which one must take another’s
spatial perspective. However, as the position of the reference electrode remained
constant across both right temporoparietal area and left temporoparietal area
conditions, regardless of whether it had an impact on task performance there
was still a difference between anodal stimulation of right temporoparietal area
and left temporoparietal area on MBT performance, suggesting a differential
involvement of the left and right hemisphere in this ability.
Activity in TPJ has been widely reported in response to egocentric per-
spective transformations. Experiment 2 extends the knowledge of the right
temporoparietal area’s inolvement in this function by demonstrating that exci-
tatory anodal tDCS over the right temporoparietal area leads to an enhanced
ability to perform MBTs. This finding has implications for a wide range of
social cognitive processes which may rely in part on mental imagery of bodies.
It has been suggested that ability to take someone else’s spatial perspective
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may contribute to higher-level social cognitive processes, such as mental state
understanding (Decety & Sommerville, 2003), and that the rTPJ underpins
a general self-other discrimination mechanism which is involved in both low-
level and high-level social cognition (Decety & Lamm, 2007). In line with this,
Santiesteban et al. (2012) found that anodal tDCS over rTPJ improved perfor-
mance on two social cognitive tasks which required control over self and other
representations. MBTs and high-level sociocognitive processes may share neural
underpinnings, and future research may wish to explore whether improvement
in MBT abilities through training can lead to improvements in social cognition.
In conclusion, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that the right tem-
poroparietal area is not only involved in controlling representations of the self-
face, but also postural and spatial representations of the self-body. Experi-
ment 2 provides further evidence that the mechanisms underpinning self-other
discrimination in the right temporoparietal area may support other processes
involved in producing a coherent sense of self.
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5 The role of intraparietal
sulcus in self-identification
and self-updating
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 of this thesis explored the involvement of the right temporopari-
etal area in self-recognition: the process by which a mental representation of
the self-face is maintained. Chapters 5 and 6 will focus on the processes of
self-identification and self-updating. The introductory chapter of this thesis
defined self-identification as the process by which a mental representation of
the self-face is initially acquired, and self-updating as the process by which the
mental self-face representation is updated to reflect changes in physical appear-
ance over time. Both self-identification and self-updating rely on the integration
of multisensory stimulation, and the experiments in the following two chapters
will investigate, using tDCS, the involvement of two brain areas in multisensory
integration during the Enfacement Illusion.
As indicated in Chapter 1 of this thesis, a central element of self-identification
and self—updating is the integration of multisensory information relating to
the body. Research has shown that the interaction of information from multi-
ple modalities can have a powerful effect on the experience of one’s body (e.g.
Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris, 2008), as well as perception of external
stimuli. For example, in the classical McGurk effect, the integration of a seen
lip-movement with a temporally congruent speech sound alters the way the
sound is perceived (McGurk & Macdonald, 1976). Similarly, visual detection
can be enhanced by the presentation of an auditory stimulus at a temporally and
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spatially congruent location (Frassinetti, Bolognini, & La`davas, 2002). While
these studies demonstrate how the convergence of unimodal information can
affect the perception of external stimuli, the current Chapter will investigate
how multisensory integration can affect the mental representation of one’s own
body.
In 1998, Botvinick and Cohen elegantly demonstrated how the impact of
multisensory integration extended to the process of self-identification. Par-
ticipants sat at a table with their left hand resting on the table but hidden
from view. A rubber left hand was placed on the table in front of the par-
ticipant. Participants were instructed to fixate on the rubber hand, while the
experimenter stroked the rubber hand and the participant’s hand with two
paintbrushes. When the stroking was synchronised, such that touch occurred
on the participant’s real hand at the same time as the rubber hand, participants
reported feeling as if the touch they felt was that observed on the rubber hand.
Botvinick and Cohen (1998) also reported a distortion in proprioception follow-
ing the illusion. Participants’ own judgements about the position of their left
hand following the illusion were displaced towards the position of the rubber
hand (relative to pre-illusion judgements). The RHI shows how the integra-
tion of felt and observed touch is able to change proprioceptive information,
and elicit a sense of body ownership over an object not a part of one’s body.
Since the initial studies on the RHI, researchers have adapted and extended the
paradigm to show how multisensory integration is also implicated in the for-
mation, and updating, of mental body-representations at the level of the whole
body: in the full body illusion (Petkova et al., 2011), and faces in the Enface-
ment Illusion (Tsakiris, 2008, see Chapter 1 for a full discussion of multisensory
bodily illusions). These findings provided evidence for the growing idea that
the processes of identification with a body-part may be driven by specific forms
of multisensory integration.
FMRI studies of the RHI implicate premotor cortices, intraparietal cortices
and the cerebellum in the illusory experience of ownership over a fake hand
(Ehrsson, Holmes, & Passingham, 2005; Ehrsson et al., 2004). Ehrsson et al.
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(2005, 2004) suggested that activity in these areas reflected the detection and
integration of multisensory information during the illusion. Activity in pre-
motor and intraparietal cortices has also been found to correlate, along with
activity in the left putamen, with the experience of ownership over a whole
body in the multisensory body-swap illusion (Petkova et al., 2011). In Apps
et al.’s (2013) study of the neural correlates of the Enfacement Illusion, they
identified activity in multimodal TPJ and intraparietal sulcus (IPS) which var-
ied parametrically with the strength of the illusion. Interestingly, there was a
reduction in activity in TPJ during the experience of the illusion. As TPJ has
been shown to be involved in processing the perspectives of self and other, re-
duction in this area during the experience of enfacement may reflect a merging
of self with other. TPJ is also thought to underpin a ‘test for fit’ process, dis-
criminating objects as either body or non-body related (Tsakiris, 2010). TMS
to rTPJ during the RHI reduced the proprioceptive drift experienced towards
a rubber hand, and increased proprioceptive drift towards a non-hand object,
reducing the discrimination between body related and non-body related objects
in body-ownership (Tsakiris, 2008).
The IPS on the other hand is thought to integrate multisensory information
during the Enfacement Illusion (Apps et al., 2013). IPS is a multimodal area,
with studies in monkeys and humans showing that IPS receives both vestibular
and somatosensory input (Grefkes & Fink, 2005; Lopez & Blanke, 2011; Mat-
suzaki, Kyuhou, Matsuura-Nakao, & Gemba, 2004; Seltzer & Pandya, 1980,
1986), suggesting that this area is involved in integrating proprioceptive and
tactile information relating to the body. Furthermore, bimodal neurons that
have topographically aligned somatosensory and visual receptive fields have
been identified within IPS in both monkeys and humans (Duhamel, Colby, &
Goldberg, 1998; Avillac, Dene`ve, Olivier, Pouget, & Duhamel, 2005; Sereno
& Huang, 2006). This has led to the suggestion that the IPS is involved in
integrating incoming sensory, vestibular, and visual information, contributing
to the process of self-updating. In support of this, Makin, Holmes, and Zohary
(2007) manipulated sensory information about hand position while participants
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were inside an MRI scanner, and analysis of IPS activity showed that anterior
IPS was sensitive to both visual information about hand location and tactile
stimulation applied to the hand, suggesting that the anterior IPS combines
multisensory information about the hand to produce hand representations in
peripersonal space. IPS activity has also been linked with the illusory sense of
ownership over a rubber hand (Ehrsson et al., 2005) and whole body (Petkova
et al., 2011). Furthermore, Apps et al. (2013) reported that activity in the
IPS during the Enfacement Illusion was modulated by the synchronicity and
specular congruency of the stroking received by participants, and that the ac-
tivity varied parametrically with the extent to which participants experienced
the illusion. Taken together, these findings suggest that the IPS is involved
in updating body representations and producing the sense of ownership during
multisensory integration.
If IPS is involved in integrating multisensory information to update and
produce coherent body representations, then it is critical for the processes of
self-identification and self-updating. Experiment 3 aimed to investigate the
involvement of right IPS in self-updating, by observing the effects of anodal
tDCS over this region on the Enfacement Illusion. Participants took part in
three experimental sessions which were distinguished by the type of stimulation
received. In one session participants received anodal tDCS to the right IPS
region, while the remaining two served as an active control (anodal-PFC) and a
baseline (Sham) condition. After receiving the tDCS, participants completed a
typical enfacement paradigm consisting of two self-recognition tasks separated
by an IMS session. The first self-recognition task served as a baseline while
the second measured changes in self-recognition following the IMS session. It
was expected that the typical enfacement effect: an inclusion of the IMS face
in the self-face representation, would be observed in the two control conditions
(anodal-PFC and sham); but also that in the IPS session this effect would
be enhanced. It was hypothesised that if IPS contributes to the self-updating
process by integrating incoming multisensory signals, then increasing cortical
excitability in this region would enhance the effect of the Enfacement Illusion.
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5.2 Materials and Methods
5.2.1 Participants
Twenty-five participants were recruited to take part in the study. Twenty-
three participants (12 female, 11 male, mean age = 20.7 years, SD = 3.72)
completed all three experimental sessions and were reimbursed for their time.
All participants were screened for possible contraindications to tDCS before
they took part in the study, and were unaware of the aim of the study until
they had completed their participation. All participants were self-reportedly
right handed. The study was approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics
Committee, Royal Holloway, University of London.
5.2.2 Design
The study was a double-blind, sham-controlled, repeated measures, within-
subjects design with factors of tDCS Type (anodal-IPS vs anodal-PFC vs
Sham), Timing of the self-recognition task (pre-IMS vs post-IMS), Synchronic-
ity of IMS (synchronous vs asynchronous), and direction of the morphing video
(“self-to-other” vs “other-to-self”).
5.2.3 Tasks and Scales
5.2.3.1 Self-Recognition Video Morphing Task
The self-recognition task used in the current experiment was the same as
that used in Experiment 1, except for the inclusion of a practice task before the
first instance of the self-recognition task. For a full description of the stimuli
and procedure see Section 3.2.3.1. Prior to the study a photograph was taken of
each participant’s face, which was then morphed separately with two unfamiliar
faces (IMS-A and IMS-B). Six morphing videos were created for each unfamiliar
face identity (10, 15 and 20sec for each direction of morphing), resulting in 12
videos per participant. All photo manipulation, morphing, and video creation
was carried out using Adobe Photoshop CS6, Abrasoft Fantamorph, and Adobe
Premier Pro.
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Preceding the beginning of the task, participants were able to view the photo
of their own face and the unfamiliar person’s face used to create the videos.
During the self-recognition task participants viewed the morphing videos pre-
sented in a randomised order, and responded with their right index finger when
they judged a change in identity of the face. Each of the six videos was played
five times (30 trials total). Between each video a fixation cross was presented
for between 1-2.5 seconds. Each video ended once the participant made their
response, and the next trial began.
Before the first block of the first session, participants took part in a practice
video morphing task in which they saw videos morphing between the faces of two
famous individuals (Emma Watson and Jennifer Lawrence). The instructions
given were the same as for the actual self-recognition task, such that participants
were instructed to respond when they thought that the face in the video started
to look more like the person it was morphing into.
5.2.3.2 Interpersonal Multisensory Stimulation Session
Two IMS videos were recorded, one with each of the unfamiliar individuals
(IMS-A and IMS-B). In the videos the model looked directly into the cam-
era with a neutral expression while they were stroked on the cheek with a
cotton bud. The videos lasted two minutes with a stroke occurring approxi-
mately every 3 seconds (Cardini, Tajadura-Jime´nez, Serino, & Tsakiris, 2013;
Tajadura-Jime´nez, Longo, et al., 2012; Tajadura-Jime´nez, Lorusso, & Tsakiris,
2013).
During the IMS session participants were instructed to sit as still as possible
while watching the video of one of the unfamiliar individuals (IMS-A or IMS-B)
being stroked on the cheek with a cotton bud. While watching the video the
participant was stroked on the same place on their own cheek with a cotton bud
by the experimenter. The stroking was always applied in a specularly congruent
location to the video, as if the participant were looking into a mirror. The
participants were stroked either in synchrony or asynchrony with the stroking
in the video.
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5.2.3.3 Interpersonal Multisensory Stimulation Questionnaire
The Interpersonal Multisensory Stimulation (IMS) questionnaire can be
used to assess the subjective strength of the enfacement experience. The scale
was adapted from (Tajadura-Jime´nez, Longo, et al., 2012). Participants an-
swered ten questions assessing four different aspects of the enfacement experi-
ence (Control, Similarity, Ownership and Touch Referral), making four subs-
scales. The Control sub-scale focuses on the sense of control and imitation of
the IMS face. The Similarity sub-scale focuses on the subjective sense of sim-
ilarity between the participant’s own face and the IMS face. The Ownership
sub-scale contains questions about the sense of body-ownership over the IMS
face, and the Touch Referral sub-scale asks about the experience of touch during
IMS. Items are scored on a 7-point Likert scale from “Strongly Agree” (3) to
“Strongly Disagree” (-3), with positive scores representing stronger subjective
effects of the illusion. Scores were recoded to a scale of 0 to 6 for the analysis.
See Table 5.1 for the full list of items in the IMS questionnaire.
Table 5.1: Items in the Interpersonal Multisensory Stimulation Questionnaire.
Item During the IMS session... Sub-scale
1 “I felt like the other’s face was my face” Ownership
2 “It seemed like the other’s face belonged to me” Ownership
3 “It seemed like I was looking at my own mirror reflection” Ownership
4
“It seemed like the other’s face began to resemble my own
face”
Similarity
5
“It seemed like my own face began to resemble the other person’s
face”
Similarity
6 “It seemed like my own face was out of my control” Control
7
“It seemed like the experience of my face was less vivid than
normal”
Control
8 “I felt that I was imitating the other person” Control
9
“The touch I felt was caused by the cotton bud touching the
other’s face”
Touch Referral
10
“The touch I saw on the other’s face was caused by the cotton
bud touching my own face”
Touch Referral
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5.2.3.4 Inclusion of Other in Self Scale
The Inclusion of Other in Self Scale (IOS) is a single-item, pictorial mea-
sure of self-other closeness (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). Participants are
presented with a series of images showing increasingly overlapping circles, rep-
resenting themselves and another person (see Figure 5.1). Participants choose
which of the images best represents their relationship with a named person.
Figure 5.1: The single-item Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale. Participants
choose which of the Venn-like diagram images best represents their relationship
with a named person.
5.2.4 tDCS Parameters
Two square electrodes, placed inside saline soaked sponge sleeves were used
for the stimulation. Two rubber straps held the electrodes in place on the par-
ticipant’s head. For Anodal-IPS, the anodal electrode was placed over electrode
position P4, corresponding to right IPS (electroencephalography 10/20 system:
Herwig et al., 2003; Jacobson et al., 2012; Klein et al., 2013) while the Cathodal
electrode was placed on the forehead. For Anodal-PFC stimulation the anodal
electrode was placed over F3, corresponding left PFC (Herwig et al., 2003), and
the Cathodal electrode was placed on the vertex (individually measured for each
participant). For the Sham stimulation, either the Anodal-IPS or Anodal-PFC
electrode set-up was used, counterbalanced across participants. The stimula-
tion duration was 20 minutes, with an intensity of 1.5 mA (30 seconds ramp
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up, 20 seconds ramp down). For the Sham stimulation, the stimulator was
switched on only the first 15 seconds of stimulation, to mimic the initial itch-
ing sensation experienced in the active stimulation sessions, after which it only
conducted periodic impedance checks.
5.2.5 Procedure
Each participant took part in three stimulation sessions, separated by at
least 24 hours. In each session the participant received a different type of stim-
ulation at the beginning of the session (Anodal-IPS, Anodal-PFC, and Sham-
IPS/PFC). The order of the stimulation type received was counterbalanced
across participants. Participants received 20 minutes of stimulation before
starting the experimental tasks.
Following 20 minutes of stimulation, the participant took part in two experi-
mental blocks. Each block consisted of a Pre-IMS self-recognition task, followed
by a two minute IMS session, followed by the post-IMS self-recognition task, and
finally the IMS questionnaire and IOS scale. Within each block participants saw
the same unfamiliar face (IMS-A or IMS-B) across both self-recognition tasks
and the IMS session. The other unfamiliar face (IMS-A or IMS-B) was used in
the second experimental block. Between the two blocks participants rested for
five minutes, and looked at their face in a mirror for 60 seconds to abolish the
effect of the IMS. In each session, participants experienced synchronous IMS in
one block, and asynchronous IMS in the other. The order of synchronicity and
the identity of the unfamiliar face used in each IMS session was counterbalanced
across participants. See Figure 5.2 for an illustrated procedure.
5.2.6 Data Analysis
Preceding analysis, the raw RT data from the self-recognition task was
converted into ‘% of self visible at time of response’.
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Figure 5.2: An illustrated procedure of one experimental session. Each session
started with 20 minutes of tDCS, followed by two blocks. Each block started with 60
seconds of mirror exposure, followed by a pre-IMS self-recognition task, an IMS
session, a post-IMS self-recognition task, and lastly the IMS and IOS questionnaires.
In one of the blocks participants experienced synchronous IMS, and in the other
block they experienced asynchronous IMS.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Self-Recognition Task Analysis
3 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors of tDCS (anodal-
IPS vs. anodal-PFC vs. sham), synchronicity of IMS (synchronous vs. asyn-
chronous), timing of self-recognition task (pre-IMS vs. post-IMS) and direction
of morphing (self-to-other vs. other-to-self). The ANOVA revealed a pre-
dictable main effect of direction of morphing: F (1, 22) = 47.30, p < .001, η2
= .68, reflecting that in the self-to-other direction of morphing, when partici-
pants indicated the point at which they recognised the other’s face, there was
significantly less of the self-face-visible than in the other-to-self direction when
participants indicated the point at which they recognised their own face (self-
to-other M = 41.28, other-to-self M = 65.88). There was also a significant
main effect of timing: F (1, 22) = 35.36, p < .001, η2 = .62, reflecting a reduc-
tion in the %-of-self-face visible at the point of discrimination following IMS,
regardless of synchronicity of the IMS, tDCS or direction of morphing (pre M
Chapter 5. The role of intraparietal sulcus in self-identification and
self-updating
106
= 54.81, post M = 52.35). These main effects were eclipsed by a significant
interaction between timing and direction of morphing: F (1, 22) = 4.42, p =
.047, η2 = .17.
To explore the interaction, four new variables were created by collapsing
across tDCS and synchronicity, to create values reflecting the % of self-face
visible at the pre-IMS self-recognition task for self-to-other and other-to-self
directions of morphing, and the post-IMS self-recognition task for self-to-other
and other-to-self directions of morphing. Paired samples t-tests (with a cor-
rected alpha level of .016) revealed significant differences in both directions of
morphing following IMS: self-to-other pre vs. post-IMS [t(22) = 5.229, p <
.001] (pre M = 42.97, post M = 39.59)., other-to-self pre vs. post-IMS [t(22)
= 5.743, p = .012] (pre M = 66.65, post M = 65.12. See Figure 5.3. Means,
SDs and 95% confidence intervals for all conditions can be seen in Table 5.2.
Figure 5.3: There was a significant reduction in the amount of self-face visible
following IMS in both directions of video, regardless of synchronicity of the IMS or
the type of tDCS received. Error bars represent standard error.
A further two variables were created to explore whether the change following
IMS was different between directions of morphing. These variables represented
the difference between the post-IMS and pre-IMS scores for each direction of
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morphing separately. A paired-samples t test (with corrected alpha level of
.016) revealed that there was no significant difference in the change following
IMS between the two directions of morphing: t(22) = 2.102, p = .047 (self-to-
other M = 3.383, other-to-self M = 1.531).
5.3.2 Interpersonal Multisensory Stimulation Questionnaire Anal-
ysis
The potential effects of tDCS on the subjective experience of the Enfacement
Illusion were analysed by comparing reports on the IMS questionnaire across
the different stimulation sessions and the IMS blocks. The four sub-scales of
the IMS questionnaire were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with
factors sub-scale (ownership vs. similarity vs. touch referral vs. control), tDCS
(anodal-IMS vs. anodal PFC vs. sham) and synchronicity of IMS (synchronous
vs. asynchronous). There was a significant main effect of sub-scale: F (3, 66) =
8.951, p < .001, η2 = .289, reflecting that participants agreed more strongly with
the Similarity and Control sub-scales than the Ownership and Touch Referral
sub-scales (Similarity M = 2.681, Control M = 2.644, Ownership M = 2.012,
Touch Referral M = 1.761). Bonferroni corrected t-tests comparing each sub-
scale against every other sub-scale revealed significant differences between scores
on the Ownership and Similarity sub-scales (p = .004), Ownership and Control
sub-scales (p = .028), Touch Referral and Similarity sub-scales (p = .019),
and Touch Referral and Control sub-scales (p = .003). There was also a main
effect of synchronicity of IMS: F (1, 22) = 26.94, p < .001, η2 = .55, reflecting a
stronger subjective experience of the Enfacement Illusion following synchronous
IMS (M = 2.79), rather than asynchronous IMS (M = 1.76). The main effect
of tDCS was not significant, nor were any interaction effects. See Figure 5.4.
5.3.3 Inclusion of Other in Self Scale Analysis
The scores from the IOS scale were analysed, to compare the subjective
experience of the inclusion of other in self following IMS across the tDCS con-
ditions. Scores from the IOS scale were provided as input in a 3 x 2 repeated
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Figure 5.4: Scores on the IMS questionnaire were significantly highly across all
sub-scales and tDCS sessions for the synchronous IMS block, relative to the
asynchronous IMS block. Error bars represent standard error.
measures ANOVA with factors of tDCS (anodal-IMS vs. anodal PFC vs. sham)
and synchronicity of IMS (synchronous vs. asynchronous). There was a main
effect of synchronicity of IMS: F (1, 22) = 19.186, p < .001, η2 = .466, indicat-
ing a stronger subjective inclusion of other into self following synchronous IMS
(M = 3.2), as opposed to asynchronous IMS (M = 2.33). No other main or
interaction effects reached significance. See Figure 5.5.
5.4 Discussion
Experiment 3 aimed to investigate the involvement of IPS in multisensory
integration during the process of self-updating. It was hypothesized that An-
odal tDCS over IPS would facilitate the integration of multisensory signals
during the Enfacement Illusion, resulting in a stronger behavioral and subjec-
tive Enfacement effect (relative to anodal-PFC and Sham stimulation). It was
predicted that the results of the self-recognition task would show more inclu-
sion of the IMS in the self-face representation following synchronous IMS in
the anodal-IPS condition than synchronous IMS in both the anodal-PFC and
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Figure 5.5: Subjective ratings on the IOS scale were significantly higher across all
tDCS conditions following synchronous IMS, as opposed to asynchronous IMS. Error
bars represent standard error.
Sham conditions. No change in the self-face representation was expected follow-
ing asynchronous IMS in any tDCS condition, akin with the typical Enfacement
effect. It was also expected that the subjective experience of Enfacement, mea-
sured with the IOS scale and IMS questionnaire, would be stronger following
synchronous IMS in the anodal-IPS condition relative to following synchronous
IMS in both the anodal-PFC and Sham conditions. As with the behavioural
results, it was expected that the overall subjective experience of Enfacement
would be stronger following synchronous IMS compared with asynchronous IMS
across all tDCS conditions.
Firstly, analysis of the questionnaire data (IMS and IOS scales) indicated
that the synchronous IMS session successfully elicited a subjective ‘enface-
ment’ experience across all tDCS conditions. Agreement with all sub-scales
of the IMS questionnaire was stronger following synchronous IMS, in compar-
ison with asynchronous IMS. This indicates that participants identified more
with the IMS face, and felt that the IMS face and their own face were more
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similar, following synchronous IMS. The same pattern was also found for the
IOS scale: participants reported feeling closer to the IMS individual following
synchronous IMS in comparison with asynchronous IMS. Interpretation of the
IMS questionnaire results would suggest that the manipulation of synchronicity
was successful at inducing the introspective experience of enfacement, that is:
participants identified with the face in the video, and participants felt that the
face more closely resembled their own. This subjective experience during syn-
chronous IMS mirrors two of the key processes involved in producing a mental
self-face representation – self-identification and self-recognition.
However, although the synchronous IMS session appeared to have induced
a subjective ‘enfacement’ effect, the same pattern was not reflected in the re-
sults of the self-recognition task. The results indicated that, following both
synchronous and asynchronous IMS, participants discriminated between their
own and the other’s face at a point where less of their own face was visible than
before the IMS session. This was apparent in both directions of morphing video.
Previous research investigating self-updating using the Enfacement Illusion and
video morphing self-recognition tasks has found a specific effect of synchronous
IMS on self-other recognition (Tsakiris, 2008), with one study finding an effect
only in the other-to-self direction of morphing (Tajadura-Jime´nez, Longo, et
al., 2012). Specifically, following synchronous IMS, participants responded dur-
ing the video to indicate recognition of their own face at an earlier point, when
more of the other’s face was visible than before the IMS session. This has been
interpreted as reflecting an inclusion of the other’s face in the mental self-face
representation, induced by the multisensory integration of seen and observed
touch during the IMS session.
Considering the results of the questionnaire analysis, suggesting that an
‘enfacement’ effect was induced during synchronous IMS, it is surprising that
such an effect was not reflected in the self-recognition data. This disparity be-
tween subjective and objective measures of the illusion may suggest that the
video morphing task used to measure self-recognition is sensitive to practice
effects, and not able to capture the subtle changes in self-face representation
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following a successful induction of the ‘enfacement’ illusion. A review of stud-
ies that used the ‘enfacement’ paradigm, and objectively measured changes in
self-recognition between synchronous and asynchronous IMS, shows that five
studies used a static photo task to measure self-recognition (Cardini et al.,
2013; Maister, Banissy, & Tsakiris, 2013; Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, & Aglioti,
2010; Tajadura-Jime´nez, Longo, et al., 2012; Tajadura-Jime´nez et al., 2013),
while two used a morphing video task (Tajadura-Jime´nez, Longo, et al., 2012;
Tsakiris, 2008, for a full review see Chapter 1). Of the two that used a morphing
video task, both paradigms differed to that used in the current study. Firstly,
the videos were of a longer length than those used in the current study (50sec
and 100sec: Tajadura-Jime´nez, Longo, et al., 2012; Tsakiris, 2008). Secondly,
participants responded to the videos in short blocks, consisting of one video, an
IMS session, and a second video (within each block only one direction of video
was shown). These differences between the paradigms used by previous research
and the experiment in this chapter could go some way to explaining the results
of the current experiment. Specifically, the current study had a larger number
of trials than previous enfacement research using a video morphing self-other
recognition task, and these were intermixed before and after only one session
of IMS.
The results of the current experiment may reflect a learning effect, as par-
ticipants become more familiar with what the IMS face looks like throughout
the video morphing tasks and the IMS session. Before taking part in the exper-
iment, participants had never seen the face of the IMS individual, but through
exposure to the IMS face during the video morphing task and the IMS sessions,
participants would have come to recognise the face. The results of the current
study showed that regardless of synchronicity of the IMS, the direction of the
morphing video, or the type of tDCS received, participants always responded
following IMS at a point in the video when more of the other’s face was vis-
ible. This might reflect a more stringent criterion for recognising the other’s
face, following increased familiarity with what the other looked like throughout
the experiment. As participants became more familiar with the other’s face,
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they may have started to respond at a point where more of the other’s face
was visible, to match with their newly formed concept of what the other’s face
looked like. The video task used in this experiment would be far more sus-
ceptible to this type of learning effect than static image tasks used in other
enfacement research due to the fact that participants repeatedly, and know-
ingly, saw the endpoint of the self-other morph representing 100% the other’s
face at the beginning of the other-to-self direction of morphing videos. There-
fore, on half of the trials, participants began by seeing what the other’s face
actually looked like. In static image tasks, the images are randomised so that
participants are unaware of which image truly represents 100% other, and are
therefore less likely to produce up an accurate representation of the other’s face
during the self-other recognition task. It is important to make a comparison
here between the video morphing task used in Experiment 1 and the task used
in the current Chapter. In Experiment 1, participants only performed the video
morphing task twice: once before and once after tDCS, compared with six times
in the current Experiment (with each IMS face). Furthermore, in Experiment
1 participants were already familiar with the other’s face in the videos as they
themselves had chosen a famous person with which they were highly familiar.
Therefore, the same learning effect would not have been present in the video
morphing task in Experiment 1.
Because of the potential practice effects of the morphing video task, it is
difficult to conclusively tell whether there was an effect of anodal tDCS over
IPS on multisensory integration. Analysis of the questionnaire data did not
indicate a difference in the subjective experience of the illusion between tDCS
types, but it is unclear whether this would indicate that there was no effect at
all of the tDCS on multisensory integration, or whether different brain areas
are involved in producing the subjective experience of ownership over a seen
face, from those involved in integrating visual and tactile experiences in order
to produce coherent representations of the body. Apps et al. (2013), in their
brain imaging study of the Enfacement Illusion, found that the IPS, IOG and
TPJ all showed activity that varied parametrically with the extent to which the
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illusion was experienced. IPS is thought to be involved in updating representa-
tions of the body via the integration of multisensory information, which then
result in predictions being formed about upcoming somatosensory input to the
body (Blanke, 2012). The TPJ also integrates multisensory information and is
important in processing of the first person perspective (Ionta et al., 2011), but
additionally, TPJ has also been implicated in the processing of other’s men-
tal perspectives (Decety & Lamm, 2007; Frith & Frith, 2006; Santiesteban et
al., 2012). This indicates that activity in TPJ may reflect the extent to which
both self, and other people’s perspectives are being processed. Interestingly,
Apps et al. (2013) observed a reduction in TPJ activity during synchronous
IMS, scaled with the experience of enfacement, which they suggest could in-
dicate that participants were representing and experiencing the other’s face as
their own during synchronous IMS, rather than a separate individual. It could
be that the subjective experience of identifying with the IMS face relies more
closely on processing within the TPJ, and thus was not affected by the tDCS
manipulation of the current study. Although, it is important to note that the
TPJ is connected to the ventral IPS (reference), and therefore it may be ex-
pected that the extent to which the illusion is experienced subjectively – if this
is dependent on activity in TPJ – would also be linked to the functioning of
IPS during multisensory integration.
It is also possible that the current study found no effect of tDCS on the
magnitude of the Enfacement Illusion because the tDCS targeted only one area
of a wider network that contributes to the updating of body-representations
through multisensory integration. As previously stated, activity within TPJ,
IPS and IOG has been shown to vary parametrically with the extent to which
the Enfacement Illusion is being experienced (Apps et al., 2013). The experi-
ence of the illusion therefore is likely to rely on the interplay between, at least,
these three brain regions. It may not be possible to influence the strength
of the illusion by manipulating neuronal excitability in just one part of this
network (IPS). If the effects of multisensory integration on self-updating and
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self-recognition reply on processing in a wider network of areas, increasing ex-
citability in one area may not have an overall effect on the illusion while the
excitability of neuronal populations in other areas remains unchanged, leading
to a bottleneck processing effect.
In conclusion, it is difficult to interpret from the results of the current study
whether tDCS over IPS affected self-recognition when viewing the self-other
morphing videos following synchronous IMS. However, it did not appear to
affect the subjective experience of the synchronous IMS, as measured by the
IMS questionnaire and IOS scale, which may suggest that anodal tDCS of
IPS did not increase the magnitude of multisensory integration on self-face
updating. It is speculated that this could be due to IPS’s role as a part of
a wider network involved in integrating multisensory stimulation during the
Enfacement Illusion, in which the interplay between different areas produces
the enfacement experience. Increasing excitability in one area may not be able
to enhance the effect of synchronous IMS as other brain areas also critically
contribute to the processes of updating one’s face representation and identifying
with a new face.
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6 The role of primary
somatosensory cortex in
self-identification and
self-updating
6.1 Introduction
In the previous Chapter, Experiment 3 investigated the invovlement of IPS
in self-identification and self-updating during the Enfacement Illusion. In this
Chapter, Experiment 4 will investigate how the primary somatosensory area
(S1), as part of the somatosensory mirror system, may contribute to these two
processes by representing observed and experienced tactile stimulation.
Chapter 1 of this thesis introduced the idea that self-identification and self-
updating rely on mechanisms of multisensory integration, by coupling unimodal
visual and tactile information about the body in order to update existing mental
body representations (Tajadura-Jime´nez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012). Touch on
the skin is conveyed to the primary somatosensory cortex, which is then mapped
onto a stored mental representation of the body – localising the touch to a par-
ticular body part. This tactile information then converges with visual informa-
tion in multisensory brain areas, i.e. the intraparietal sulcus and rTPJ (Apps et
al., 2013). Here, the tactile and visual information is integrated, leading to an
updated self-face representation. Thereby the process of self-recognition is not
simply a comparison of what is seen in the mirror with a stored representation
of one’s face, but relies on a complex network of brain regions which integrate
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incoming sensory information about the body with pre-existing and continu-
ally updated body representations. The role of multisensory integration in body
updating can be observed experimentally with bodily illusions (e.g. RHI and
Enfacement Illusion), which manipulate sensory inputs under experimental con-
ditions to induce changes in body ownership and representation. Neuroimaging
research combined with bodily illusions has highlighted a number of brain re-
gions that may be involved in multisensory integration during self-updating
(Apps et al., 2013). However, to date there has been little research employing
the techniques of noninvasive brain stimulation to provide causal evidence of
the involvement of specific regions in this process. The current chapter aims
to investigate the role of the primary somatosensory area (S1) in the percep-
tion of touch and its contribution to self-updating. Specifically, Experiment
4 will combine a well reported bodily illusion (the Enfacement Illusion) with
non-invasive brain stimulation (tDCS) to explore the causal involvement of S1
in self-updating.
The conscious experience of touch depends on a close link between somatic
sensory receptors on the skin and activation of a specific population of neurons
in S1 (Serino & Haggard, 2010). When the body is touched, peripheral signals
from the skin are conveyed by the dorsal column-medial lemniscus pathway to
S1 of the contralateral hemisphere. The neurons in S1 code the spatial prop-
erties of the tactile stimulation relative to the body. Within S1, the neurons
comprise a topographically organised map of the contralateral side of the hu-
man body. Thus, tactile stimulation to a body part will elicit activation in a
specific part of S1. The relationship between localisation of touch on the body
and activation of the corresponding part of the somatosensory homunculus has
been reported in both humans and animals (Penfield & Boldrey, 1937; Kaas,
Nelson, Sur, Lin, & Merzenich, 1979; Yang, Gallen, Schwartz, & Bloom, 1993).
However, evidence for reorganization of this ‘map’ following peripheral (e.g.
amputation), or central (e.g. lesion) modifications, suggests that there is not a
hard-wired link between the perception of touch on the body and activation of
a specific part of S1 (Medina & Coslett, 2010). In line with this, it is suggested
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that the localisation of physical touch to the body is a two-step process. Firstly,
the tactile stimulus is localised within the somatotopic map within S1, which
codes its location relative to other locations within the map. Secondly, the lo-
cation of the touch within the somatotopic map is mapped onto structural and
postural representations of the body (Longo, Azan˜o´n, & Haggard, 2010; Med-
ina & Coslett, 2010; Serino & Haggard, 2010). Following the mapping of the
somatotopic touch onto the pre-existing body models, the physical experience
of touch is localised to the corresponding body part.
Under certain conditions, the human somatosensory system can also be
activated in the absence of tactile stimulation. In a somatosensory analogue of
the human mirror neuron system that represents both executed and observed
actions (Rizzolatti, 2005), the human somatosensory system appears to reflect
the tactile experiences of others (Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010). SII, and
parts of SI, have been shown to be vicariously activated during the perception
of touch being delivered to other people (Schaefer, Xu, Flor, & Cohen, 2009;
Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith, & Ward, 2005; Keysers et al., 2004). Crucially,
BA3 (within SI) is never activated during the observation of touch to others,
but only when we are touched ourselves (Keysers et al., 2010). This lack of
vicarious BA3 activation may be the crucial factor that accounts for the fact
that we can neurally represent others’ tactile experiences but do not consciously
experience them as qualia on our own body (Keysers et al., 2010). In support of
this, vicarious activation of BA3 has been observed in a sub-set of synathestic
individuals (mirror-touch synathetes) who experience the sensation of touch on
their own bodies when viewing other people being touched (Blakemore et al.,
2005).
Blakemore et al. (2005) provided the first report of an individual with vision-
touch, or ‘mirror-touch’ synesthesia (MTS). When ‘C’ observed another person
being touched on their body, she experienced the sensation of tactile stim-
ulation on the same part of her body. Blakemore et al. (2005) used fMRI
to compare activation in C’s brain during the observation of touch with non-
synesthetic controls. In C, the observation of another person being touched
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was associated with heightened activation of the somatosensory system, and
additional activation in the central sulcus (roughly corresponding to BA3). A
recent tDCS study in neurotypical individuals supports the idea that the expe-
rience of synaesthetic touch in MTS may be in part due to overactivity in the
somatosensory system. Bolognini, Miniussi, Gallo, and Vallar (2013) induced
MTS-like effects in non-synesthetic participants by applying anodal tDCS over
S1 while the participants performed a vision-touch interference task (specifi-
cally designed to test MTS). The increase in cortical excitability in S1 caused
participants to become slower at localising a tactile stimulus delivered to their
hand when they viewed a video of the opposite hand being touched, similar to
typical task performance for individuals with MTS.
Maister et al. (2013) tested whether the remapping of observed touch in
individuals with MTS could lead to changes in the self-face representation.
Participants took part in a modified enfacement paradigm in which they per-
formed a self-recognition task before and after watching a typical enfacement
video, except that during the video they did not receive any touch to their own
face (neither synchronous nor asynchronous). In a control group of participants
without synesthesia, no change in self-recognition was observed following the
enfacement video. However, the participants with MTS reported feeling tac-
tile stimulation on their own face when they watched the other person being
touched; showed corresponding subjective reports of self-other blurring; and
demonstrated behavioural change in self-recognition akin to the typical Enface-
ment effect. The results show that synesthetic touch, in the absence of physical
touch, is able to update the mental representation of the self-face, reflecting
the typical process of self-updating during the Enfacement Illusion. Taken to-
gether with theories of MTS, this suggests that activity in S1 contributes to
self-updating during multisensory integration by representing the experienced
physical touch in the brain.
Experiment 4 aimed to explore the involvement of S1 in self-updating by us-
ing tDCS to enhance cortical excitability in S1 in an attempt to induce MTS-like
somatosensory mirroring effects. The experiment compared the effect of anodal
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tDCS over S1 with a control condition of sham stimulation. Participants took
part in two experimental sessions, on separate days, which were the same ex-
cept for the type of tDCS delivered at the beginning of each session. In one
session, participants received 20 minutes of anodal tDCS over S1, while in the
control session they received 20 minutes of sham stimulation. Following stimu-
lation, participants performed a self-recognition task before and after watching
an IMS video in which an unfamiliar person was stroked on the cheek but,
unlike in the typical Enfacement Illusion, the participant did not receive touch
to their own face. Performance on the self-recognition task before IMS was
compared to the performance following IMS. The interaction between the tim-
ing of the self-recognition task and the type of tDCS received was explored. It
was hypothesised that there would be a change in self-recognition performance
following IMS in the anodal condition, as the enhanced cortical excitability of
S1 would lead to above threshold vicarious activation in this area in response
to the observation of the other’s face being touched in the IMS video. This
would result in the conscious experience of touch, and lead to the integration
of the visual information in the video with the tactile sensation, resulting in a
change in the stored self-face representation. It was further hypothesised that
the magnitude of the change would be positively related to individual differ-
ences in empathic traits because previous research has reported of higher levels
of empathic ability in individuals with MTS (Banissy & Ward, 2007), as well as
a positive relationship in neurotypical individuals between empathic ability and
the vicarious recruitment of S1 while observing touch delivered to others (as
measured by the Perspective Taking sub-scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity
Index) (Schaefer, Heinze, & Rotte, 2012).
6.2 Materials and Methods
6.2.1 Participants
30 participants volunteered to take part in the study. Two participants did
not complete the second session of the experiment and so were not included
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in the analysis, leaving 28 complete data points. All participants were female
and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision (Mean age = 21.5 years, SD =
2.5; Right-handed = 23, Left-handed = 5). All participants were screened for
contraindications to tDCS before taking part, and provided signed informed
consent before the experiment began. The study was approved by the Royal
Holloway, University of London Ethics Committee.
6.2.2 Design
The study employed a sham-controlled, double-blind, repeated measures,
within-subjects design, with factors Type of Stimulation (anodal vs. sham)
and Timing of self-recognition task (Pre-IMS vs. Post-IMS). All participants
took part in two sessions, separated by at least 24 hours, in which they received
active stimulation in one session and sham stimulation in the other. The order
of the stimulation sessions was counterbalanced across participants.
6.2.3 Procedure
All participants took part in two experimental sessions. At the beginning
of the first session, participants filled out the Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(IRI) as a measure of empathy. Each session started with 20 minutes of tDCS
(either anodal or sham stimulation) over right S1. Participants then performed
a self-recognition task both before and after watching an IMS video in a no-
touch IMS session session (where they watched a face being stroked but were
not touched themselves). Both experimental sessions were identical, except for
the type of stimulation received (Active or sham), and the identity of the face
seen in the self-recognition task and IMS video. The identity of the face in the
self-recognition task and IMS video was held constant within each stimulation
condition, but differed between stimulation conditions. The identitiy of the
IMS face was not a factor in the design, but a different face was used for each
session to avoid carry over effects from the previous session. See Figure 6.1C.
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Figure 6.1: (A) An example of the morphed images presented to participants in the
self-recognition task. (B) A frame from the IMS video. (C) The experimental
procedure.
6.2.4 tDCS Parameters
In the anodal session, participants received anodal stimulation to the right
S1, contralateral to the side of the face that would have received tactile stimu-
lation during the IMS session. The electrode positions were localised using the
EEG 10/20 system, with the anodal electrode placed centrally over the point
2cm posterior from EEG electrode position P4 to stimulate S1, and the refer-
ence electrode over the contralateral supraorbital area (Bolognini et al., 2013).
Participants received stimulation for 20 minutes at an amplitude of 1.5mA (fade
in time: 30sec; fade out time: 30sec).
6.2.5 Stimuli and Tasks
6.2.5.1 Self-Recognition Task
Before the experimental session a photograph was taken of each participant’s
face with a neutral expression. All photographs were converted to greyscale,
flipped horizontally so as to reflect the orientation of the self-face that partici-
pants would be most accustomed with (from mirror exposure), and a template
was applied around the face to remove hair and non-facial features. All photo
manipulation was completed using Adobe Photoshop CS6. The same procedure
was also applied to photographs of two gender-matched unfamiliar individuals.
The participant’s face was then morphed with each of the two unfamiliar faces
separately, creating two sets of morphed images images (one for use in each
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session - anodal/sham). The face morphing software Abrasoft Fantamorph
(www.fantamorph.com) was used to create a morphing continuum between each
pair of faces. 25 images representing 4% steps of morphing between the two
faces were exported. See Figure 6.1A.
In each session, one of the sets of morphed images was used for both the pre-
IMS and post-IMS self-recognition task. Each trial of the self-recognition task
began with a central fixation cross, presented for 500-1500ms. One of the 25
morphed face images was then presented for 2000ms, replaced by a sliding scale
consisting of a vertical line marked with 100 at the top and 0 at the bottom.
Participants used a mouse to rate on the scale how much the presented face
resembled their own face. Participants had as much time as they required
to give their response, but were encouraged to go with their initial instincts
about the photos and respond quickly. Images were presented in a randomised
order. Each of the 25 images was repeated four times per block (pre-IMS and
post-IMS), resulting in a total of 100 trials per block. The identity of the face
morphed with the participant’s face for the self-recognition task matched the
face seen in the IMS video within the same session. The order of the morphing
face identities (first session or second session) and the pairing between each
identity and each type of stimulation (anodal and sham) was counterbalanced
across participants.
6.2.5.2 No-touch Interpersonal Multisensory Stimulation Session
Following the first block of the self-recognition task, participants took part
in a ‘no-touch’ IMS session. For two minutes participants watched a typical IMS
video in which the face in the video was stroked on the cheek approximately
every 2 seconds, however, participants received no touch themselves during this
time.
The person in the video was always touched on their right cheek, which was
contralateral to the tDCS site (right S1) from a specular perspective. The ra-
tionale for this was that when looking at a pair of hands from a first-person per-
spective, the induction of mirror-touch synesthesia in non-synaesthetes through
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tDCS was only effective when visual touch was contralateral to tDCS (Bolognini
et al., 2013), suggesting the use of an anatomical frame of reference. As for ob-
served touch to faces, Blakemore et al. (2005) provide functional MRI support
for an anatomical reference frame as well. In non-synesthetes viewing videos of
faces being touched, S1 activation was observed contralateral to the side of the
face being touched, such that touch to the left side of a face activated right S1.
However, one’s own face is only ever viewed in the mirror, which supports the
relative bias among mirror-touch synesthetes towards a specular frame of ref-
erence when observing touch to a face (Banissy, Cohen Kadosh, Maus, Walsh,
& Ward, 2009). When mirror-touch synaesthetes experience the Enfacement
Illusion in a no-touch condition (Maister et al., 2013), they must be using a
specular reference frame – and experiencing touch on the same side of their
face as the touch in the video (from a specular perspective, not anatomically)
– otherwise the illusion would not work. Therefore, for the illusion to work
through the inducement of mirror-touch synesthesia by tDCS, the observed
touch must be contralateral to the tDCS site (from a specular perspective),
and ipsilateral anatomically. See Figure 6.1B.
6.2.6 Scales
6.2.6.1 Interpersonal Multisensory Stimulation Questionnaire
The IMS Questionnaire was used to measure the subjective experience of
the Enfacement Illusion. For a full description of the questionnaire see Section
5.2.3.3. One adaption was made to the Touch Referral sub-scale of the ques-
tionnaire, removing the item “The touch I saw on the other’s face was caused
by the cotton bud touching my own face”, leaving nine items.
6.2.6.2 Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale
The IOS Scale was used to measure the subjective sense of overlap between
the participant and the IMS individual. See Section 5.2.3.4 for a full description
of the scale.
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6.2.6.3 Interpersonal Reactivity Index
In their first experimental session, before receiving tDCS, participants com-
pleted the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) as a measure of empathic ability.
The IRI is a 28-item measure, answered on a 5-point likert scale, from “Does
not describe me well” to “Describes me very well”. The items in the scale are
split up into 4 sub-scales, containing 7 items each: Perspective Taking, Fantasy,
Empathic Concern and Personal Distress (Davis, 1983). Higher scores on the
scale represent better empathic ability.
6.2.7 Data Analysis
The participants’ ratings of the morphed-face stimuli in the self-face recogni-
tion task were fitted into a sigmoid statistical model to determine the percentage
of morphing at which participants judged the amount of their own face and the
other face to be equal – the ‘point of subjective equality’ (PSE; Sforza et al.,
2010). This resulted in four PSE values per participant, i.e. the baseline and
post-IMS self-recognition tasks for both the anodal and sham tDCS sessions.
These values were used in the analysis to investigate the effect of tDCS over S1
on self-updating.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 IMS Questionnaire and IOS Scale Analysis
First, the subjective effect of the IMS video was investigated by analysing
data from the IMS questionnaire and IOS scale. A two-way within-subjects
ANOVA was conducted with factors Type of Stimulation (anodal vs. sham)
and sub-scale (4 sub-scales: Similarity, Ownership, Control and Touch Refer-
ral). There was no main effect of Type of Stimulation, indicating that the
subjective experiences of the IMS session did not differ depending on whether
participants received tDCS to S1 or sham stimulation: F (1, 27) = 1.761, p
= .196, η2 = .061. For both the main effect of sub-scale, and the interaction
between Type of Stimulation and sub-scale, Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was
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Table 6.1: Mean scores on the sub-scales of the IMS Questionnaire and the IOS Scale
across both tDCS conditions.
Sub-scale
Ownership Similarity Control Touch Referral IOS
Anodal 1.7 (1.61) 2.13 (1.74) 2.38 (1.44) 1.39 (1.99) 2.5 (1.26)
Sham 1.57 (1.38) 2.41 (1.72) 2.67 (1.32) 2.39 (2.15) 2.75 (1.27)
Sig.* 0.65 0.38 0.26 0.04* 0.45
*Comparisons are significant at alpha level of .05.
significant, indicating that the assumption of Sphericity was not met (both ps
< .001). Therefore, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values were applied for the
main effect of sub-scale and the interaction between Type of Stimulation and
sub-scale. There was a significant main effect of sub-scale: F (1.787, 48.24)
= 4.13, p = .026, η2 = .133. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons indi-
cated that scores on the Ownership sub-scale were significantly lower than both
the Similarity and Control sub-scales (p = .01, p < .001 respectively). There
was also a significant interaction between sub-scale and Type of Stimulation:
F (1.854, 50.065) = 4.071, p =.026, η2 = .131. Paired samples t-tests indicated
that there were no significant differences between anodal and sham stimulation
on the Ownership: t(27) = .462, p = .648, Similarity: t(27)= -.9, p = .376,
and control sub-scales Control, t(27) = -1.151, p = .26. There was a significant
difference between anodal and sham stimulation on the Touch Referral sub-
scale, t(27) = -2.16, p =.04, indicating a stronger experience of touch referral
following sham tDCS compared with anodal tDCS. Average responses on all
sub-scales in both stimulation conditions can be seen in Table 6.1.
Responses on the IOS scale were compared across both experimental sessions
using a paired-samples t-test. There was no significant difference in self-other
overlap between S1 tDCS and sham stimulation as measured by the IOS scale:
t (27) = -.893, p = .38.
6.3.2 Self-Recognition Task Analysis
Next, the analysis explored whether tDCS over S1 (relative to sham stimu-
lation) elicited a change in self-recognition when participants watched the IMS
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video but did not receive touch to their own face. The PSE values were entered
into a 2-way repeated measures ANOVA with factors Type of Stimulation (an-
odal vs. sham) and Timing (pre-IMS vs. post-IMS). There was a significant
main effect of Type of Stimulation: F (1, 27) = 8.372, p = .007, η2 = .237,
reflecting that, regardless of Timing, PSE values were lower in the sham session
than the anodal session (sham M = 48.70 , anodal M = 51.56). There was also
a main effect of Timing: F (1,27) = 16.574, p < .001, η2 = .38, reflecting the
fact that in both anodal and sham sessions, the PSE was lower after watching
the IMS video (Pre-IMS M = 51.79, Post-IMS M = 48.54). The interaction be-
tween Type of Stimulation and Timing was not significant, indicating that the
effect of tDCS to S1 on self-updating did not differ from the control condition
of sham stimulation. See Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: PSE scores for the anodal and sham stimulation sessions, before and
after the no-touch IMS session. There was a main effect of Timing, and a main
effect of tDCS.
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6.3.3 Interpersonal Reactivity Index Analysis
To investigate whether changes in PSE were related to empathic traits,
change scores were calculated to reflect the magnitude of the change in self-
recognition. These were calculated as Post-IMS minus Pre-IMS, such that a
negative value would indicate a lower PSE following the IMS video, reflecting
less of the self-face visible at the PSE. The change score for the anodal and
sham sessions were entered as the outcome variables into two separate mul-
tiple regressions with the sub-scales of the IRI (Perspective Taking, Fantasy,
Empathic Concern, Personal Distress) as predictor variables.
In the anodal condition, scores on the IRI explained 13.5% of the variance
of the PSE change between post- and pre-test. The overall model was not
significant in predicting the change in PSE score: F (4, 21) = 1.98, p = .135.
Individually, Fantasy (β = .403, t = 1.703, p = .103), Empathic Concern (β =
-.256, t = -1.144, p = .266) and Personal Distress (β = .295, t = 1.374, p =
.184) did not significantly predict PSE change score. However, scores on the
Perspective Taking sub-scale did significantly predict PSE change score (β =
-.581, t = -2.226, p = .037). Higher scores on the Perspective Taking sub-scale
(reflecting better cognitive empathic ability), predicted more of a reduction in
PSE following the IMS video (reflecting more of an inclusion of the other’s face
in the self-face representation). See Figure 6.3.
For the regression on PSE change score in the sham condition, the overall
model was not significant: F (4, 21) = .86, p = .504. Individually, none of the
sub-scales significantly predicted PSE change score: Perspective Taking: β =
-.102, t = -.265, p = .794; Fantasy: β = -.413, t = -1.184, p = .25; Empathic
Concern: β = -.188, t = -.57, p = .575; Personal Distress: β = .173, t = .546,
p = .591.
6.4 Discussion
Experiment 4 aimed to induce mirror-touch synesthetic-like symptoms in
non-synesthetic participants through the modulation of cortical excitability in
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Figure 6.3: Higher Scores on the Perspective Taking sub-scale of the Interpersonal
Reactivity Index predicted larger decreases in PSE score following the no-touch IMS
session in the anodal tDCS session.
S1, using anodal tDCS as a means to investigate self-identification and self-
updating in neurotypical individuals. Following 20 minutes of tDCS, partic-
ipants took part in a typical enfacement paradigm, except that during the
IMS session the participants did not receive any touch to their own face. It
was hypothesised that after receiving anodal tDCS over S1, a change in self-
recognition akin to the typical enfacement effect would be observed following
the IMS session. This would result from the integration of the observed tactile
stimulation (in the IMS video) with synesthetically experienced touch induced
through tDCS of S1. This would be in line with theories of body-representation
and body-ownership which suggest that S1 plays a role in maintaining and up-
dating current representations of the body (Tsakiris, 2010). The results of Ex-
periment 4 indicated that anodal tDCS over S1 did not facilitate self-updating
following the no-touch IMS session. The analysis of the change in PSE follow-
ing the non-touch IMS session indicated that there was no difference in changes
in PSE between the anodal and sham tDCS session. The following discussion
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will consider possible explanations for the lack of a specific effect of tDCS on
self-recognition following the no-touch IMS video
Firstly, the lack of a specific behavioural effect of anodal tDCS over S1
suggests that the manipulation may not have been effective at inducing over-
activity in the somatosensory mirror system. Agreement with the statement
‘I felt touch on my face when I saw the other being touched’ (from the Touch
Referral sub-scale of the enfacement questionnaire) did show a significant dif-
ference between anodal and sham sessions, but it was in the sham session that
participants reported higher subjective experiences of touch referral. Despite
this difference between anodal and sham session, it is important to note that
the mean responses on the touch referral sub-scale indicated that participants
did not consciously experience touch on their own face when they observed the
other being touched in either session. Mean scores for both sessions reflected
disagreement with the statement ‘I felt touch on my face when I saw the other
being touched’. This suggests that the modulation of cortical excitability in S1
with anodal tDCS did not induce the conscious experience of tactile stimulation
when observing another person being touched. It is important to note that a
previous application of anodal tDCS over S1 did not elicit differences in explicit
subjective reports of synesthetic touch, but did induce synesthetic-like effects
that manifested at the level of reaction time differences (Bolognini et al., 2013).
As such, a lack of conscious experience of synesthetic touch does not mean that
‘sub-threshold’ synesthetic symptoms were not induced by anodal tDCS in the
current experiment. However, given that the results indicated that there was
a similar change in PSE following the IMS video in both the anodal and sham
stimulation conditions, they suggest that any effect of the tDCS manipulation
did not play a specific role in updating stored self-face representations. Despite
this, it is interesting that any change in at all in PSE was observed following the
no-touch IMS session, as during the session there was no conscious experience
of tactile stimulation to be integrated with the observed touch. Explanations
for the lack of a specific effect of tDCS, as well as the finding of a change in
PSE in both tDCS sessions, will be discussed below.
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Firstly, there may be brain areas other than S1 that are critically involved
in the experience of synesthetic touch during observation of tactile stimulation.
Blakemore et al. (2005) showed that individuals with MTS showed increased
activity in BA3 corresponding to the observation of touch on other peoples’
bodies and the experience of synesthetic touch. In neurotypical individuals,
BA3 is never vicariously activated by the observation of touch to other people,
suggesting that BA3 may maintain boundaries between the sensory experiences
of the self and others (Keysers et al., 2010). Banissy et al. (2009) suggested that
overactivity in the somatosensory system in MTS is mediated by mechanisms
involved in the process of self-other discrimination, causing a blurring of self-
other boundaries and the misattribution of another’s experience of touch to the
self. Banissy et al. (2009) speculate that areas involved in self-other discrim-
ination, including the IPL and IFG, are overactive in MTS and cause other’s
bodies to be incorporated into the representation of the synaesthetes body. In-
terestingly, the studies by Heinisch et al. (2011, 2012) and Uddin et al. (2006)
as well as Experiment 1 in this thesis, provide causal evidence that disruption
of typical functioning in the temporoparietal area and the encompassing IPL
can cause a blurring between representations of the self and other. It may be
the case that, without disruption to the mechanisms of self-other discrimina-
tion, vicarious activation of the somatosensory cortices will not be attributed
to the self. Therefore, even in the case of heightened neuronal excitability in S1
induced by anodal tDCS, vicarious activation during the observation of touch
to another would not be experienced as synesthetic touch to the self.
With regard to the finding that there was a change in PSE following the
no-touch IMS session in both tDCS sessions, firstly, the change in PSE could
have been a result of increased familiarity with the IMS face. Research suggests
that familiar others can become integrated within our own self-concept, altering
cognitive processing of the other (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Aron &
Aron, 1996; Aron & Fraley, 1999). Observing the other’s face for two minutes
immediately preceding the second self-recognition task may have made the face
sufficiently familiar as to change the perception of the boundary between self
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and other. However, the inclusion of others into the self-representation tends
to reflect the level of personal closeness, rather than merely familiarity with
another (Symons & Johnson, 1997). Furthermore, in previous research using
the Enfacement Illusion, when the participants received tactile stimulation that
was asynchronous with the touch observed in the IMS session, there was no
change in self-recognition performance despite the fact that participants saw
the IMS face during the session and thus also became more familiar with it
(e.g. Tajadura-Jime´nez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012; Tajadura-Jime´nez et al., 2013;
Tsakiris, 2008). Taken together, these results could suggest that the familiarity
developed with the other’s face during the IMS-session is not sufficient to induce
an inclusion of the IMS-face into the self-face representation. To control for
this possibility, a follow-up study should compare changes in self-recognition
following an IMS session in which the IMS face is not touched at all, with an
IMS session in which only the participant does not receive touch (such as the
IMS session in the current experiment). This would create the same level of
familiarity between the participant and the IMS individual, and thus provide
evidence to clarify the question of whether a mere increase in familiarity with
a face is sufficient to change one’s self-face representation.
Alternatively, the results of the current study could suggest that vicarious,
sub-threshold somatosensory resonance with another individual is ever-present
(i.e. even in the sham condition), and under certain conditions, is able to elicit
a change in self-recognition. Research on the human mirror neuron system
(MNS) has shown that during action observation, areas of the brain involved
in the execution of the observed action are activated (Rizzolatti, 2005). This
vicarious activation of the motor system during the observation of action can
have measurable effects on behavioural. For example, vicarious activation of
the motor plan of an observed action can facilitate performance of that action
(Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschla¨ger, & Prinz, 2000; Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, &
Rizzolatti, 2002). More recently the idea of a somatosensory mirror system
has been proposed, following evidence of vicarious activation of S1 during the
observation of touch to another person (Blakemore et al., 2005; Keysers et
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al., 2004; Schaefer et al., 2012). Along the same lines of action facilitation
during action observation in the mirror neuron system, evidence shows that
vicarious somatosensory activity in response to the observation of another per-
son being touched can also affect behaviour. For example, the detection of
near-threshold touch to one’s own face can be enhanced by watching another
person’s face being touched in a congruent location (Serino, Pizzoferrato, &
La`davas, 2008). Similarly, somatosensory areas show vicarious activation when
observers view emotional faces (Winston, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2003). More-
over, when this activity is disrupted by TMS or brain injury, emotional recogni-
tion suffers (Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 2000; Pourtois et
al., 2004), suggesting that neurological mirroring of other’s facial expressions in
somatosensory areas contributes to emotional detection. In summary, past re-
search implies that automatic, vicarious activation of the somatosensory system
occurs in response to the observation of other peoples’ tactile experiences (or
emotional facial expressions), and that this activation can facilitate the sharing
of that experience in the observer. Considering this, watching the IMS video
in the current Experiment is likely to have elicited vicarious activation of the
participants’ somatosensory cortices, mirroring the experience of the person in
the video, regardless of whether participants received anodal tDCS or sham
stimulation. This activation, while sub-threshold for the physical experience of
touch, may have had an effect on the stored representation of the self-face in a
similar way to activation elicited through actual touch.
Although multisensory bodily illusions rely on the integration of both ob-
served touch and physically experienced tactile sensations, in the current study,
while participants did not receive touch to their own face that was congruent
with the touch they observed during the IMS session, they did not receive
incongruent touch either. In the classical enfacement paradigm, the typical
control condition consists of touch being delivered to the participant’s face at a
temporally incongruent location to the touch observed in the IMS video. The
temporal discrepancy between the observed and the felt touch ensures that
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these will be processed as discrete events, and will not be combined in mul-
tisensory brain areas. Thus, the touch in the IMS video is not judged to be
the same touch as that felt on the body. Therefore, the self-face representation
is not updated. In the current study, although participants did not receive
temporally congruent touch during the IMS session, they also did not receive
conflicting tactile stimulation (as asynchronous stroking provides) which would
have indicated to them that the face they were observing was not their own.
Evidence suggests that vision can have powerful effects on the perception of
touch. Pavani, Spence, and Driver (2000) have demonstrated a ‘visual capture
of touch’ effect, in which the perceived location of touch to one’s hidden hand
was drawn towards a seen rubber hand in an anatomically plausible location,
despite being in conflict with proprioceptive information. Therefore, evidence
shows that when sensory modalities (visual and proprioceptive) are in conflict,
visual information can dominate over proprioception. In the current experi-
ment, the observed touch to the IMS face may have taken precedent over the
lack of felt touch on the participant’s own body, leading to a remapping of the
body schema to include the IMS face, resulting in a change in PSE.
To investigate this possibility further, it would be beneficial for future re-
search to directly compare the effects of synchronous IMS, asynchronous IMS, a
no-touch IMS session (where the participant receives no touch), and an IMS ses-
sion in which neither the participant nor the IMS individual receives touch. It is
unlikely that the same magnitude of change in PSE would be observed between
the synchronous and no-touch IMS sessions, as the effect of integrated multi-
sensory stimulation on updating one’s face representation would certainly be
stronger than that of vicarious somatosensory activation experienced alongside
observed touch. However, if a difference were found between the asynchronous
and no-touch conditions this would provide support for the idea that somatosen-
sory mirroring of touch is able to induce a change in self-recognition which was
previously thought to require both physical touch and observed touch.
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7 Investigating Novel
Mechanisms of Self-Updating
7.1 Introduction
1The mental representation of the self is a complex construct, containing
both perceptual information (such as information about the physical appear-
ance of the body, e.g. facial appearance), and conceptual information, which
is comprised of varied semantic and episodic knowledge relevant to the self. So
far in this thesis, Chapters 3-6 have investigated mechanisms involved in the
maintenance and updating of the perceptual self-representation. Interestingly,
there appears to be modulatory links between the conceptual and perceptual
self-representations. Changes in the bodily self-representation have been shown
to elicit changes in the way the self is conceptualised (Banakou et al., 2013)
and to also elicit changes in social cognition (Maister et al., 2014). However,
it is unclear whether changes to the conceptual self can elicit corresponding
changes in the perceptual self-representation. In this Chapter, Experiment
5 will investigate whether the mental representation of the self-face can be
changed as a consequence of changes to the conceptual self-representation. Ex-
periment 5 will use a recently developed perceptual matching paradigm (Sui,
He, & Humphreys, 2012) to create an association between a novel face and the
conceptual self-representation, and investigate whether the self-face represen-
tation has changed to incorporate the novel face.
The study of self-representations can be split into perceptual and concep-
tual. The perceptual representation of the self, the main focus of this thesis,
1This experiment has been published as Payne, S., Tsakiris, M., & Maister, L. (2016). Can
the self become another? Investigating the effects of self-association with a new facial identity.
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1-13.
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constitutes information about the physical appearance and proprioceptive in-
formation about one’s body. The conceptual self-representation encompasses
varied semantic information about the self, including personality traits, demo-
graphic information and episodic memories (Gillihan & Farah, 2005). Research
on the processing of conceptual aspects of self highlights that processing of
conceptual self information often benefits from a ‘self-reference effect’, in which
self-relevant information receives prioritised processing relative to information
relating to other people, corresponding with research on the processing of the
self-face as described in Chapter 1. For example, trait words referring to the
self are remembered more accurately than trait words referring to other peo-
ple (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). Furthermore, self-relevant stimuli are
more likely to grab attention when presented as distractor stimuli, suggesting
that self-relevant information may be processed in a highly automatic fashion.
Bargh (1982) used a dichotic listening task, in which participants are presented
with two streams of auditory information, one in each ear, and attend to only
one, to investigate the automatic processing of self-relevant information. It was
found that information in the unattended stream only entered conscious aware-
ness when it contained words relating to the conceptual self-representation,
and that this information was processed more efficiently than non-self relevant
information. Information relating to the conceptual-self also appears to dif-
ferentially engage neural regions in comparison with information about others.
Areas spanning the frontal (medial frontal gyrus) temporal (bilateral superior
temporal gyrus) and parietal cortices (inferior parietal lobule) have all shown
activity during processing of self-relevant information in contrast with infor-
mation about other people (Hu et al., 2015), and EEG research suggests that
self-information benefits from selective attention (Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, &
Deldin, 2004).
Evidence suggests that conceptual and bodily aspects of self-representation
are closely linked, and that changes to the perceptual self-representation can
lead to changes to conceptual self-representations (Banakou et al., 2013; Mais-
ter et al., 2014; Paladino, Mazzurega, Pavani, & Schubert, 2010). For example,
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Banakou et al. (2013) demonstrated that after embodying a child-sized body
in a virtual reality environment, participants showed implicit associations be-
tween themselves and child-like concepts. In another study, Paladino et al.
(2010) demonstrated that after experiencing IMS with an unfamiliar face, not
only did participants report an increase in perceived physical similarity between
themselves and the unfamiliar actor, but the IMS also led them to represent
themselves as conceptually closer and more similar to the embodied other (see
also Mazzurega, Pavani, Paladino, & Schubert, 2011). However, it remains
unknown whether this link is bidirectional; whether a change in conceptual
self-representation could lead to a change in the perceptual self-representation.
Recent evidence suggests that a bidirectional link may exist. Farmer et al.
(2013) report an experiment in which the manipulated trustworthiness of an
unfamiliar individual impacted upon perceived similarity between the partici-
pant’s face and the unfamiliar face. Participants played a trust game with two
unfamiliar individuals whose faces were shown on screen. One of the individuals
was trustworthy, while the other always betrayed the participant’s trust. Before
and after the game, participants performed a self-other discrimination task us-
ing morphed images (the same task as used to measure the increased perceptual
similarity after the Enfacement Illusion; Tajadura-Jime´nez, Grehl, & Tsakiris,
2012), to measure the perceived similarity between their own face and the faces
of both players. Following the trust game, participants perceived their face to
be more similar to the trustworthy individual than the untrustworthy player.
This evidence may suggest that changes to the conceptual self-representation
can have a modulatory effect on the bodily self-representation, however, as of
yet such a link between the conceptual and perceptual self-representations has
yet to be properly investigated.
In a series of recent experiments, Sui et al. (2012) elegantly demonstrated
the malleability of the conceptual self-representation. Participants first associ-
ated geometric shapes with labels for themselves, familiar or unfamiliar others,
and then performed a perceptual matching task in which they judged whether
subsequent label-shape pairings were correctly matched. Self-associated shapes
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benefitted from faster reaction times (RT) and increased accuracy, compared
to both familiar and unfamiliar shape associations. The authors suggest that
the self-associated shape was incorporated into the ‘self-template’, a rich and
well developed schema of the self based on self-knowledge, enabling “fast same”
responses (participants are faster to identify when two pieces of information
are the same, rather than different; Krueger, 1978). In support of this inter-
pretation, they found that neutral shapes which had been associated with the
conceptual self activated brain regions involved in self-representation and self-
attention (Sui & Humphreys, 2013), suggesting that the newly-associated shape
had been incorporated into the conceptual self-representation.
Experiment 5 will modify the simple paradigm reported by Sui et al. (2012)
to investigate whether a bidirectional link between conceptual and bodily as-
pects of self exists. In this paradigm, Sui et al. (2012) established a rapid as-
sociation between the self and a previously neutral shape. Robust attentional
and perceptual biases in the processing of this newly self-associated shape sug-
gested that the conceptual self-representation was extended to include it. The
experiment in this chapter will firstly: develop this paradigm to test whether
an unfamiliar face, rather than shape, can be associated with the conceptual
self-representation. RT and accuracy data will be analysed to measure for per-
ceptual biases towards the newly self-associated face in order to assess whether
it has truly acquired an association with the conceptual self-representation. Sec-
ondly, Experiment 5 will investigate whether the bodily self-representation will
update correspondingly to incorporate the newly-associated face. The self-face
representation will be measured before and after the perceptual matching task
using the same self-recognition task as used in Experiment 4. Experiment 5
will therefore assess whether a change in the conceptual self-representation can
lead to a change in the bodily self-representation (i.e the mental representation
of one’s own face).
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7.2 Materials and Methods
7.2.1 Participants
28 participants (26 female, mean age 20.07 years, SD 1.12) volunteered
to take part in the study. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and
were right-handed. Informed consent was given by all participants before their
participation, and the study was approved by Psychology Department Ethics
Committee, Royal Holloway, University of London.
7.2.2 Stimuli and Tasks
7.2.2.1 perceptual matching task
The current experiment employed an adapted version of Sui et al.’s (2012)
shape-label matching paradigm with unfamiliar faces in place of neutral geo-
metric shapes. Three photos of gender-matched unfamiliar faces were converted
to greyscale, and a circular template was applied to remove the outer hairline.
The faces were presented above a fixation cross, with an identity label pre-
sented below. Three identity labels were used: ‘Self’, ‘Friend’, and ‘Stranger’,
following Sui et al. (2012). During the task participants were required to judge
whether briefly-presented face-label pairings were correct, or incorrect. The
same three unfamiliar faces were used throughout the experiment, with the
identity label pairings assigned randomly for each participant. The task was
run on Presentation (NeuroBehavioural Systems).
The task started with a learning phase, in which all three unfamiliar faces
were presented on screen with their matching identity labels written below
each one (face-label pairings were counterbalanced across participants). Par-
ticipants were told that each of the three faces belonged to themselves, their
closest friend, or a stranger. Participants had 60 seconds to learn the face-label
pairings before starting the perceptual matching task. During the perceptual
matching task, a fixation cross was presented at the beginning of each trial
for 400ms, followed by a face-label pairing for 200ms. The face-label pairing
either corresponded to a pairing seen by participants during the learning phase
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(match trial), or was a novel pairing (mismatch trial). Participants were then
required to judge whether the pairing was correct or incorrect based on what
they had learnt during the learning phase. Following presentation of the face-
label pairing, participants had 1000ms to respond, using one of two buttons
(one for correct, one for incorrect), as quickly and as accurately as possible.
Visual feedback for the participant’s response was then presented following
each trial (correct or incorrect), lasting 500ms. The task lasted a maximum
of 15 minutes and was split into three blocks of 80 trials (240 trials total),
with 12 practice trials before the first block. At the end of each block par-
ticipants received visual feedback detailing the accuracy of their performance
in the preceding block. Each identity label was presented an equal number
of times, with an equal number of match and mismatch pairings, such that
there were 40 trials in each condition (self-match, self-mismatch, friend-match,
friend-mismatch, stranger-match, stranger-mismatch). Trials were randomised
for each participant. It is important to note that, although the Learning Phase
and the Matching Phase are differentiated by name, participants continue to
learn the associations throughout the Matching Phase as feedback is given on
every trial. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 7.1A.
7.2.2.2 Self-Recognition Task
The self-recognition task was the same morphed photos task as that used in
Chapter 6, except that 50 morphed images were created instead of 25, represent-
ing 2% steps through the self-other morphing continuum. For a full description
see Section 6.2.5.1. Briefly: a photograph of each participant’s face taken with
a neutral expression was morphed separately with the self-associated face, and
the stranger-associated face, creating two morphed image sets per participant.
Fifty morphed images were created for each set, representing 2% steps from the
participant’s face to the self/stranger face . During the self-recognition task,
each of the 100 images was presented once, and participants rated how similar
they perceived the face to their own. The pre-perceptual matching task self-
recognition task acted as a baseline measure of self-recognition, and changes
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Figure 7.1: The experimental design and procedure for Experiment 5. A shows a
visual representation of the perceptual matching task. In the Learning Phase all three
unfamiliar faces and identity labels (self, friend and stranger) are presented on screen
for 1 min. In the Matching Phase, each trial starts with a fixation cross (400ms),
followed by a face-label pair (200ms), after which the participant has 1000ms to
respond. Following the response, visual feedback is presented for 500ms before the
start of the next trial. B shows a trial from the self-recognition task: a random
interstimulus interval (ISI) with fixation cross is presented for 500-1500ms, followed
by the presentation of one of the morphed images for 2000ms. The sliding response
scale then appears until participants make their response. C shows the procedure for
Experiment 5: participants complete the self-recognition task, followed by the
perceptual matching task, and lastly the self-recognition task again.
from baseline were examined in the post-perceptual matching self-recognition
task. We controlled for effects due to mere exposure to the self-associated face
by including a control condition in which participants rated morphs between
their own face and the stranger-associated face.
Each trial of the self-recognition task began with a central fixation cross,
presented for 500-1500ms. One of the 100 morphed face images was then pre-
sented for 2000ms, replaced by a sliding scale consisting of a vertical line marked
with 100 at the top and 0 at the bottom. Participants used a mouse to rate on
the scale how much the presented face resembled their own face. Participants
had as much time as they required to give their response, but were encouraged
to go with their initial instincts about the photos and respond quickly. Images
from both morphing sets (‘self’ and ‘stranger’) were intermixed and presented
in a randomised order. The procedure is presented in Figure 7.1B.
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7.2.3 Procedure
Participants performed the Self-Recognition Task first (lasting for approxi-
mately 8-10 minutes), followed by the perceptual matching task (lasting approx-
imately 10 minutes), and lastly the Self-Recognition Task again. The procedure
is illustrated in Figure 7.1C.
7.2.4 Data Analysis
7.2.4.1 perceptual matching task
Preceding analysis, responses shorter than 200 ms or longer than 1000 ms
were excluded, eliminating 2.6% of trials.
7.2.4.2 Self-Recognition Task
The participants’ ratings of the morphed-face stimuli in the self-recognition
task were fitted into a sigmoid statistical model to determine the percentage
of morphing at which participants judged the amount of their own face and
the other face to be equal – the ‘point of subjective equality’ (PSE; Sforza et
al., 2010). This resulted in two PSE values per participant: pre-perceptual
matching task, and post-perceptual matching task.
7.3 Results
7.3.1 perceptual matching task Analysis
In line with Sui et al. (2012), a bootstrapping procedure was performed,
combining accuracy (see Figure 7.2B) and RT data (see Figure 7.2A) in or-
der to assess the overall training effect in each of the association conditions.
RT and accuracy data for each condition, and each participant, were combined
separately to create one data point. This data was then resampled with replace-
ment, and the sample size was kept as the number of participants, creating a
bootstrapped dataset. This procedure was repeated 2000 times, and the mean
of the dataset from each instance was plotted, creating a visual representation
of the estimated population mean and variation of each association condition.
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The distributions across the three association conditions can be seen in Figure
7.2D. For matched trials, responses to self-associations follow a distinct RT-
accuracy distribution, falling in the bottom right of the figure, while friend-
and stranger-associations fall towards the middle and left respectively. For
mismatch trials, responses in each condition tend to overlap (see Figure 7.2D).
Accuracy on the perceptual matching task was assessed using a signal de-
tection approach. D’, reflecting perceptual sensitivity to each face, was cal-
culated by combining performance in each face identity condition across both
match and mismatch trials. It was entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA
with the within-subjects factor of Face Identity (Self vs. Friend vs. Stranger),
and helmert planned contrasts were used to investigate any effects. There was
a significant main effect of Identity, F (2, 52) = 3.574, p = .035, η2 = .121.
Self-associations benefited from a larger d’ than both friend and stranger as-
sociations (p = .026). There was no difference between friend and stranger
associations (p = .411).
To investigate the effect of Face Identity on RT, a repeated-measures ANOVA
was run with factors of Face Identity and Match-type. Only trials in which par-
ticipants made the correct response were included in the RT analysis. There
was a main effect of Identity, F (2, 52) = 3.677, p = .032, η2 = .124 reflecting
faster RTs to self-associations relative to friend and stranger associations (p =
.018). There was also a main effect of Match-type, F (1, 26) = 105.769, p <
.001, η2 = .803, reflecting faster RTs for matched pairs relative to mismatched
pairs (p < .001). The interaction between Identity and Matching Judgment
was also significant, F (2, 52) = 11.339, p < .001, η2 = .304. Analysis was then
run separately for matched and mismatched trials. There was no effect of Face
Identity for mismatched trials, F (2, 42) = .359, p = .7, η2 = .014. However,
for Matched trials, Face Identity had a significant effect on RTs, F (2, 52) =
8.542, p = .001, η2 = .247. Self-associations showed faster RTs than both friend
and stranger associations (p = .002). Friend and stranger associations did not
significantly differ (p = .172). See Table 7.1 for means, SDs and 95% confidence
intervals for each trial type.
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Figure 7.2: Behavioural results from the perceptual matching task. Mean RTs on
correct trials (A), accuracy (B) and D-prime (C) to self, friend and
stranger-associated faces for match trials (face and label were correctly matched) and
mismatch trials (the label presented did not match the face). Error bars represent
standard error. D shows the bootstrapped sample means (resampling with
replacement repeated for 2000 samples) for match and mismatch trials. A
bootstrapping procedure combining accuracy and RT was adopted to examine the
distribution characteristics of each trial type.
7.3.2 Self-Recognition Task Analysis
Next the self-recognition task data was analysed. To check that baseline
PSE values for self-associated morphs and stranger-associated morphs did not
differ, baseline PSE scores for each morph set were analysed first in a repeated
measures ANOVA with Morph Identity as a factor. There was no effect of
morph identity on baseline PSE scores F (1, 27) = .646, p = .429, η2 = .023,
so then all of the PSE values were analysed in a repeated measures ANOVA
Table 7.1: Means, standard deviations and 95% confidence intervals for D’ and
RT measures (across match and mismatch trials) for each face-identity.
Self-associated face Friend-associated face Stranger-associated face
Variable M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI
D’ 1.87 (1.13) [1.42, 2.32] 1.51 (1.11) [1.07, 1.94] 1.36 (1.04) .95, 1.77]
RT Match Trials 511.68 (145.82) [454, 569.37] 552.24 (154.36) [491.18, 613.3] 569.59 (156.6) [507.64, 631.54]
RT Mismatch Trials 605.58 (153.11) [545.01, 666.15] 603.95 (164.62) [538.83, 669.07] 598.32 (166.41) [532.49, 664.15]
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with factors Morph Identity (‘Self’ vs ‘Stranger’ morphs) and Timing of Task
(pre- vs. post-perceptual matching task). There was no main effect of Morph
Identity, F (1, 27) = .506, p = .483 η2 = .018, or Timing of Task, F (1, 27)
= 2.89, p = .101, η2 = .097, nor an interaction between Morph Identity and
Timing, F (1, 27) = .249, p = .622, η2 = .009, indicating that PSE scores were
not influenced by the timing of the task or the association of a new face with
the self. See Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3: The bars represent the point in the morphing spectrum that
participants perceived there to be an equal amount of their own and the other face
(PSE). On the left are the mean PSEs for self and self-associated-face morphs, before
and after the perceptual matching task. On the right are mean PSEs for self and
stranger-associated face morphs, before and after the perceptual matching task.
Positive changes from pre- to post-test would indicate an increased amount of the
other’s face at the perceived PSE, while negative changes would indicate more of the
self-face at the perceived PSE.
7.4 Discussion
The perceptual matching task used in Experiment 5 measured the effects of
associating an unfamiliar face with the self on perceptual processing. The re-
sults showed a clear perceptual prioritisation effect towards the unfamiliar face
after only a brief period of self-association, which manifested itself in faster
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reaction times and increased perceptual sensitivity to the self-associated face
over faces associated with a friend or stranger. The pattern of results closely
mirrored those reported by Sui et al. (2012), in an analogous task using neutral
shapes instead of faces. This suggests that the conceptual self-representation
can be rapidly extended to incorporate an unfamiliar face, and that corre-
spondingly, perceptual and attentional processing of that face is prioritised as
‘self-relevant’. The results indicate that the perceptual matching task was suc-
cessful at eliciting a change in the self-concept, reflecting a change at a more
abstract level of the self-representation that the previous Experiments in this
thesis which targeted the perceptual self-representation.
Experiment 5 also aimed to investigate whether a change in the conceptual
representation of the self could elicit a change in the perceptual, bodily rep-
resentation of the self. A self-face recognition task was used to measure each
participant’s self-face representation by calculating the PSE between the partic-
ipant’s own face and both the self-associated and stranger-associated faces from
the perceptual matching task (the stranger-associated face was used as a con-
trol condition). The self-recognition task was performed both before and after
the perceptual matching task. It was hypothesised that a change in PSE would
be observed following the perceptual matching task, reflecting that an incorpo-
ration of the self-associated face had occurred in the bodily self-representation,
causing participants to perceive an increase in physical similarity between their
own and the newly associated face. However, the results indicated that the
incorporation of a novel face into the self-concept, while leading to the unfamil-
iar face becoming self-relevant, did not alter the perceptual self-representation.
Following successful association of the self-concept with an unfamiliar face, par-
ticipants did not perceive their own face as more similar to the unfamiliar face.
The self-face is the most salient aspect of one’s body. One’s own face au-
tomatically captures attention (Bre´dart, Delchambre, & Laureys, 2006) and
demands preferential processing above all other faces (Sui & Humphreys, 2013;
Tong & Nakayama, 1999). Yet despite this strong salience of our own face,
the results of the current experiment demonstrate that we are able to rapidly
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associate a previously unfamiliar face with our conceptual self-representation.
The results from the perceptual matching task show a distinct response pat-
tern to self-associated faces compared to both friend and stranger associations,
reflecting the perceptual processing bias afforded to self-relevant stimuli. This
rapid modification of perceptual processing to newly acquired self-associations
fits in with a growing understanding of plasticity in the self, both in the physical
and conceptual domains (Paladino et al., 2010; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-
Jime´nez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012; Tsakiris, 2008; Banakou et al., 2013; Maister
et al., 2014).
The association of a previously unfamiliar face with the conceptual self-
representation did not affect the perception of one’s own face. On one level,
this is surprising as previous research has demonstrated the striking malleabil-
ity of the self-face representation (Paladino et al., 2010; Sforza et al., 2010;
Tajadura-Jime´nez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012), and has also suggested the ex-
istence of functional links between conceptual and bodily aspects of the self-
representation. For example, Paladino et al. (2010) showed that the modulation
of perceived facial-similarity through interpersonal multisensory integration af-
fects the experience of conceptual ‘closeness’ with the IMS individual, increas-
ing the perception of not only physical but also psychological similarity. There
was also evidence to suggest that the converse relationship might be true; that
the modulation of conceptual aspects of self may have a knock-on effect on the
bodily self-representation. The modulation of trust with another individual has
been shown to affect the perceived physical similarity between one’s self and
the other individual (Farmer et al., 2013). Based on this it was hypothesised
that the association of the conceptual self with an unfamiliar face would affect
the perceived physical similarity between the self and the self-associated face.
However, the findings demonstrated no functional link between alterations to
the conceptual self-representation and the bodily self-representation.
It could be suggested that the manipulation, while successful at creating
an association between participants and an unfamiliar face, may have been
ineffective at altering central aspects of the self-concept because of the transient
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nature of the task. However, there is evidence to suggest this is not the case.
For example, using the same brief association task in combination with fMRI,
Sui and Humphreys (2013) demonstrated that areas of the brain associated
with self-representation, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC;
Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Northoff et al., 2006) were robustly activated
in response to a self-associated shape. Similarly, Kim and Johnson (2014)
found activation in mPFC even when participants observed objects that they
merely transiently ‘owned’ in a non-self-referential task. Given that activation
in mPFC is reliably observed when participants view well established, explicit
self-relevant information such their own name (Moran, Heatherton, & Kelley,
2009), this evidence suggests that even transient links between the self and
an object can lead to the incorporation of the object into one’s sense of self,
causing a change at the conceptual level (see also: Perkins & Forehand, 2012,
for behavioural changes following implicit links between the self and neutral
stimuli ).
One explanation for the findings could be the lack of social interaction in
the paradigm, given that evidence suggests that social interaction and body
representations are highly linked (Maister et al., 2014). In contrast, Farmer
et al.’s (2013) paradigm involved an interaction with another through a trust
game, in which the other player actively rewarded or punished the partici-
pant. The effect of trustworthiness on increased perceived physical similarity
may play a functional role, as it could induce kin-like behaviours in future
interactions, benefitting the participant (DeBruine, Jones, Little, & Perrett,
2008). DeBruine et al. (2008) has shown that individuals are more likely to
trust others who bear a physical resemblance to them, and so a modulation
of the bodily-self representation to more closely resemble those who act pro-
socially towards one’s self may reflect a functional role in driving future in-
teractions. Therefore, the bodily self-representation in Farmer et al.’s (2013)
task, and its relation to the other’s body, was highly relevant, and likely to be
strongly activated alongside conceptual aspects of self, enabling information in
the conceptual self to change aspects of the perceptual self. In contrast, the
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current study was involved purely in ‘self’ representations, without any inter-
action with another individual. Because of this, the transient inclusion of a
novel face into the self-concept may never have become relevant to the bodily
self-representation, and so links between the novel conceptual aspects and ex-
isting perceptual aspects of self may not have been formed. Despite there being
evidence for changes in body representation leading to changes in conceptual
self- and other-processing (Banakou et al., 2013; Maister et al., 2014; Paladino
et al., 2010), the results of Experiment 5 suggest that the converse relationship,
whereby basic self-association at the conceptual level can alter body represen-
tations, does not hold. The results support a hierarchical model of the self
with unidirectional connections flowing in a bottom-up direction, from bodily
self-representations to conceptual self-representations. If this is the case, then
it is important to investigate the effects of these basic associations with the
conceptual self-representation on higher levels of interpersonal processing, as
while these associations do not seem to alter self-other relations at the physi-
cal bodily level, they may have an effect on the self-other relationship further
up the processing hierarchy. In this way, the incorporation of an unfamiliar
face into the conceptual self-representation may have interesting effects in the
social domain. For example, the perception of another individual as an out-
group member, based only on facial characteristics, can have profound effects
on a number of social cognitive processes, ranging from explicit (e.g. ratings
of trustworthiness, intelligence, attractiveness) to implicit attitudes, as well as
affecting interpersonal behaviours (Pavan, Dalmaso, Galfano, & Castelli, 2011;
Ratner, Dotsch, Wigboldus, van Knippenberg, & Amodio, 2014). Crucially,
research has suggested that the neurological correlates of face perception also
differ depending on whether the face belongs to an in-group or out-group mem-
ber (Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, & Eberhardt, 2001), even when group membership
distinctions are arbitrary (Ratner & Amodio, 2013). These studies show that
in-group faces benefit from prioritised perceptual and attentional processing
relative to out-group faces.
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In the current study, a perceptual processing bias towards a minimally self-
associated face affected basic identity processing (as measured by the perceptual
matching task), but it might also result in prioritised processing of the self-
associated face’s social signals, such as emotional expressions and gaze cueing,
in a similar way to that observed for established in-group members (Pavan et al.,
2011). Our social lives are structured around categorising other individuals as
either ‘in-group’ or ‘out-group’, and we show strong self-associations with people
who we conceptualise as similar to ourselves. The findings of Experiment 5 have
demonstrated, at a relatively pure and fundamental level, that rapidly formed
self-associations with another individual can alter the way in which their face is
processed, and this modulation of perceptual processing may have fascinating
knock-on consequences for social cognition.
In conclusion, Experiment 5 firstly showed that the conceptual self-representation
can be extended to include a previously unfamiliar face, and that this extension
of the conceptual self to the newly associated face results in enhanced percep-
tual processing of the self-associated face. Experiment 5 also found that this
modulation of the conceptual self-representation did not affect the perception
of the bodily self, suggesting a hierarchical model of the self with unidirectional
links between levels flowing in a bottom-up direction. In this case the results
of the current experiment may reflect a mechanism that can affect higher-level
self-other processing; the extension of prioritised perceptual processing to the
self-associated face may extend to the processing of social signals belonging to
the face, such as emotion expression, gaze cues or social group membership.
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8 Investigating Associations
with the Self-Representation
8.1 Introduction
Experiment 5 replicated and expanded Sui et al.’s (2012) perceptual match-
ing paradigm in which a neutral shape is associated with the self, and subse-
quently benefits from prioritised processing. Experiment 5 replaced the neutral
shape with an unfamiliar face, and the results indicated that participants were
able to quickly associate this face with themselves, resulting in the face becom-
ing self-relevant and benefitting from the same prioritised perceptual process-
ing observed in the original experiments (Sui et al., 2012; Sui, Rotshtein, &
Humphreys, 2013). Experiment 5 also investigated whether the association of
this novel face with the self would change the stored mental representation of
one’s own face, such that the newly associated face would be incorporated into
the self-face representation. Participants completed a self-face recognition task
before and after the Perceptual Matching Task in which they judged morphed
images between their own and the self-associated face. The point of subjective
equality (PSE) between the two faces was calculated at both time points and
compared. No change in PSE was found following self-association with the new
face, suggesting that although the new face had become associated with the
self, it had not been incorporated into the self-face representation.
The lack of inclusion of the newly-associated face into the self-face repre-
sentation suggests that when the novel face is associated with the self, it is
associated only with the conceptual self-representation, and not with the per-
ceptual self-representation. If this is the case, then the results further suggest
that changes to the conceptual self-representation do not lead to corresponding
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changes in the perceptual self-representation. Evidence suggests that modu-
latory links exist between the conceptual and perceptual self-representations,
however, the research to date, including the resutls of Experiment 5, suggests
that these links flow in a bottom-up direction, with changes to the perceptual
self-representation leading to corresponding changes in the way the self is con-
ceptualised (Maister et al., 2014). The results presented in Chapter 7 suggest
that modulatory links do not exist in the opposite direction, in other words,
changes to the conceptual self-representation do not lead to changes in the per-
ceptual representation of the self-face. Chapter 8 aims to elucidate upon this
theory by investigating the nature of the association created between the self
and a novel face during the Perceptual Matching Task. Experiment 6 aims to
understand in what way the newly-associated face has been incorporated with
the self: is the face associated with both the conceptual and perceptual self-
representations, or, as the results suggest, only associated with the conceptual
self. To test this, Experiment 6 directly contrasts how assocaition with a new
face affects recognition of conceptual and perceptual representations of the self.
To investigate the nature of the self-association formed during the Percep-
tual Matching Task, Experiment 6 will employ a semantic priming paradigm.
In a typical semantic priming task a ‘prime’ stimulus is presented first, followed
closely by a ‘target’ stimulus to which the participant responds. Meyer and col-
leagues reported the first semantic priming effect in a task in which words were
presented as both primes and targets, and participants were required to make a
lexical decision (word/nonword) about the target word (Meyer & Schvaneveldt,
1971; Meyer, Schvaneveldt, & Ruddy, 1975). Responses to the target were
faster when the prime and the target were semantically similar (e.g. doctor /
nurse) than when they were dissimilar (e.g. doctor / bread): this is known as
the semantic priming effect. Since these initial lexical priming studies, research
has shown that semantic priming can also occur between stimuli of different
modalities, such as words and pictures (Bajo & Juan Canas, 1989; Irwin &
Lupker, 1983; Vanderwart, 1984), suggesting that a single system of seman-
tic representation exists, which is accessed by multimodal stimuli, rather than
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separate semantic systems for stimuli of different types.
Indeed, the system of semantic memory has been metaphorically compared
by Hutchison (2003) to a dictionary, encyclopaedia, and thesaurus; semantic
memory contains information about a concept’s identity, meaning, and rela-
tion to other similar concepts. Concepts within semantic memory are proposed
to be connected to other concepts, or ‘nodes’, that share similarities through
learned associations (Collins & Loftus, 1975), or shared features (Moss, Hare,
Day, & Tyler, 1994). Evidence suggests that semantic priming can occur as a
result of both associative strength between concepts as well as featural similar-
ities (Hutchison, 2003). In regards to associated concepts, semantic priming is
thought to occur as a result of activation, by the prime stimuli, of neural re-
gions involved in the semantic representation of that word/picture, which leads
to the automatic activation of related notes, facilitating the recognition of sub-
sequently presented semantically related stimuli (Neely, 1991). In regards to
featural similarity, it is suggested that semantic priming occurs not because of
the spreading of activation from one node to a related node, but because the
prime and target share multiple overlapping features, facilitating the processing
of the featurally similar target (Masson, 1995). When the interval between pre-
sentation of the prime and target (stimulus onset asynchrony; SOA) is small,
semantic priming is thought to occur as a result of automatic processes facilitat-
ing the processing of semantically similar concepts (Neely, 1991). In contrast,
when the SOA is larger, over 400ms, the semantic priming effect is proposed to
occur as a result of expectancies developed by participants based on the nature
of the prime stimulus, such that attention is directed to semantically related
target stimuli (Neely, 1977).
In Experiment 6 participants complete the same Perceptual Matching Task
from Experiment 5, followed by a semantic priming task. During the Per-
ceptual Matching Task participants learn to associate three unfamiliar faces
with three identities (self, famous and stranger). The semantic priming task
is used to investigate the nature of the association formed between the self-
associated face and the pre-existing self-representation. To investigate whether
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the self-associated face is associated with the conceptual self-representation
only, or both the conceptual and perceptual self-representations, target stimuli
in the priming task represent aspects of the conceptual (self-name) and percep-
tual (self-face) self. Prime stimuli are the unfamiliar face from the Perceptual
Matching Task. As a control condition, the face and name of the famous in-
dividual chosen to represent the famous identity in the Perceptual Matching
Task are also used as target stimuli, and the famous-associated face as a prime
stimulus. Participants make a categorical decision to the target stimuli (self /
famous), and response times were hypothesised to vary depending on the nature
of the association between the novel face and the conceptual/perceptual self-
representation. It was hypothesised that the self-associated face is associated
only with the conceptual self-representation, and thus, faster responses to the
self-name would be observed when it follows the self-associated face, in contrast
with responses to the self-face when it follows the self-associated face.
8.2 Materials and Methods
8.2.1 Participants
21 participants (15 female, mean age 21.3 years, SD 3.54) volunteered to
take part in the study. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were
right-handed. Informed consent was given by all participants before their par-
ticipation, and the study was approved by the Psychology Department Ethics
Committee, Royal Holloway, University of London. Design
8.2.2 Design
The experiment was a within-subjects repeated-measures design, with fac-
tors of Prime ID (self-associated face vs. famous-associated face), Target ID
(self vs. famous), and Target Type (face vs. name). Participants took part
in one experimental session in which they completed the Perceptual Matching
Task (as used in Experiment 5) followed by a Priming Task described below.
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8.2.3 Stimuli and Tasks
8.2.3.1 Perceptual Matching Task
The adapted version of Sui et al.’s (2012) Perceptual Matching Task from
Experiment 5 was used in the current study. For a full description of the task see
Section 7.2.2.1. One change was made to the task procedure: the ‘Friend’ label
was replaced by an ‘Actor’ label, and participants named a familiar, gender
matched actor, and were instructed that the ‘Actor’ label and corresponding
unfamiliar face belonged to the famous individual. The unfamiliar face-identity
label pairings were assigned randomly for each participant. The task was run
on Presentation (NeuroBehavioural Systems).
8.2.3.2 Priming Task
Stimuli for the Priming Task consisted of the ‘Self’ and ‘Famous’ associated
faces from the Perceptual Matching Task, a photo of the participant’s own
face and the named famous individual’s face, and the participant’s and famous
individual’s names. Photos of the participant’s face was taken with a neutral
expression, converted to greyscale and mirrored horizontally (for the self-face
only), and cropped with a circular template to remove the outer hairline. The
same procedure was applied to an image of the famous person’s face. The
images were then resized to match the dimensions of the unfamiliar faces from
the Perceptual Matching Task.
Each trial of the Priming Task began with a prime stimulus presented for
20ms, which was then replaced by a target stimulus, presented for 200ms, af-
ter which a blank screen was presented until response. The next trial started
as soon as the participant responded, but only responses made within 1000ms
of the target disappearing were used in the analysis. All primes were either
the self-associated face or the famous-associated face, both of which were pre-
sented an equal amount of times as the prime. The target stimuli were the
self-face, self-name, famous-face and famous-name. All targets were presented
an equal amount of times and were preceded by both of the two primes an
equal amount of times. Participants were instructed to respond to the target
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stimulus, and to indicate with a button press whether the target was ‘self’ or
‘famous’. Participants responded with their right index and middle fingers, and
the ascription of ‘self’ and ‘famous’ to either finger was counterbalanced across
participants. Unlike the Perceptual Matching Task, participants did not re-
ceive feedback on their responses during the Priming Task. The Priming Task
was split into three blocks, with 66 trials in the first block, and 67 trials in
the second and third blocks. There were 25 trials in each of the eight condi-
tions: self-associated face prime – self-face target; self-associated face prime –
self-name target; self-associated face prime – famous-face target; self-associated
face prime – famous-name target; famous-associated face prime – self-face tar-
get; famous-associated face prime – self-name target; famous-associated face
prime – famous-face target; famous-associated face – famous-name target. For
a visual representation of the task procedure see Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1: A) The Prime stimuli, the self-associated face and famous-associated
face from the Perceptual Matching Task. B) The Target stimuli: actual self-face,
actual famous-face, self-name and famous-name. C) An example of two consecutive
trials in the semantic priming task. Each trial starts with the presentation of a prime
stimulus for 20ms, followed by a target stimulus for 200ms. A blank screen is then
shown for 1000ms or until the participant makes their response, at which point the
next trial begins.
8.2.4 Procedure
Participants first completed the Perceptual Matching Task, and then the
Priming Task. Participants were able to take short breaks in between the
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blocks of each of task.
8.2.5 Data Analysis
For both tasks, responses shorter than 200ms or longer than 1000ms were
excluded from the analysis, eliminating less than 5% of trials. For the Priming
Task, only correct trials were included in the analysis.
8.3 Results
8.3.1 Perceptual Matching Task Analysis
Accuracy on the Perceptual Matching Task was assessed using a signal de-
tection approach. D’ was calculated for each face by combining performance
across match and mismatch trials, reflecting perceptual sensitivity. A repeated
measures ANOVA with a within subjects factor of Face Identity (Self vs. Fa-
mous vs. Stranger) was used to compare sensitivity towards each face identity.
There was a main effect of Face Identity: F (2, 40) = 5.643, p = .007, η2
= .22. Helmert planned contrasts revealed a significant different between D’
for the self-associated face compared with the famous-associated and stranger-
associated faces (p = .005). There was no difference between D’ for famous-
and stranger-associated faces (p = 87). Means are displayed in Table 8.1. This
finding replicates previous studies and confirms that the self-associated face had
become self-relevant.
Next the effect of Face Identity on RT was assessed with a repeated-measures
ANOVA with factors of Face Identity and Match Type (match vs. mismatch).
Only trials in which participants responded correctly were included in the RT
analysis. There was a significant main effect of Face Identity: F (2, 40) =
9.594, p < .001, η2 = .324, reflecting faster responses to Self trials than Fa-
mous or Stranger trials (p = .002). Again there was no significant difference in
performance between Famous and Stranger trials (p = .816). There was also
a significant main effect of Match Type: F (1, 20) = 10.415, p = .004, η2 =
.342, reflecting faster RTs for Match trials compared with Mismatch trials (p
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Table 8.1: Means, standard deviations and 95% confidence intervals for D’ and
RT measures (across match and mismatch trials) for each face-identity.
Self-associated face Famous-associated face Stranger-associated face
M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI
D’ 1.589 (1.091) [1.092, 2.086] .988 (.94) [.56, 1.416] 1.019 (.814) [.648, 1.389]
RT Match Trials 498.533 (116.919) [445.312, 551.754] 558.879 (105.189) [510.997, 606.76] 591.281 (96.76) [547.236, 635.326]
RT Mismatch Trials 582.457 (140.383) [518.556, 646.359] 574.855 (104.615) [527.234, 622.475] 604.041 (87.853) [564.05, 644.031]
= .004). The interaction between Face Identity and Match Type did not reach
significance. The means for each trial type are displayed in Table 8.1.
8.3.2 Priming Task Analysis
A 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on RT data from
the Priming Task, with factors of Prime ID (self-associated face vs. famous-
associated face), Target ID (self vs. famous), and Target Type (face vs. name).
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Target ID: F (1, 20) = 11.198, p = .003,
η2 = .359, reflecting faster responses to self targets regardless of Prime ID (self
target M = 493.815; famous target M = 514.877). There was also a significant
3-way interaction between Prime ID, Target ID and Target Type: F (1, 20) =
13.034, p = .002, η2 = .395. As the aim of the study was to compare semantic
priming by the newly associated face across perceptual and conceptual aspects
of self, further analysis to investigate the interaction was split by Target ID.
First, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on Self Target trials, with
factors of Prime ID and Target Type. The ANOVA revealed no significant main
effect of Prime ID: F (1, 20) = .282, p = .602, η2 = .014, or Target Type F (1,
20) = 2.639, p = .120, η2 = .117. Nor a significant interaction between the two
factors: F (1, 20) = 2.185, p = .155, η2 = .098. The means and SDs for each
trial type can be seen in Table 8.2.
Next, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on Famous Target trials,
with factors of Prime ID and Target Type. The ANOVA revealed a main
effect of Prime ID: F (1, 20) = 8.381, p = .009, η2 = .295, reflecting faster
responses to targets preceded by famous-associated face trials. The main effect
of Target Type was not significant: F (1, 20) = .770, p = .391, η2 = .037, but
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the interaction between Prime ID and Target Type was significant: F (1, 20)
= 8.680, p = .008, η2 = .303. To investigate the interaction, paired samples
t-tests were used to investigate whether RTs to face and name targets differed
depending on the ID of the prime stimulus. The paired samples t-tests (with a
corrected alpha level of .025) revealed no significant difference between RTs to
famous-face targets primed by the self-associated face or famous-associated face:
t(20) = -.403, p = .691. However, there was a significant difference between
famous-name targets preceded by self-associated face or famous-associated face
primes: t(20) = 3.810, p = .001. Specifically, famous-name targets preceded by
famous-associated face primes benefitted from faster RTs than those preceded
by self-associated face primes (self-associated primes M = 527.357, famous-
associated primes M = 492.333), see Figure 8.2. Means and SDs for all trial
types can be seen in Table 8.2.
Figure 8.2: There was a significant difference in RTs between famous-name targets
preceded by famous-associated primes and famous-name targets preceded by
self-associated primes.
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Table 8.2: Means (M), standard deviations (SD) and 95% confidence intervals for all trial types in the
Semantic Priming task.
Self-Face Self-Name Famous-Face Famous-Name
SAF Primes
M (SD) 507.169 (100.634) 484.974 (98.828) 518.348 (90.773) 527.357 (97.628)
95% CI [461.361, 552.977] [439.988, 529.959] [477.028, 559.667] [482.917, 571.797]
FAF Primes
M (SD) 494.833 (102.186) 488.283 (120.983) 521.471 (89.687) 492.333 (123.886)
95% CI [448.319, 541.348] [433.213, 543.354] [480.646, 562.297] [435.941, 548.726]
SAF = self-associated face, FAF = famous-associated face.
8.4 Discussion
Experiment 6 aimed to investigate the nature of the association created be-
tween a previously unfamiliar face and the self-representation in the Perceptual
Matching Task. Firstly, the Perceptual Matching Task was used to create an
association between the participant and an unfamiliar, gender-matched face.
Prioritised perceptual processing of the self-associated face, reflected in faster
RTs and higher accuracy, suggested that the self-associated face had been incor-
porated into the self-representation, becoming self-relevant. Next, a semantic
priming task was used to investigate the nature of the association created by
the Perceptual Matching Task. It was hypothesized that the self-associated
face, presented as the ‘prime’ stimulus in the semantic priming task, would fa-
cilitate recognition of self-related targets. The self-name and the self-face were
used as targets to investigate whether the newly associated face had only been
associated with the conceptual self-representation, as the results of Experiment
5 suggested, or also with the perceptual self-representation. The results of the
analysis on the semantic priming task did not show a semantic priming effect
between the self-associated face and either the self-face or the self-name. How-
ever, there was a semantic priming effect when the famous-associated face pre-
ceded the famous-name (but not the famous-face), suggesting that the famous-
associated face had been incorporated into the conceptual representation of the
famous individual.
It is surprising that the results of Experiment 6 show no semantic priming
effect by the self-associated face on the conceptual self-target. The results of the
Perceptual Matching Task in the current Experiment and the previous Chapter
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showed that the newly-associated face benefitted from prioritized processing,
reflected in faster RTs and higher accuracy. Sui et al. (2012) suggest that
prioritised processing is elicited for the self-associated stimuli once it has been
incorporated into the ‘self-template’, a rich schema of the self, based on self-
knowledge. Along these lines, self-prioritised processing of the self-associated
face in the previous chapter was suggested to reflect an incorporation of the
self-associated face into the conceptual self-representation. Furthermore, Sui et
al. (2013) identified that activation in areas of the brain associated with self-
representation, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC; Mitchell et
al., 2006; Northoff et al., 2006) correlated with presentation of self-associated
stimuli, providing further evidence that the perceptual matching paradigm leads
to the incorporation of the associated face into the self-representation. Because
of these previous results, in combination with the results of Experiment 5, which
suggested that the associated face was not incorporated into the perceptual self-
representation, Experiment 6 hypothesised that a semantic priming effect would
be elicited for conceptual-self information (the self-name) when it was preceded
by the self-associated face.
The results of Experiment 6 may suggest that the self-associated face was
not incorporated into either the conceptual or the perceptual self-representations.
They do, however, suggest that the famous-associated name was incorporated
into the conceptual representation of that individual. Famous name targets
were responded to significantly faster when preceded by famous-associated face
primes than self-associated face primes. This dissociation may be explained
by the differing nature of the conceptual representation of the self and the
other. Specifically, the Perceptual Matching Task may not be able to establish
a strong and lasting association between the self-associated face and the self-
concept due to the rich nature of the self-representation. When thinking about
the conceptual representation of the self compared with the representation of
a famous individual, information within the conceptual self-representation is
likely to be far more established, familiar, important, and reflect a far larger
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amount of information than the conceptual representation of any famous indi-
vidual (Andersen, Glassman, & Gold, 1998) Within this context, it is unlikely
that a face that has been seen for only a short period of time, with a very
arbitrary connection to the self, would be able to prime such well-established
aspects of the self-representation as the self-face and self-name. On the other
hand, the depth of the semantic representation of the famous individual is likely
to be far more shallow, reflecting a far smaller amount of information. Because
of this, the famous-associated face may be more easily assimilated into the con-
ceptual representation alongside the existing knowledge, able to semantically
prime the existing information related to that identity.
In light of this, it would be illuminating for future research to investigate
the longevity of the self-prioritisation effect observed for the stimuli associated
with the self in the perceptual matching paradigm. To date, research has only
investigated processing of the self-associated face during, and immediately fol-
lowing the perceptual matching paradigm (Sui et al., 2012; Sui & Humphreys,
2015), and there is no research to highlight how long the associated stimuli
benefits from prioritized processing after the initial association is formed. The
paradigm may result in a very transient and artificial association between the
self and the associated stimuli, outside of the context of any other self-related
information. If this is the case, it is less surprising that the self-associated
face in Experiment 6 was unable to prime well-established components of the
self-representation.
Further research could also benefit from designing a paradigm in which
a novel piece of information can be robustly incorporated into the concep-
tual self-representation. Experiment 5 aimed to investigate, in part, whether
changes to the conceptual self-representation could elicit changes in the percep-
tual representation of self. The results of Experiment 5 indicated that this was
not the case, however, the lack of a change in PSE following association with
the novel face may not have been due to a lack of modulatory links from the
conceptual self-representation to the perceptual self-representation, but rather
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because the association created between the novel face and the conceptual self-
representation was not strong enough to elicit such change. Investigating the
modulatory links between conceptual and body representations of self is be-
coming increasingly relevant for self-recognition and social cognition, and this
topic represents an area of study that would benefit from further empirical
investigation.
164
9 General Discussion
9.1 Summary of Background and Aims
The self is a multifaceted entity comprising conceptual (e.g. attitudes, per-
sonality) and perceptual (bodily) representations (Gillihan & Farah, 2005). In
light of the growing popularity of embodied accounts of social cognition (Gallese
et al., 2004), research into the cognitive and neural mechanisms underpinning
representations of the physical self is of importance not only for an understand-
ing of the self, but also wider social cognition. This thesis focuses specifically
on representations of the self-face, in light of the criticality of the self-face rep-
resentation for identity and awareness (Zahavi & Roepstorff, 2011; Povinelli &
Simon, 1998).
Currently within the literature there is not a clear understanding of the
processes that underpin the acquisition, maintenance and updating of self-face
representations. Studies of self-face recognition have typically focused on the
process of self-recognition, involving a comparison of behaviour (or neural activ-
ity) between the visual recognition of the self-face and other faces. Neuroimag-
ing research in particular has identified a large number of brain areas involved
in the visual recognition of the self-face (see Devue et al., 2007). This intro-
duces a number of gaps in the present literature. Firstly, there is little research
that has used noninvasive brain stimulation methods to causally investigate
the role of specific brain areas in self-face recognition (in comparison with us-
ing neuroimaging to investigate neural correlates). Secondly, the existing brain
stimulation research has only focused on the process of self-recognition, while
the neural underpinnings of self-identification and self-updating have yet to be
explored with noninvasive brain stimulation. The present thesis aimed to fill
these gaps by using tDCS to explore the causal involvement of specific brain
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areas in the processes of self-face recognition (self-identification, self-recognition
and self-updating). Three studies to date have used rTMS to implicate rTPJ in
the process of discriminating between one’s own and another’s face (Heinisch et
al., 2011, 2012; Uddin et al., 2006), and research with tDCS has also implicated
this area in higher-level self-other discrimination processes (Santiesteban et al.,
2012). The present thesis aimed to expand upon this research by using tDCS to
enhance cortical excitability in the right temporoparietal area, and investigate
the effects on self-recognition and social cognition. Based on research investigat-
ing the neural correlates of self-identification and self-updating in the Enface-
ment Illusion (Apps et al., 2013), and an exploration of self-updating in mirror
touch synesthesia (Maister et al., 2013), this thesis used tDCS to investigate the
roles of IPS and S1 in self-identification and self-updating. Additionally, the
focus of existing research into the mechanisms underpinning self-identification
and self-updating has focused on the integration of multisensory information,
informed by developmental research and bodily illusions. This thesis also aimed
to explore whether the self-face representation could be updated via changes
to the conceptual self-representation. Research suggests that changes to the
way the bodily self is perceived can lead to corresponding changes in the way
the self is conceptualised, but it is unclear whether modulatory links exist in
the opposite direction, from conceptual to bodily. The present thesis aimed to
investigate whether changes to the conceptual self-representation could elicit
changes in the way the bodily self is perceived. A perceptual matching task,
shown to rapidly create associations between novel stimuli and the self concept
(Sui et al., 2012), was used to incorporate a novel face into the conceptual self-
representation. Recognition of the self-face was tested following self-association
to investigate whether changes had occurred to the self-face representation.
9.2 Summary of Results
Experiment 1 investigated the role of the right temporoparietal area in self-
recognition using tDCS. Participants completed a well-established self-other
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face discrimination task (e.g. Heinisch et al., 2011, 2012) in which videos mor-
phed from the participant’s face into a familiar face, or the familiar face into the
participant’s face. Participants responded when they perceived that the face in
the video started to look more like the person it was morphing into. The task
was completed over two blocks, and in between the blocks participants received
either anodal, cathodal, or sham stimulation over the right temporoparietal
area, localised using the EEG 10/20 system. RT performance on the video
morphing task was converted to reflect the percentage of the self-face at the
point in the videos that participants discriminated between the self-face and the
other’s face. Anodal tDCS over the right temporoparietal area resulted in an in-
crease in the amount of self-face required to discriminate between self and other.
Cathodal and sham stimulation had no effect on self-other discrimination. The
finding supported previous research that had implicated the right TPJ in the
process of self-other discrimination with rTMS (Heinisch et al., 2011, 2012; Ud-
din et al., 2006). Furthermore, the findings of Experiment 1 expanded upon
previous research by providing evidence that the right temporoparietal area
may contribute towards self-other discrimination by maintaining the boundary
between the visual representations of self and other.
Experiment 2 aimed to expand upon the findings of Experiment 1 by in-
vestigating the role of the right temporoparietal area in mental body rotation.
Participants performed a task in which they had to mentally rotate their own
body to take the perspective of another person shown on screen. On half of
the trials participants saw an image of a close friend’s body, and on the other
half of trials participants saw a photo of their own body. Before completing the
mental body rotation task, participants received 20 minutes of either anodal
tDCS to the right temporoparietal area, anodal tDCS to the left temporopari-
etal area, or sham tDCS. Participants who received anodal tDCS to the right
temporoparietal area were significantly faster at taking the perspective of the
body shown on screen (regardless of identity) than both other tDCS groups
(left temporoparietal area and sham). Critically, there was no difference be-
tween tDCS groups on a similar control task in which participants did not have
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to perform mental body transformations. The findings provided evidence that
the right temporoparietal area is causally involved in imagined transformations
of one’s body position and location.
Experiment 3 investigated the role of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) in self-
identification and self-updating. The IPS receives multimodal input and has
recently been implicated in multisensory integration during the Enfacement
Illusion (Apps et al., 2013). Experiment 3 aimed to provide causal evidence for
the role of the IPS in multisensory integration for self-updating using tDCS.
Participants took park in three experimental sessions in which they first received
20 minutes of tDCS (anodal IPS, anodal PFC, or sham), and then took part in
a typical enfacement paradigm (self-recognition task > IMS > self-recognition
task). Changes in the self-face representation following IMS, measured using
the self-recognition task, were compared across the tDCS sessions. There was
no specific effect of any of the tDCS conditions on changes in the self-face
representation following IMS. The typical enfacement effect, an inclusion of
the IMS face in the self-face representation, was observed following IMS in all
tDCS conditions, regardless of synchronicity of the IMS session. The result may
reflect increased familiarity with the IMS face due to practice effects of the video
morphing self-recognition task, as participants took part in the task six times in
total over the three experimental conditions. The results suggested that it may
not be possible to facilitate self-updating by increasing cortical excitability in
only one brain region involved in the process, without also increasing excitability
in other areas of the network.
Experiment 4 investigated the role of the primary somatosensory cortex (S1)
in the processes of self-identification and self-updating. Based on research show-
ing that individuals with mirror touch synesthesia can experience enfacement
without receiving touch to their own face – but by experiencing synesthetic
touch while watching the enfacement face being touched, and research showing
that MTS-like symptoms can be induced in neurotypical individuals through
the application of anodal tDCS over S1, Experiment 4 aimed to induce symp-
toms of MTS with tDCS and investigate whether the induced synesthetic touch
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during a non-touch IMS session would be sufficient to cause a change in the self-
face representation. Participants took part in two sessions: in one they received
anodal tDCS over S1, and in the other they received sham tDCS. Each session
started with a morphed photo self-recognition task, followed by 20 minutes of
tDCS, a no-touch IMS session, and lastly a final self-recognition task. Perfor-
mance on the pre-tDCS and post-tDCS self-recognition tasks was compared to
investigate whether the self-face representation had been updated. The Inter-
personal Reactivity Index was also used to measure empathic ability, as the
experience of synesthetic touch appears to be linked with empathy. The results
showed no specific effect of tDCS on performance on the self-recognition task,
suggesting that the tDCS had failed to induce symptoms of MTS and lead to
updating of the self-face representation during the no-touch IMS session. The
results showed a similar change in self-recognition following the no-touch IMS
session across both tDCS sessions, in the direction typically observed following
the induction of a typical Enfacement Illusion. These results could suggest that
vicarious, ‘mirroring’ activation of the somatosensory system in response to the
observation of another person being touched are able to lead to self-updating
under certain circumstances.
Experiment 5 investigated whether the self-face representation could be up-
dated through the novel use of a self-association paradigm (Sui et al., 2012).
Participants completed a self-recognition task before and after associating an
unfamiliar face with themselves in a perceptual matching task. Prioritized per-
ceptual processing of the self-associated face, reflected by faster RTs and higher
accuracy, suggested the face had been successfully associated with the self and
had become self-relevant. Performance on the self-recognition task before and
after the perceptual matching task was compared to investigate whether self-
association with the novel face had an effect on the self-face representation. No
changes on the self-recognition task following self-association were observed,
suggesting that association of the self with a new face is not able to update the
stored mental representation of the self-face. Despite the fact that the associ-
ation did not have an effect on the bodily, perceptual self-representation, the
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prioritized processing of the self-associated face suggested that it been incor-
porated into the conceptual self-representation. It was suggested that changes
to the conceptual self-representation may not be able to elicit corresponding
changes in the perceptual self-representation.
Experiment 6 aimed to explore the nature of the association created be-
tween the self and an unfamiliar face during the perceptual matching task.
Based on the results of Experiment 5, it was suggested that the perceptual
matching paradigm creates an association between the self-associated face and
the conceptual self-representation, but not the perceptual self-representation.
Experiment 6 aimed to investigate whether this dissociation was true. Partic-
ipants completed the perceptual matching task, associating a previously un-
familiar face with themselves, as well as associating another unfamiliar face
with a familiar famous person. They then completed a semantic priming task,
in which prime stimuli were the self- and famous-associated faces, and target
stimuli were the actual face (perceptual) and name (conceptual) of the partic-
ipant and the famous person. The results of the priming task suggested that
the self-associated face had not been associated with either the conceptual self-
representation or the bodily self-representation. The results did suggest that
the famous-associated face had been incorporated into the conceptual represen-
tation of the famous individual.
9.3 Interpretation
9.3.1 The role of the right temporoparietal area in bodily self-
representation
The right temporoparietal junction (and encompassed right IPL) have been
implicated in self-recognition by previous research with fMRI (Apps et al., 2013;
Sugiura et al., 2005), and rTMS (Heinisch et al., 2011, 2012; Uddin et al., 2006).
One aim of the current thesis was to further explore the role of this area in the
process of self-recognition, described in the introductory chapter of this thesis
as the process by which a self-face representation is maintained, such that it can
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be compared with visual stimuli. Firstly, the results of Experiment 1 provide
causal evidence for the involvement of the right temporoparietal area in the
process of self-recognition. Experiment 1 showed that increased excitability in
the right temporoparietal area, induced with anodal tDCS, affects discrimina-
tion of the self-face from another familiar face. Additionally, when considered
in relation to previous brain stimulation research, these results are able to pro-
vide further insight into the mechanism that underpins the process of self-other
discrimination. Heinisch et al. (2011, 2012) and Uddin et al. (2006) both found
that, after stimulating rTPJ and rIPL respectively, with low frequency rTMS
to disrupt typical cortical functioning, participants accepted a face as their
own that contained a larger amount of another person’s face that before the
rTMS. In contrast, Experiment 1 increased cortical excitability in the right
temporoparietal area with tDCS and found that following stimulation, in a
similar self-other face discrimination task, participants accepted less of another
person’s face in the self-other morph when recognizing their own face. Taken
together these results suggest that the right temporoparietal area is involved in
maintaining a boundary between visual representations of self and other, and
that increasing coritical excitability in an area that underpins this mechanism
reduces the overlap between self and other representations.
The proposal that this mechanism may modulate overlap between represen-
tations of the self and other is interesting when considered in relation to Banissy
et al.’s (2009) neurocognitive model of MTS. Banissy et al. (2009) suggest that
MTS arises due to a dysfunction of the mechanisms that distinguish between
self and other, leading to the attribution of touch observed on others to the self.
They argue that there is not one dedicated module for discriminating between
the self and others, rather, discrimination of self from others relies on a number
of processes involved in linking visual representations with internal body mod-
els. Banissy et al. (2009) speculate that the mechanisms that give rise to the
synesthetic experience in MTS can be divided into three key processes. These
processes are involved in identifying what has been touched (the ‘what’ mecha-
nism), whether it is self or other that has been touched (the ‘who’ mechanism),
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and localising the observed touch onto the body (the ‘where’ mechanism). The
authors suggest that one of the brain areas potentially involved in the ‘who’
mechanism may be the IPL (encompassed within the right TPJ), and that over-
activity in this area and the right IFG may lead to the attribution of another’s
body parts into the self-body representation. The results of Experiment 1 in
the present thesis showed that increasing cortical excitability in the right tem-
poroparietal area led to a reduction in the amount of another person’s face that
was included in the self-face representation, supporting the idea that a dys-
function of this mechanism could lead to the attribution of another’s physical
features into the self-body representation.
Apps et al.’s (2013) neuroimaging study of the Enfacement Illusion sug-
gested that the rTPJ was involved in the experience of Enfacement. Activity
within the right TPJ was shown to vary parametrically with the reported sub-
jective strength of the illusion, specifically, a stronger subjective experience
was associated with a reduction in the magnitude of the BOLD response in
rTPJ. This was interpreted as reflecting increased overlap between the self and
the other, and thus a reduction in the extent to which the participant and
the enfacement individual were being processing as two distinct individuals.
Therefore, it appears that the involvement of the right temporoparietal area
in discriminating between self and other is not only important for the pro-
cess of self-recognition, but is also involved during self-identification and self-
updating. Much like the speculated role of self-other discrimination processes in
MTS, the right temporoparietal junction may contribute to self-identification
and self-updating by increasing the overlap between the observed face (either
a mirror-reflection of one’s own face, or another’s face as in the Enfacement
Illusion) and the stored self-face representation.
The results of Experiment 2 further extend the understanding of the role
of the right temporoparietal area in the representation of the physical self. In
Experiment 2, participants performed a mental body rotation task in which
they had to imagine themselves in the same spatial and anatomical position
as a person shown on screen. Typically in this task, participants are slowler
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to adopt the other’s perspective when the body position is more far removed
from the participant’s actual body position, as their own body representation
must be inhibited. Experiment 2 showed that following anodal tDCS over the
right temporoparietal area (relative to anodal over the left, and sham tDCS),
participants were faster to adopt the perspective of the person on screen. This
suggests that increased excitability in right temporoparietal area facilitated the
inhibition of the participant’s actual body representation, while facilitating the
representation of the other’s body.
9.3.2 The temporoparietal area in social cognition
It has been suggested that the rTPJ not only distinguishes between the
self and others at a physical, bodily level, but also that the same mechanisms
may be used to perform higher-level social cognitive processes in which dis-
tinctions between self and other representations must be maintained, such as
mental perspective taking and empathy (Decety & Lamm, 2007). Decety and
Lamm (2007) performed a meta-analysis of neuroimaging data spanning studies
of agency, reorienting of attention, empathy, and theory of mind. They found
substantial overlap in the activation within rTPJ during the performance of
both the low-level (e.g. attention reorienting, agency processing) and high-
level (e.g. theory of mind, empathy) tasks, suggesting that one mechanism
supports different levels of processing. This domain-general account of social
cognition proposes that higher levels of meta-cognition are supported by a low-
level computational mechanism involved in comparing internal representations
with external events. Spengler et al. (2009) directly tested this theory, provid-
ing neuroimaging evidence that mentalizing, agency processing, and imitative
control activate the same regions of rTPJ in the same participants. These find-
ings support a theory of embodied social cognition, in which higher-level social
cognitive processes such as theory of mind recruit the same neural mechanisms
as low-level body discrimination. Along these lines, Bird and Viding (2014)
propose a model of empathy that relies a switch from focusing on the self,
which they argue is the default state of the representational system, to focusing
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on the representation of the other’s mental state. Bird and Viding (2014) also
speculate that the location of this switching mechanism may be rTPJ.
Santiesteban et al. (2012, 2015) suggest that TPJ controls coactivated rep-
resentations of the self and other, and supports the ability to switch between
these representations, inhibiting or enhancing the representations of either in-
dividual depending on the task demands. This mechanism is required whenever
a task requires an individual to enhance their own perspective while inhibiting
another person’s, or vice versa. For example, when completing a visual perspec-
tive taking task, representation of the other’s perspective needs to be enhanced,
while one’s own conflicting perspective should be inhibited. On the other hand,
in a control of imitation task in which one must perform movements that are
incongruent with the movements of another person, one’s own body representa-
tion should be enhanced while representation of the other’s body (and actions)
should be inhibited. Across two tDCS studies, Santiesteban et al. (2012, 2015)
showed that both the left and right TPJ were causally involved in two tasks
requiring control over self and other representations, and that anodal tDCS
over these areas resulted in better performance in both tasks: one requiring
self-enhancement and other-inhibition (imitation inhibition), and the other re-
quiring other-enhancement and self-inhibition (perspective taking). Sowden et
al. (2015) has further supported the involvement of rTPJ in social cognition by
showing that anodal tDCS over rTPJ improved performance on a lie detection
task when the other individual expressed an opinion that was incongruent with
the participant’s own opinion. The authors suggested that anodal tDCS over
the rTPJ improved lie detection by inhibiting the participant’s own views while
enhancing those of the other.
This thesis has expanded upon the work of Santiesteban et al. (2012, 2015)
and Sowden et al. (2015) by showing that tDCS over the right temporopari-
etal area also affects representation of the self and other at the physical, bodily
level. Experiment 2 showed that 20 minutes of anodal tDCS over the right tem-
poroparietal area affected discrimination between one’s own face and the face of
another. Furthermore, Experiment 2 showed that the same type of stimulation
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facilitated the mental rotation of one’s body to take another’s spatial perspec-
tive. Experiment 2 also suggested that the process of mental body rotation is
lateralised to the right temporoparietal junction, as stimulation over the left
did not enhance performance during the task.
9.3.3 The neural underpinnings of self-identification and self-
updating
A further aim of this thesis was to use tDCS to explore the involvement
of brain regions in the processes of self-identification and self-updating. Previ-
ously, the majority of research had focused on the process of self-recognition,
neglecting the importance of self-identification and self-updating for the under-
standing of self-face recognition, and although research using bodily illusions
had shed some light on these two processes, there was a lack of brain stimulation
research. Experiments 3 and 4 aimed to provide some causal evidence for the
roles of S1 and IPS in self-identification and self-updating. Firstly, it is impor-
tant to note that neither of the two experiments found a specific effect of tDCS,
and secondly, the results of both experiments suggest that the self-recognition
tasks used to assess changes to the self-face representation following the En-
facement Illusion elicited practice effects. Or alternatively, that the increased
familiarity with the IMS face, as a result of seeing the face during the IMS
session, led to changes in the self-recognition tasks that mimicked those of the
typical enfacement effect. It is therefore difficult to use the results of these ex-
periments to inform the understanding of these two areas in self-identification
and self-updating. However, it is worth considering the reasons which could
explain the lack of stimulation specific effects.
Firstly, the results of Experiment 4 will be discussed. Experiment 4 aimed
to induce symptoms of MTS by increasing cortical excitability in S1 and thus
enhance the vicarious activation of the somatosensory system during the obser-
vation of touch, and investigate whether this vicarious activation was sufficient
to elicit changes in the self-face representation. Individuals with MTS can ex-
perience enfacement while watching a video of another person being touched,
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without receiving any touch themselves, suggesting that vicarious activation
of the somatosensory system during the observation of touch to another’s face
may be able to elicit a change in the self-face representation. The tDCS in Ex-
periment 4 was not successful at inducing a conscious experience of synesthetic
touch, or a change in the self-face representation. The results may reflect that
the neural basis of MTS extends beyond mere over-activation of the somatosen-
sory system in response to the observation of touch. Although the experience of
synesthetic touch may in part reflect over-activation of a somatosensory mirror
system, in which vicarious activation of the somatosensory cortex is heightened
in individuals with MTS compared with neurotypical individuals, the dysfunc-
tion of other mechanisms that distinguish between the self and other alongside
this enhanced mirroring of somatosensory experience appear to also be criti-
cally important to the experience of synesthetic touch (Banissy et al., 2009).
Without the dysfunction of mechanisms that distinguish between self and other,
even if vicarious somatosensory activation is increased with tDCS over S1 in
neurotypical individuals, it may not be attributed to the self as it is in MTS.
Experiment 3 aimed to investigate the involvement of the IPS in multi-
sensory integration during the Enfacement Illusion. It was hypothesized that
increasingly cortical excitability in IPS may enhance the strength of the Enface-
ment Illusion by facilitating the integration of multisensory information. The
results however showed no specific effect of the stimulation on the subjective
or objective strength of the illusion. This may reflect the fact that within the
process of self-updating, the IPS is one part of a large network that processes
incoming multimodal signals. As the IPS receives multimodal input, from mul-
tiple areas, it may not benefit from increased cortical excitability while previ-
ous areas within the network still have baseline levels of cortical excitability. In
other words, although cortical excitability may be enhanced in IPS, the areas of
the network that send information to IPS will still have typical levels of cortical
excitability, therefore, IPS is only able to process multimodal information at
the rate that it receives it from other areas in the network.
Chapter 9. General Discussion 176
9.3.4 Self-updating beyond multisensory integration?
A third aim of this thesis was to investigate whether the self-face represen-
tation could be updated by means other than multisensory integration. Ex-
periment 5 used a perceptual matching task to form an association between
participants and a novel face, and investigated, using a morphed images self-
recognition task, whether this association was able to alter the self-face repre-
sentation. The results showed that the association had no effect on the way
that participants perceived their own face. Considering the developmental tra-
jectory of self-face recognition, which develops upon a base of sensitivity to
multisensory contingency from birth, it is not entirely surprising that a mere
association formed between oneself and a previously unfamiliar face is not able
to alter the self-face representation, which is built upon repeated mirror expo-
sure throughout one’s whole life.
The results are more interesting when considered in relation to research
that has shown that changes to the self-body representation are able to elicit
changes in the conceptual, social self. For example, Banakou et al. (2013) used
virtual reality to create a sense of ownership over a child-like body in adult
participants. Ownership over the body caused participants to overestimate the
size of objects (compared to a baseline condition in which embodiment did not
occur), as well as cause participants to classify child-like attributes with them-
selves faster than adult-like attributes, suggesting the self-concept had become
associated with child-like features. Along similar lines, two experiments have
found that changes in body ownership are able to elicit changes in implicit atti-
tudes towards out-group members. Peck et al. (2013) conducted an experiment
in which white participants experienced embodiment over a dark-skinned body
in virtual reality, and Farmer et al. (2014) created the illusion of ownership over
a dark-skinned rubber hand with white participants using the RHI. Following
embodiment (over a whole body or a hand) both experiments found a reduc-
tion in implicit racial bias. The findings suggest that changes to the bodily
self-representation are able to change interpersonal attitudes, and this may be
due to the way the self is conceptualised. The group affiliation of the self may
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have been changed to match that of the racial-group of the embodied body (or
body part), changing implicit attitudes towards that group.
Maister et al. (2014) suggest that changes in the self-body representation
are able to lead to changes such as these through a process of self-association.
Firstly, the self-body representation incorporates the new body part, leading to
an increase in perceived similarity between the self and an out-group member.
Secondly, the new perceived similarity between the self and the out-group leads
to the association of the conceptual self-representation with the out-group, and
the extension of positive self-attitudes to this group. This proposed model
suggests that changes to the representation of the body can have a ‘bottom-
up’ effect on other aspects of the self – namely how the self is conceptualized,
leading to a change in social behaviour.
Currently, it is unclear whether there is a modulatory link between the con-
ceptual and bodily self-representations in the opposite direction. A ‘top-down’
process by which changes to the conceptual self-representation lead to corre-
sponding changes in the way one’s body is perceived. Experiment 5 aimed to
investigate whether changes to the conceptual self-representation could elicit
changes in the physical self-representation by creating an association between
the conceptual self and a novel face. A perceptual matching task (Sui et al.,
2012) was used to create the association, which has been shown to quickly create
a link between the self and a novel stimulus, making the stimulus self-relevant
(Sui et al., 2012, 2013). Neuroimaging research shows that the self-associated
stimulus activates areas of the brain associated with self-representation, pro-
viding evidence that the perceptual matching task establishes a link between
the self-associated stimulus and the conceptual self-representation (Sui et al.,
2013). Participants performed a self-recognition task before and after associ-
ating the novel face with themselves. Prioritised perceptual processing of the
self-associated face suggested that it had been incorporated into the conceptual
self-representation, however, no change in the self-face representation was ob-
served following association. These results may suggest that modulatory links
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between the physical and conceptual self-representations only exist in a bottom-
up direction, from physical to conceptual, and that changes to the conceptual
self-representation are unable to elicit corresponding changes in the way one
perceives their own body.
9.4 Limitations
9.4.1 Links between the bodily and conceptual self-representations
Chapter 7 explored whether changes to the conceptual self-representation
could cause corresponding changes to the physical self-representation. This the-
ory was drawn from research showing that changes in the way one’s body is
perceived can lead to changes in the way the self is conceptualized (Maister et
al., 2014). It was hypothesized that links in the opposite direction may exist,
however, Experiment 5 did not find evidence to support this. One reason may
be that the changes observed in these experiments following changes to the
bodily representation appear to affect the social self, that is, how the self is
perceived in relation to others. For example, when white participants experi-
enced ownership over a dark-skinned hand or a dark-skinned body, the change
in body representation affected implicit attitudes towards people of that racial
group (Farmer et al., 2014; Peck et al., 2013). The change in body representa-
tion leading to increased perceived similarity between the self and an outgroup
might not cause a change in the conceptual representation of the self, but rather
may only lead to a change in the way individuals from that outgroup are per-
ceived by changing the conceptual representations of that outgroup. Maister
et al. (2014) suggest that changes in social behaviour following experiences
of body ownership occur due to associations being created between the con-
ceptual representations of the self and the outgroup. This leads to positive
associations of the self being extended to the out-group – but, importantly, it
may not lead to any aspects of the outgroup representation being incorporated
into the conceptual representation of the self. Therefore, changes to the bodily
self-representation, increasing physical similarity between the self and another
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group, may affect perception and behaviour towards individuals of that group
by changing the way they are conceptualised, without affecting the way the
self is conceptualised. In summary, apparent links between the bodily and con-
ceptual self-representations may actually reflect modulatory links between the
physical representation of self and the perception of others, without affecting
the conception of the self.
9.4.2 Issues in the measurement of self-recognition
The results of Experiments 3 and 4 highlight that the tasks commonly used
to measure self-face recognition may suffer from practice effects. Both of these
experiments used within-subjects designs, with multiple experimental sessions
in which participants completed a self-recognition task two (Experiment 4) or
four times (Experiment 3) per session. These Experiments did not find any
specific effect of tDCS – which may be explained in part due to the lack of
spatial focality of tDCS, as explained in more detail in the next section – but
did find main effects of the timing of the administration of the self-recognition
tasks. This lack of a specific effect of tDCS, and main effects of timing of the
task even in the control (sham) sessions, would point to practice effects being
present in the self-face recognition tasks. The nature of both of the tasks used -
the video morphing, and the morphed static images – was very repetitive, and
as the same photo of the IMS individual’s face was used for all of the morphs, it
is likely that participants became familiar with the IMS face very quickly. They
may have therefore become better at discriminating between their own and the
other’s face as they became more practiced at the task, and thus the point at
which they discriminated between their own and the other’s face changed due
to familiarity with the other’s appearance, rather than a change in their own
face-representation.
In contrast, there is no evidence for a practice effect in Experiment 1, despite
the same self-recognition task being used in both Experiments 1 and 3. This
may be due to the fact that Experiment 1 used a between-subjects design,
and as such each participant only took part in one experimental session in
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which they completed the self-recognition twice, once before, and once after,
receiving tDCS. For Experiments 3 and 4, it was important to use within-
subjects designs, as both of these experiments used the Enfacement Illusion
to attempt to change the mental self-face representation. The extent to which
the enfacement paradigm is successful at eliciting the illusion varies between
individuals, and as such it was important to use participants as their own
controls by having them take part in all tDCS conditions. However, the repeated
use of the self-recognition tasks seems to have resulted in practice effects which
make it difficult to interpret the findings of these experiments. Or, alternatively,
the results could be due to increased familiarity with the IMS face from exposure
during the IMS session.
9.4.3 Lack of spatial focality of tDCS
TDCS applied using rectangular pad electrodes is considered to have rela-
tively poor spatial focality. Firstly, a portion of the stimulation never reaches
the cortex as it is dispersed by the scalp. Of the current that does pass through
the scalp, it is first conducted by the cerebrospinal fluid before passing through
into the brain. Once in the brain, the flow of the tDCS current is further influ-
enced by the tissue morphology of the brain under the electrode site. Datta et
al. (2009) used an MRI compatible tDCS device to model precisely the spread
and magnitude of the current induced by tDCS in the brain. They found that
tDCS induced by conventional 35cm2 electrodes resulted in diffuse modulation
of the cortical electric field, with the peak induced magnitude located away
from the site of stimulation, at an intermediate lobe.
Spatial focality can be improved in a number of ways. Firstly, reducing
the size of the electrodes used to apply the stimulation has been reported to
provide better spatial focality (Nitsche et al., 2007). Nitsche et al. (2007)
reduced the size of an anodal electrode used to stimulate the primary motor
cortex to 3.5cm2, relative to the conventional size of 35cm2, and found that it
reduced the dispersion of the current without diminishing the efficacy of the
stimulation. Kwon et al. (2008) also used a reduced electrode size of 7.07cm2 to
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successfully stimulate M1, observing the effects of the stimulation with fMRI.
However, it is also important to consider safety guidelines on the use of tDCS.
While neither of the above studies reported any adverse effects, suggesting that
the combinations of electrode size and current strength may be safe for use in
humans, both studies only applied stimulation for very short periods of time
(between 4-84sec), so it is of yet unclear whether such small electrodes would
be safe to use for extended stimulation periods (e.g. 20 minutes).
It has also been suggested that using a ring electrode configuration can re-
sult in more focal stimulation. Datta et al. (2009) compared the focality of
conventional rectangular electrodes with a 5 point ring electrode configuration,
and found that the ring electrode configuration resulted in a more focal mod-
ulation of the cortical electric field. They also observed that the peak induced
electric field magnitude was located directly underneath the stimulation site
when using the ring configuration, suggesting that the ring electrode configu-
ration can be used to provide more accurately targeted stimulation to brain
regions of interest. It is important to note that other research has suggested
that the focality of the ring electrode configuration can be negatively affected
by tissue anisotropy (Suh, Lee, Cho, Kim, & Kim, 2010), and so it is important
to consider this factor in models of tDCS stimulation.
Lastly, accurate placement of electrodes on the scalp is critical in achiev-
ing modulation of the cortical electric field in the desired region. All of the
experiments in the current thesis used the probabilistic approach of following
the 10/20 EEG system for localisation of brain regions. Preferably, individual
localisation in each participant using a structural MRI scan would be used,
but this requires each participant to take part in an MRI scan, which was not
feasible within the constraints of the research in this thesis. Sparing, Buelte,
Meister, Pausˇ, and Fink (2008) compared placement of a TMS coil that was
either guided by MRI data, or the 10/20 EEG system. Although neuro-guided
TMS resulted in the most accurate stimulation, the probabilistic approach was
shown to produce fairly consistent results, suggesting that it is an acceptable
method of localisation when neuro-guided navigation is not feasible.
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The Experiments in the present thesis attempted to follow, where possible,
the localisation methods of previous studies that had been successful at stimu-
lating the target regions with tDCS. Despite this, it is important to remember
that however precise the positioning of the electrodes on the scalp, the current
flow will always be influenced by the structure of the scalp and underlying brain
tissue. Because of this it is difficult to be sure of the spread of the stimulation
even when localisation on the scalp is accurate and consistent. It is therefore
unlikely that the stimulation used in the experiments in this thesis only mod-
ulated cortical excitability in the targeted regions. It would be insightful for
future research to use tDCS in combination with fMRI to gain an understand-
ing of which regions have been stimulated, and combine this with measures of
behaviour to provide a more accurate picture of the neural regions involved.
9.5 Future Directions
Future investigations should examine the relationship between the concep-
tual and the physical representations of the self. As discussed, in Experiment
5 a change in the conceptual self-representation did not cause a corresponding
change in the perceptual self-representation. However, as discussed above, links
between perceptual and conceptual aspects of self seem to play an important
role in the perception of others. Therefore, it would be interesting to investi-
gate whether changes in the way the self is conceptualized in relationship to
an outgroup could lead to changes in the way the self is perceived physically
in relation to that outgroup. It may be the case that perceived physical sim-
ilarity between the self and others is not only determined by actual featural
similarities, but is also mediated by perceived conceptual closeness, and that
by manipulating this sense of closeness, one can change the physical perception
of self. This could be explored experimentally by manipulating aspects of the
conceptual self to include aspects of the outgroup, and testing to see whether
the inclusion of conceptual aspects of the other in the representation of the self
can lead to an increase in the perceived physical similarity between the self and
members of that outgroup
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Further research is still needed to investigate the neural underpinnings of
self-identification and self-updating during multisensory integration. One pos-
sibility for further study would be to use rTMS to disrupt typical functioning
within IPS during the Enfacement Illusion. Anodal tDCS over IPS may not
be able to produce a measurable effect on the integration of observed and ex-
perienced tactile stimulation as the mechanisms underpinning integration may
already be processing at a ceiling level. rTMS on the other hand should be able
to demonstrate causality in this instance as it should disrupt the integration,
resulting in a disruption to self-updating.
Future research should additionally investigate whether changes in self-other
discrimination, induced by manipulations in cortical excitability within the tem-
poroparietal area, have an effect on attitudes and behaviour towards others.
The results of Experiment 1 show that the perceived level of physical overlap
between the self and another person is determined in part by activity within the
temporoparietal junction. This mechanism may also be involved in determin-
ing behaviour towards others by mediating this self-other overlap. As discussed
previously, research with bodily illusions has shown that increasing perceived
physical similarity with others can lead to more positive attitudes towards them
(Maister et al., 2014), which could suggest that an increase in overlap between
representations of the self and other, underpinned by a mechanism within the
temporoparietal junction, may play a role in shaping attitudes and behaviour
towards others.
9.6 Conclusions
This thesis investigated the neural and cognitive mechanisms underpinning
self-face representation. TDCS was used to investigate the causal involvement of
different brain regions in the processes of self-identification, self-recognition and
self-updating, and a perceptual matching task was used to investigate poten-
tial mechanisms for self-updating. It was found that the right temporoparietal
area plays an important role in self-recognition and distinguishing the self from
others, but also, in taking the physical perspective of others. It was speculated
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that this mechanism may contribute not only to self-recognition, but also self-
identification. It was also found that associating the self with a novel face is
unable to change the self-face representation, suggesting that the bodily repre-
sentations of self are grounded in multisensory experience, and that top-down
processes do not serve to update bodily representations of self.
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